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Abstract
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) is a technological revolution that is expected
to replace barcode systems in the future. RFID makes it possible to identify objects
without the need for physical or visual contact and has been used in the public domain
for several years now - in defense, logistics, retail shops, manufacturing, supply chain,
healthcare, pharmaceutical, aerospace and many other areas. Today, RFID touches
our everyday lives through RFID-enabled car keys, ePassports, clothing and electronic
items. Despite the organizational, economic, and social challenges, including the anti-
RFID campaigns by privacy advocates and activists, RFID continues to gain momentum
in various walks of life and plays a vital role in the service delivery process.
Themain motivation for this work is the various security and privacy concerns of RFID
systems that have been a huge obstacle to its large-scale implementation. Volumes of
work can be found by researchers from around the world proposing security protocols for
RFID. Yet, a systematic study of the existing literature revealed that there are many
gaps to be ﬁlled not just in terms of meeting the security and privacy requirements
but also from the design and functionality perspectives. Hence, addressing some of
these gaps form the primary objective of this research. The scope is limited to
developing security protocols for two vital functions of Multi-Tag Passive RFID Systems
viz., Grouping Proof and Ownership Transfer. The Electronic Product Code Class-1
Generation-2 (EPC C1G2) low-cost passive tags are speciﬁcally targeted for two reasons.
Firstly, it is challenging to develop protocols that meet the security requirements for
passive tags because they are highly resource constrained in terms of energy, storage and
computational abilities, which rules out the possibility of using one-way hash functions
or other complex encryption schemes. Secondly, overcoming the security challenges
successfully would enable large-scale implementation of RFID systems and consequently
gain more public acceptance in the process.
Grouping Proof in RFID is the ability to generate evidence of the simultaneous scanning
of more than two tags. It comes with some unique design requirements such as proving
simultaneity, creating dependence between tags, detecting illegitimate tags, preventing
race conditions, eliminating unwanted tag processing, completing the proof generation
within a pre-deﬁned time window and preventing denial-of-proof attacks. Existing work
in this area only partially addresses these design requirements. Further, the schemes that
target passive tags have been shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks. Further more,
none of the existing protocols verify the integrity of the messages received, thus making
them vulnerable to active-attacks and invalid proof generation. Forward security is an
open research issue in grouping proof and the existing protocols are also not resilient
to Denial-of-Proof (DoP) attacks from multiple illegitimate tags. This thesis addresses
all these important gaps in grouping proof. Hence, the proposed protocols are complete
both in terms of meeting the security/privacy requirements and also meeting the design
requirements.
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Ownership Transfer in Multi-Tag Multi-Owner RFID systems requires the communi-
cation capabilities of multiple tags to be transferred from the current owners to the
new owners. Multiple owners for a given set of tags means that ownership is shared
between owners. This does not necessarily mean zero or shared privacy with the other
owners. Any owner who shares ownership with others should still be able to maintain
privacy. This means that the owner’s communications/operations with the tags should
not be known to (or accessible by) other owners in the group. To my knowledge, current
multi-owner multi-tag protocols have not been designed to ﬁt the privacy-among-owners
model. Further, most existing schemes do not comply with the EPC C1G2 standard as
they use expensive hash operations or sophisticated encryption schemes that cannot be
implemented on passive tags. This thesis addresses all of these important gaps in multi-
tag multi-owner ownership transfer and also provides additional protection by hiding
the pseudo-random numbers during all transmissions using a blind-factor.
Finally, by combining the grouping proof and ownership transfer concepts in RFID,
a case study for RFID Enabled Currency is presented. Here, a revolutionary ap-
proach to paper currency is presented, in a way currency has not been looked at in this
angle to date. A very novel approach that defeats the purpose of counterfeiting and
detects counterfeits eﬀectively using RFID. Two scenarios are described and a protocol
for each scenario has been proposed. The ﬁrst scenario addresses the everyday cash
transactions of common users, where the number of banknotes involved are few. The
second scenario addresses bulk cash transactions where the number of banknotes could
be in millions. The signiﬁcance of these protocols is that they are the ﬁrst of their kind,
though previous attempts for RFID-enabled banknotes have been made from entirely
diﬀerent perspectives. A full-scale implementation of these protocols has a strong po-
tential to eradicate counterfeit currency, pick-pocketing and retail-store/bank
robberies which often end in fatal shootings, thereby saving precious human
lives and also possibly curtail money laundering to a considerable extent.
By implementing these protocols, individuals, businesses and the government would be
able to safely conduct cash transactions without worrying about counterfeit banknotes
or getting robbed/shot at (for this reason).
As the research targets only passive tags, the proposed protocols do not employ any
complex encryption schemes or hash operations on the tag side. Computations on the
tags are limited to simple XOR, MOD and 128bit PRNG operations. All complex
computations are performed by the server/reader which has the computational power
to carry out these operations. Thus, the protocols achieve compliance with the EPC
C1G2 standard. Formal security analysis has been carried out for all the proposed
schemes using security models that are widely accepted by the RFID research commu-
nity. The analysis shows that the protocols meet the necessary security requirements
of RFID systems. In order to study the scalability of the proposed schemes, the proto-
cols were implemented in a simulation environment using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2).
The results show the proposed schemes achieve acceptable system performance and are
practical to implement.
To summarize, the aim of this research is to develop security protocols for multi-tag
RFID environments that meet the necessary security requirements of RFID systems,
and which are compliant with the EPC C1G2 standard, thereby enabling large-scale,
secure and private implementation of RFID Systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter begins with an overview of the evolution of Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation
(RFID) through the 20th century. A brief note on the technical aspects of RFID provides
an overall picture of the diﬀerent modules involved in the architecture and how they
interact with each other. This is followed by a brief description of the properties of
Electronic Product Code Class-1 Generation-2 (EPC C1G2) RFID tags. A detailed
discussion is then presented on the need for security, the security issues and the required
security properties in RFID systems. After brieﬂy exploring the scalability challenges
in RFID, the multi-tag RFID environment is described and the concepts of Grouping
Proof and Ownership Transfer in RFID are introduced. The scope of this research is
then clearly outlined followed by the motivation for conducting this research. The key
research questions answered in this thesis are then highlighted and the chapter concludes
with a brief note on the thesis structure.
1.1 History of RFID
The history of RFID [130] can be traced back to World War II when several countries
started using radar technology discovered by Scottish Physicist Sir Robert Alexander
Watson-Watt in 1935. It was under Watson-Watt, the British developed the ﬁrst active
Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system which was used to warn about approaching planes
while they were still miles away. A transmitter was placed in every British plane that
would broadcast a signal back to ground that identiﬁed the aircraft as friendly. Advances
in radar and Radio Frequency (RF) communications continued through the 1950s and
1960s. Companies started commercializing anti-theft systems that used radio waves to
determine if an item had been paid for or not. Electronic Article Surveillance Tags used
today in packaging, have a one bit tag that is turned oﬀ if an item has been paid for.
If the item has not been paid for, the readers at the exit detect the tag and sound an
alarm.
The ﬁrst active RFID tag with rewritable memory was patented in the US by Mario
W Cardullo in 1973. In the same year, Charles Watson from California, US patented
a passive transponder that was used to unlock a door without a key. The Energy
Department of the US wanted to track nuclear materials and approached the Los Alamos
National Laboratory. To fulﬁll this need, the latter developed the concept of putting
transponders in trucks and placing readers at the facility gates. The antenna in the
reader would wake up the transponder in the truck and start exchanging data. This
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system was later commercialized in the mid 1980s. The lab also developed a passive
RFID system for the Agriculture Department to track cows. The system used Ultra
High Frequency (UHF) radio waves and the device drew energy from the reader and
reﬂected back a modulated signal using the backscatter technique. In the early 1990s,
IBM developed and patented a UHF RFID system that oﬀered a long read range of up to
20ft and faster data transfer. The patent was later sold to Intermac, a barcode systems
provider. UHF RFID received its boost in 1999 when the Auto-ID center was established
at the MIT. Two professors at MIT, David Brock and Sanjay Sarma, revolutionized
RFID technology in the supply chain arena by opening the possibilities of placing low-
cost RFID tags on all products to track them through the supply chain. The Auto-ID
Center gained momentum between 1999 and 2003 and it developed the Class 0 and Class
1 air interface protocols. The Electronic Product Code (EPC) numbering scheme and
the network architecture looks up the data associated with a tag on the internet. The
technology was licensed to Uniform Code Council which created EPCGlobal which then
ratiﬁed a second generation standard in December 2004.
Through this evolutionary process, RFID has come to be identiﬁed as a highly eﬃcient
Auto Identiﬁcation and Data Capture Technology (AIDC) [139]. Today, RFID has a
wide range of applications including but not limited to areas such as defense, logistics, re-
tail shops, manufacturing, supply chain, healthcare, pharmaceutical and aerospace. This
technology touches our everyday lives through RFID-enabled car keys, ePassports, cloth-
ing and electronic items. The US government has mandated the adoption of ePassports
using bio-metrically enabled RFID tags for 27 countries in the Visa-Waiver Program [98].
This widespread implementation was made possible mainly due to the development of
low-cost passive tags. Despite the organizational, economic, and social challenges, not
to mention the anti-RFID campaigns by privacy advocates and activists, this technology
continues to gain momentum in various walks of life and plays a vital role in the service
delivery process. On the other hand, various security and privacy concerns about RFID
systems have been a huge obstacle for their large-scale implementations. However, on
the positive side, it has motivated researchers to give more attention to developing se-
cure and private RFID systems. Volumes of work can be found by researchers from
around the world proposing security protocols for RFID, which signiﬁes the importance
and its potential market in the future. The global RFID industry was estimated to
be at USD 5.2 billion in 2008 [35],and USD 9.7 billion in 2013, with an annual growth
rate of about 15 percent [174]. By 2018, the projected growth is estimated to be more
than USD 25 billion [35]. The total volume of tags used worldwide was estimated to
be 10.6 billion pieces by 2011 of which 80 percent were UHF passive tags [174]. In the
foreseeable future, we may become dependent on RFID technology as we are on e-mail
and cell phones today [87].
1.2 RFID Architecture
The three key elements of an RFID system are the tags, readers and the back-end server.
Tags are devices physically attached to objects; readers (wired or mobile) recognize the
presence of tags in its range; and the server maintains all the crucial information about
the IDs for the tags, readers, their secrets, and information about the object attached
to the tag. Typically, the channel between a tag and the server/reader is wireless. The
wireless frequency used for communication are of two main categories: a) systems that
use a frequency of 13.56MHz, and b) systems that use a frequency of 860− 960MHz [4].
The communication range is greater for the latter and the information sent by the reader
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Figure 1.1: Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) Architecture
can be received up to a hundred meters. However, the information returned from the
tag to the reader is only a few meters at most. A typical RFID architecture is depicted
in Figure 1.1.
The key features of RFID include its indiﬀerence to physical contact between readers
and tags, and tag scanning out of direct line of sight [142]. A tag is typically made
up of an antenna for receiving and transmitting a radio-frequency (RF) signal and an
integrated circuit for modulating and demodulating the signal and storing and process-
ing information [142]. There are three types of RFID Tags - active tags, semi-active
tags and passive tags [89, 110, 141, 150]. Active tags have their own battery to power
its internal circuitry and transmission components; semi-active tags also have their own
power source which is only used for powering the internal circuitry but not for trans-
mission; passive tags have no internal battery to power themselves and they use the
electromagnetic signal from the reader as the power source. This makes the passive tags
highly cost-eﬀective thereby enabling large-scale application. However, they are highly
resource constrained and have very minimal capabilities in terms of functionality. Pas-
sive tags are classiﬁed as EPC C1G2 tags. A summary of the properties of EPC C1G2
tags is given below [45]:
• EPC C1G2 tags are passive, which means they receive power supply from the
readers.
• They communicate in the 860− 960MHz frequency and its communication range
is between 2− 10 meters.
• They support an on-chip pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) and Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC).
• As a privacy protection requirement, a passive tag is permanently disabled when
it receives a kill command with a valid 32bit kill-password.
• Read/Write operations to a tag’s memory are allowed but only in a secure mode.
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Tag Components: Seshabhattar et al. [139] describe the core components of a tag
as follows. The four major components of a EPC C1G2 compliant RFID tag are the
Antenna, the RF Front End (receiver and transponder), the Physical Layer (encoder and
decoder) and the Tag Identiﬁcation Layer. EPC C1G2 Protocol states that the Physical
Layer is mainly responsible for encoding and decoding the outgoing and incoming bit
stream respectively. The input to the Tag Identiﬁcation Layer comes from the Physical
Layer decoder, and is mainly centered around the operational Finite State Machine
(FSM) functionality. Other entities like Memory Banks, Slot Counter, Random Number
Generator and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) are also a part of the Tag Identiﬁcation
Layer. Security is integrated in this layer in order to make the communications secure.
Also, this layer requires a signiﬁcant amount of hardware resources over the physical
layer since it has more functions to perform. Figure 1.2 shows the high level architecture
of a EPC C1G2 Tag Identiﬁcation Layer. The architecture has seven major modules
categorized into three main sections.
Figure 1.2: High Level Architecture of EPC C1G2 Tag ID Layer [139]
• Command Detection Module: This module is responsible for receiving, decod-
ing and validating the command sent from the reader. The following sub-modules
incorporate the logic required for this. The Input Buﬀer Module collects the vari-
able number of incoming bits from the reader. The CRC Engine Module is made
up of a CRC-5 and CRC-16 engine, which ensures the validity of the reader to tag
commands.
• Control Unit: This forms the core component of the design and is responsible
for performing the necessary functions as speciﬁed by the operational state ma-
chines in the EPC standard. A Finite State Machine (FSM) controls the state
transitions of the tag and decides what response is sent from the tag, whereas the
Slot Counter randomly picks a slot for the tag to reply, depending on the most
recent Query/QuerRep/QueryAdjust command issued by the reader.
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• Response Module: Depending on the command issued by the reader and the de-
cision made by the FSM module, the response module backscatters the response
from the tag. The Random Number Generator (RNG) Module generates either
16bit or 64bit random numbers using a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR).
The Memory Module implements the four memory banks viz., EPC Memory, Re-
served Memory, Tag ID Memory and User Memory as speciﬁed in the EPC stan-
dard. The Output Buﬀer Module arranges the outgoing bits in order and sends
bit by bit at each rising edge of the clock to the Physical Layer encoder.
1.3 Security in RFID Systems
In this section, the discussion focuses on the need for security in RFID, the related
security issues and the required security properties for RFID systems to be secure and
private.
1.3.1 Need for Security
Agencies such as the Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering
(CASPIAN), the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) campaign against the use of RFID technology, especially in
retail environments due to security and privacy concerns arising from its use [120]. The
security and privacy threats in RFID systems discussed by Song and Mitchell [142]
clearly justify the anti-RFID sentiments of these agencies. A summary of these threats
is presented below [142]:
• Tag Information Leakage occurs when a tag is queried and it responds with an
identiﬁer. If an unauthorized entity captures and deciphers the information, he
may be able to access the private information related to a tag at a later time.
• Tag Tracking: If the responses from a tag can be linked to its previous responses
or distinguishable from other tags’ responses, then the location of a tag could
be tracked. This is also known as compromising the location privacy of the tag
and by extension, the tag-holder. For example, consider a tag attached to a
passport. If an unauthorized reader obtains a constant reply from the tag he
can use that information to track the movements of the holder of the tag. Even
though the contents may not be deciphered by the adversary, he can still compare
the tag’s replies at diﬀerent locations and times. When the same tag reply is
obtained in two diﬀerent locations, the adversary can infer the person holding
the passport has been to those two locations. Thus, the location privacy of the
individual is compromised. This attack can also be conducted by sending Intended
or Meaningless Requests [28] to the tags. Here, an adversary transmits intended
or meaningless requests to a tag instead of eavesdropping on the communication.
The weaknesses in some protocols enable the adversary to anticipate the response
message of the tag. In turn, this can be used to perform location tracking or
conduct traﬃc analysis.
• Tag Data Manipulation is where a malicious RFID reader can either corrupt or
manipulate the data in a tag to suit the attacker’s needs.
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• Tag Spooﬁng is where a fake tag imitates a genuine tag. For example, a valid item
could be manipulated to have a fake label or the label of an expensive item could
be replaced with a fake one with low pricing.
• Tag Cloning creates a clone of one or more legitimate tags to overcome counterfeit
protection mechanisms such as those used in passports and drug labels.
Classifying Attackers and Attacks: Attackers on RFID systems can be classiﬁed as weak
attackers (WA) and strong attackers (SA). A WA is a malicious entity that can observe
and manipulate communications between a server and a tag but does not have the ability
to compromise a tag. A SA is a malicious entity who can compromise a tag in addition
to having the abilities of WA. Kulseng et al. [87] classify them as active attackers who
could also jam the wireless communication, send out bogus messages and can probe the
wires of the tag to learn the tag secrets or copy all the information from one tag to
another. A weak attacker (WA) has the ability to conduct the following attacks:
• Tag Impersonation Attack: The WA could impersonate a tag to a server and be
authenticated by it.
• Replay Attack: The WA could capture messages exchanged between a server and
a tag using eavesdropping attacks and replay them at a later time without being
detected. They may also be successfully authenticated. Kulseng et al. [87] classify
them as passive attackers who can use the captured information to ﬁnd secrets in
other messages by utilizing bit manipulation or other oﬄine methods.
• Man-in-the-Middle Attack: The WA could insert, modify or delete the messages
sent between a server and a tag.
• DoS Attack: The WA blocks a message between a server and a tag to cause a
desynchronization of keys between the two entities. The entities are thus unable
to authenticate each other in the future runs, thereby causing a DoS attack. Two
kinds of DoS attacks are noted in [187] that are common to RFID environments.
The ﬁrst is the ﬂooding attack, where the attacker sends more data than the system
can handle causing radio frequency jamming. The second kind of attack is where
an attacker forges or tampers messages that will cause a legitimate tag not being
authenticated by the server.
Attacks on RFID systems fall under two main categories [4].
• The ﬁrst concerns attacks that aim to disrupt the functioning of the system ( a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack for example). Tag Killing which is aimed at cutting
the functionality of the tags when deactivation is necessary (e.g., demand from
the customer at the point-of-sale), is a concern for both the companies and the
customers [74]. This idea protects the customers when properly used by giving
them the privacy they need. However, an adversary can use it maliciously to
cause DoS attacks thus making the tag useless and inoperative. Lei and Cao [92]
address the tag killing problem by adding complexity to the tag. The solution
requires additional PRNG function and chip area for storing a random number.
In addition, the identiﬁer is concatenated with the random number prior to hashing
which causes the hash function to run twice. This results in slowing down even
commonly performed tasks such as reading a tag and it also increases the energy
consumption of the tag thereby questioning the feasibility of the solution as pointed
out by Trcek and Kovac [153] and also Feldhofer and Wolkerstorfer [49].
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• The second category of attack relates to privacy which includes both information
leakage and traceability mainly arising from eavesdropping the communication
between the reader and the tags. An adversary can use the captured information
to replay the messages later, to learn the tag’s ID and to track its location.
Three types of tag tampering attacks are discussed Sandhya and Rangaswamy [136]:
• Stream Tamper: In RFID, data is treated as a continuing stream rather than
discrete data. Streaming data is usually delivered over a wireless network or other
unreliable networks, which provide room for attackers to easily inject malicious
data into the stream.
• Electronic Pedigree Tamper: Regulatory agencies have implemented provisions
that require pedigree for products in an attempt to ensure only authentic prod-
ucts are distributed through the supply chain. An item’s electronic pedigree plays
an important role in detecting counterfeit, inventory management and more. Tam-
pering of pedigree data is one vital area that adversaries focus on.
• Object Naming Service (ONS) Data Tamper: According to EPC Global [45], ONS
is like Domain Naming Service (DNS) in comparison, and all security threats
associated with DNS are also applicable to ONS.
Relay attacks [182, 183] is deﬁned as the round-trip time taken by messages between
any two entities. A relay attack takes place when an attacker simply relays the messages
between an honest reader and honest tag with or without the knowledge of the other
party. Measuring this time requires extremely sensitive devices especially where the
distance is very small (a few centimeters to a few meters at the most) which makes it
extremely diﬃcult to identify latency. But if the tagged items are sensitive enough that
security cannot be compromised in any way, then the protocols that are vulnerable to
relay attacks could not be used as is. Imran et al. [47] suggest the use of random time
delays to handle relay attacks.
The above notes clearly justify the need to improve security in RFID systems. Let
us now see how the above-mentioned threats aﬀect some of the most commonly used
functionalities of RFID systems.
1.3.2 Security Issues
Security issues in passive tags arise from the computational constraints of the passive
tags which limits the cryptographic techniques that could be used when building security
protocols. Passive tags also suﬀer from some additional built-in weaknesses. They can
broadcast information when powered and queried by a reader without the tag owner
knowing this has occurred [51]. Also, most of them can transmit a static serial number
in response to a reader’s query thus allowing tracking of the tags and by extension,
the tag-holder. Traceability problem is considered as the biggest security challenge to
the general acceptability and wide-scale deployment of RFID technology [98]. Hence,
the security protocols built for passive RFID systems should take these weaknesses into
consideration, so attacks on these systems can be thwarted. Further, the lack of a
universal model for designing and analyzing RFID protocols adds to these challenges
[4]. The security issues faced in some commonly used RFID functionalities are presented
below.
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Mutual Authentication: The reader to tag identiﬁcation and authentication scheme pro-
posed by EPC Global is shown in Figure 1.3. Molnar et al. [112] argue that mutual
authentication creates signiﬁcant overhead for many RFID applications. This is due to
the fact that in most cases the purpose is only to know the tag’s ID and mutual authen-
tication incurs an unnecessary high performance overhead. It is noted that many RFID
systems do not authenticate the tag which makes it easy for attackers to impersonate
tags. This allows an attacker to mislabel goods for illegal gains such as causing an expen-
sive item to be reported as a cheap one at the time of check out. Our recent EPC C1G2
compliant secure mutual authentication protocol [38] addresses these security concerns
without incurring performance overhead.
Figure 1.3: Reader-Tag Identiﬁcation/Authentication Scheme from EPCGlobal [45]
Tag Search: The ability to search for a particular tag among a group of tags is a
commonly required functionality for many RFID systems. One typical example is, a
warehouse storing hundreds of thousands of items and the store manager wanting to
locate a speciﬁc item. A tag search comes with a unique security problem [150]. It is
common practice to use random numbers to generate diﬀerent responses each time to
prevent tracking problems. While this technique works well in authentication protocols,
it does not solve the problem in a tag search. If an adversary can capture messages (a
search query in this case) by eavesdropping on the transactions between a reader and
a group of tags, he can broadcast the same search query to the group at a later time.
Due to the search query being legitimate, the tag will reply. Even though it uses a
diﬀerent random number to generate a diﬀerent response each time, there can be only
one response since each tag has its own unique ID. Even if the attacker is not able to
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decipher the contents of the reply, he will know the tag responded and hence track the
tag. As noted in [150], the very act of replying to a query can be used to identify a tag.
Also, there is some level of over dependency on a response message from a tag on a
random number [28] to prevent an adversary from conducting traﬃc analysis or a brute-
force attack. This is because the random numbers used in the operations are usually
exposed during the transmission. Our recent EPC C1G2 compliant secure tag search
protocols [146, 147, 148] address these issues. The use of noise tags in our protocols
prevent tracking attacks and the random numbers are not sent in the clear but hidden
during transmission using a blind-factor. Thus, an adversary stands to gain nothing by
conducting traﬃc analysis attacks.
Grouping Proof: This functionality requires the simultaneous scanning of three or more
tags. Secret key synchronization between the server and the tags and providing “forward
security” are some of the typical challenges in this area, especially when the server is
oﬄine. The Ownership Transfer functionality requires that the control of a tag (or a
set of tags) is transferred from the current owner(s) to the new owner(s). Satisfying
both current and new owners’ privacy and providing individual owner privacy are some
of the typical challenges in this area. As the grouping proof and the ownership transfer
areas form the core components of this thesis, the security/design challenges in these
areas are covered in more detail in Section 1.6.1.
Let us now focus on the security issues in other areas of RFID. Gasson [54] conducted
an interesting experiment with an implantable RFID tag infected with a virus. Through
the experiment, successful infection of computer systems via the spread of the virus from
the tag was demonstrated. It is claimed that the author may have been the ﬁrst human
infected with a computer virus. A glass capsule sized tag HITAG S 2048 infected with
a malicious code was implanted in the hand of Gasson and his mobile phone was RFID
reader enabled. The malicious code was written in such a way that instead of simply
reading the data, it also executed some SQL injection code which successfully damaged
the user’s proﬁle information with further payloads. Through this experiment, the
author highlights that implantable devices have evolved to the point where they should
be treated as small computers and close attention should be paid to security issues.
Thiesse et al. [152] point out some security/privacy issues such as injection attacks,
eavesdropping and DoS attacks which could compromise the security of the system.
Also, the ability to permanently save and link information about individuals through
temporal and spatial extension of data collection activities raise privacy concerns.
Hawrylak et al. [63] address several security risks associated with using RFID in health-
care. Threats to patient privacy and safety arise from interception of messages, interrup-
tion of communication, modiﬁcation of data and fabrication of messages and devices. In-
terception can be carried out by wireless sniﬃng (eavesdropping) and man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks. The former is where an attacker simply listens to the communication
between tags and the reader attempts to retrieve the information. MITM attacks are
even more diﬃcult to detect because they overcome a number of security issues. In a
relay attack, an attacker uses a fake reader and a fake tag to extend the range of a
legitimate reader and a legitimate tag. Several distance bounding protocols have been
proposed to solve relay attacks but they do not oﬀer complete protection as they can be
defeated using a modiﬁed transmitter. Interruption attacks are accomplished by jam-
ming the network and blocking reader-tag communication. Some methods include tag
killing, energy draining and interference of RF noise with any RFID signals using rogue
devices. Currently, only physical security oﬀers the best defense, however monitoring
for abnormal conditions does add some value but does not entirely solve the problem.
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Modiﬁcation attacks focus on maliciously modifying the information in the RFID sys-
tem by performing injection attacks. Counter-measures such as mutual authentication,
encryption, and challenge-response methods are suggested. Fabrication attacks use a
separate device to inject false information into the system. Cloning is one type of attack
where an attacker reads the data from the legitimate tag and writes the data to a coun-
terfeit tag. As a counter-measure, a strong authentication scheme such as the two-factor
authentication scheme is suggested. The authors note that while counter-measures do
exist, some are too costly to be implemented in low-cost systems.
The above notes make it apparent that security and privacy are the biggest concerns
in RFID systems. This emphasizes the need for continued research in the area,with the
goal to build protocols that are resistant from the security/privacy attacks discussed in
Section 1.3.1.
1.3.3 Required Security/Privacy Properties
Over the years, researchers from around the world have made valuable suggestions and
contributions to improve security/privacy in RFID. As a result, many security/privacy
properties speciﬁc to RFID have been identiﬁed. A summary of these required secu-
rity/privacy properties for RFID systems is presented below as deﬁned in [43, 123, 142,
171]:
• Tag Anonymity : The protocol should protect against information leakage that
can lead to disclosure of a tag’s real identiﬁer. This is important as otherwise an
attacker may be able to clone a valid tag.
• Tag Location Privacy : The protocol should ensure that the message contents are
suﬃciently randomized to make certain they cannot be used to track the location(s)
of the tags and thereby glean social information about the wearer of the tag.
• Forward Secrecy : The protocol should ensure that on compromise of the internal
secrets of the tag, its previous communications cannot be traced by an attacker.
This requires that previous messages are not dependent on current resident data
on the tag.
• Reader Anonymity : The protocol should protect against information leakage that
can lead to disclosure of a reader’s real identiﬁer. This is important as otherwise
an attacker may be able to clone a valid reader.
• Reader Location Privacy : The protocol should ensure that the message contents
are suﬃciently randomized to make certain they cannot be used to track the
location(s) of the readers and thereby glean social information about the owner.
• Forward Untraceability : This security property applies only to ownership transfer
protocols. Once ownership of a tag has been transferred to a new owner, only
the new owner should be able to identify and control the tag thereby providing
privacy for the new owner. Similarly, the new owner should not be able to trace
past transactions between the tag and its previous owner thereby providing privacy
for the old owner. In some special cases (e.g., an after sales service) it may be
necessary for the old owner to temporarily recover the means to interact with the
tag. In such cases, the current owner should be able to transfer the rights of the
tag to the previous owner thereby providing authorization recovery feature.
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• Replay Attacks : The protocol should be able to resist compromise by an attacker
through the replay of messages collected by an attacker during previous protocol
sequences. This requires that the protocol messages in each round of the protocol
are unique.
• Desynchronization Attack : The protocol should be able to recover from incom-
plete protocol sequences that can occur due to an attacker selectively blocking
messages. Importantly, such blocking of messages by an attacker should not lead
to desynchronization between the tag and the server/reader.
• Server Impersonation: The protocol should ensure that the server cannot be im-
personated by an attacker. This requires the tag/reader challenges a server to
prove its legitimacy thereby achieving mutual authentication.
• Active Attacks : In my opinion, protocols should be resistent to active-attacks,
especially where an adversary has the ability to modify messages during com-
munication. This allows for the integrity of the messages to be veriﬁed by each
entity involved in the protocol to ensure messages are not tampered with during
transmission.
Security protocols satisfying privacy properties such as the tag anonymity and tag lo-
cation privacy protect the systems from threats described in Section 1.3.1 such as the
information leakage, tracking, data manipulation, spooﬁng and cloning. Security proto-
cols satisfying attack properties such as the replay, desynchronization and impersonation
protect the systems from threats from weak attackers as described in Section 1.3.1. Secu-
rity protocols satisfying the forward secrecy property, protect the systems from threats
from strong attackers as described in Section 1.3.1, where the attacker has the ability to
physically tamper the tag. As mentioned in Section 1.3.2, providing forward secrecy in
grouping proof is a challenge due to the oﬄine nature of the server. Security protocols
speciﬁc to to ownership transfer, that satisfy the forward untraceability property, provide
privacy for both the old and new owners as described in Section 1.3.2. It is important
to note that the above security/privacy properties are common to most RFID systems.
Security protocols designed for RFID systems should meet all of the above-mentioned
properties to make them robust and secure.
1.4 Scalability in RFID Systems
Scalability in RFID is the ability to handle the increasing number of tags in a system
without a noticeable diﬀerence from the end users’ perspective. The inability of a back-
end server to recognize a tag due to excessive growth in computational complexity can
be described as follows [28]: If tag identiﬁcation by the back-end server has excessive
computational complexity, the eﬃciency of the overall system declines thereby making
the protocol unrealistic for realtime applications. Ohkubo’s et al. [116] protocol is an
example of this, where the protocol is secure but has low eﬃciency. It is typical of a
system to use pseudonyms to provide anonymity to tags. This means that whenever a tag
is queried, it responds with a diﬀerent cryptographically derived pseudonym. Further,
in many systems, a back-end server performs a linear search of its database to identify a
tag. For each tag entry in the database, its pseudonym is computed and compared with
the one received to see if there is a match. Such linear search runs in O(n) time where n
is the number of tags in the system and O(n) refers to order of n. Such a costly search
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function can potentially result in scalability issues as the number of tags increase. As
a result, some of the schemes that use pseudonyms use look-up tables to match a value
with the one received. This means the cost associated to identify a tag is only O(1),
thereby taking a constant time without the need for a linear search.
A scalable RFID system should be able to handle a large number of tags without undue
strain on the system, and the protocol should therefore avoid any requirement for work
proportional to the number of tags. This research shows that the proposed protocols are
not only secure, but also they are scalable and practical for large scale implementations.
Scalability of the proposed schemes is shown using the Network Simulator-2 (NS2), a
tool that is widely used for measuring end-to-end authentication delays and network
delays.
1.5 Scope of the Research
RFID security and privacy research is broadly categorized into two areas [150]. The
ﬁrst is protocol-based, which emphasizes designing protocols using lightweight primi-
tive cryptographic techniques. The second category is an orthogonal approach to RFID
security that focuses on changing the physical hardware of the tag itself, thus making
it capable of performing public key based authentication using Elliptic Curve Cryp-
togrpahy (ECC). This thesis falls under the ﬁrst category in a multi-tag passive RFID
environment. A passive tag environment is portrayed in Section 1.2 and a description
of the multi-tag platform is presented below.
1.5.1 Multi-Tag Environment
A single-tag RFID environment is where only one tag is involved at a time in a protocol
run. Some typical examples are a RFID-enabled ePassport, where only one tag is associ-
ated with any individual and RFID-enabled car-keys where only one tag communicates
with the reader to perform the intended operation. Tag Search and Mutual Authentica-
tion are common single-tag functionalities in RFID. On the other hand, multi-tag RFID
environments involve two or more tags participating in the protocol run at the same
time. Grouping Proof and Ownership Transfer are some typical examples of a multi-tag
environment and the research is limited to these two functionalities.
Grouping Proof: The ability to generate evidence that two tags have been scanned
simultaneously is known as “Yoking Proof” [77]. This concept has since then evolved
to “Grouping Proof” where more than two tags are involved. Grouping proof has its
applications in hospitals, military, manufacturing, pharmaceutical industry and in many
other areas. Grouping proof protocols generally operate in two modes viz., oﬄine and
online. In the former, the server (veriﬁer) that veriﬁes the proof does not actively
participate in the protocol run. The readers are entrusted to run the protocol and send
the proof to the server at a later time for veriﬁcation. The design and security challenges
in grouping proof are discussed in detail in Section 1.6.1.
Ownership Transfer: This functionality requires that control (i.e., communication
capabilities) of a tag is transferred from the current owner(s) to the new owner(s). For
example, objects change hands frequently in diﬀerent stages of a supply chain from man-
ufacturing, to distribution, to warehousing, to retailing, to end-customers. Ownership
transfer can be classiﬁed into three major types: a) transferring a single tag from the
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current owner to a new owner; b) transferring multiple tags from the current owner to a
new owner; and c) transferring multiple tags from a group of current owners to a group
of new owners. The design and security challenges in ownership transfer are discussed
in detail in Section 1.6.1.
1.5.2 Scope Outline
The scope of the research can be summarized as follows:
• The primary goal is to design security protocols using lightweight cryptography in
multi-tag RFID environments.
• The protocols are targeted for EPC C1G2 passive tags to enable large-scale im-
plementation.
• The functionalities are limited to two widely used vital functions of RFID systems
viz., grouping proof and ownership transfer.
• In grouping proof, the scope is limited to oﬄine protocols since online grouping
proof protocols are more close to mutual authentication protocols. In ownership
transfer, the multi-tag multi-owner environment is addressed ﬁrst. The proposed
protocol is generic in nature and can be used in a variety of applications. It comes
under the above-discussed third category of transferring ownership of multiple
tags from multiple current owners to multiple new owners. Then, a case study is
presented for RFID-enabled currency. This protocol is speciﬁc to this application
and it comes under the above-discussed second category of transferring ownership
of multiple tags from one current owner to one new owner.
• The implementation of the proposed protocols is limited to a simulated environ-
ment and the physical implementation is out of scope for this research. However,
I intend to develop a prototype of the proposed protocols as part of the future
work.
1.6 Motivation for the Research
There are several gaps in grouping proof and ownership transfer in terms of protocol
design, security and EPC compliance, and it is imperative that these gaps are addressed.
The motivation to conduct the research in these two areas is because many existing
approaches to grouping proof and ownership transfer are:
a) incomplete in terms of not meeting the unique design requirements of the function-
ality itself.
b) vulnerable to one or more attacks and do not meet the required security/privacy
properties as deﬁned in Section 1.3.3.
c) not compliant with the EPC C1G2 standard for passive RFID tags due to the use
of hash functions or other complex encryption schemes.
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1.6.1 Design & Vulnerability Factors
The grouping proof and the ownership transfer functionalities of RFID have some open
research issues, unique design requirements and some security challenges which are ad-
dressed in this research. They can be summarized as follows:
• Grouping Proof comes with some unique design requirements, such as proving
simultaneity, creating dependence between tags, detecting illegitimate tags, pre-
venting race conditions, eliminating unwanted tag processing, preventing denial-
of-proof attacks and completing the protocol within a pre-deﬁned time window.
Existing work in this area only partially addresses these design requirements. Fur-
ther, the schemes that target passive tags have been shown to be vulnerable to
certain attacks. Further more, none of the existing protocols verify the integrity of
the messages received, thus making them vulnerable to active-attacks and invalid
proof generation. Due to the oﬄine nature of the veriﬁer, synchronizing the secret
keys between the veriﬁer and the tags becomes a major challenge. If the keys get
desynchronized, it could lead to DoS attacks. Forward security is an open research
issue in grouping proof [123] and existing protocols are not resilient to Denial-of-
Proof (DoP) attacks from multiple illegitimate tags. This thesis addresses all of
these important gaps in grouping proof.
• Ownership Transfer comes with some unique security/privacy challenges. The
ownership transfer process should ensure that only the new owners are able to
interrogate the tag and that previous owners are prevented from communicating
with the tag. It is also important that the new owners are unable to compromise
previous communications of the tag. It is therefore imperative that ownership
transfer schemes prescribe the privacy of both the new and old owners of the tag.
Typical ownership transfers involve transferring one tag at a time but there can be
cases where multiple tags belong to one object (a car for example, can have tags
for the engine, tyres, doors, and music system), all of which have to be transferred
together to the new owner. There are also situations where the ownership of tags
has to be shared among diﬀerent owners. For example, a shared family car where
the multiple tags in the car are shared with the multiple owners. Shared ownership
does not necessarily mean zero or shared privacy with other owners. Any owner
while sharing ownership with others should still be able to maintain privacy. In
other words, his communications/operations with the tags should not be known to
(or accessible by) others in the group. To my knowledge, the existing multi-owner
multi-tag schemes have not been designed to ﬁt the privacy-among-owners model
and they have also been shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks. This thesis
addresses these important gaps in ownership transfer.
1.6.2 EPC C1G2 Compliance Factors
One common assumption made in developing RFID protocols is that tags are (or will be
in the near future) capable of executing cryptographic hash functions [150]. Currently,
most commercial RFID tags (speciﬁcally the passive tags) do not provide this capability
mainly due to the higher production cost. While passive tags with suﬃcient hardware
capabilities are yet to be a reality, providing security within the limited capabilities is
quite challenging. This is because passive tags are highly resource constrained in terms
of energy, storage and computational abilities. This rules out the possibilities of using
one-way hash functions or other complex encryption schemes.
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Many of the existing schemes in both grouping proof and ownership transfer do not com-
ply with the EPC C1G2 standard for passive RFID tags because they use hash functions
which require 8K to 10K gates [87]. Passive tags can accommodate roughly 3K gates to
implement security features [40, 87] which is also insuﬃcient for standard cryptographic
techniques such as RSA [79]. Although cheaper cryptographic alternatives such as El-
liptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is suggested as a good replacement for RSA-based
public key cryptosystems. ECC is an asymmetric key system based on elliptic curves
in ﬁnite ﬁelds and are much more eﬃcient than RSA [120]. A 160bit ECC oﬀers the
same level of security as a 1024bit RSA encryption. But the implementation of ECC
would still require between 8.2K and 15K equivalent gates [6, 91]. Complex encryption
methods such as AES take up to 3400 gates [48]. A hash function requires additional
gates to be implemented in the tag that would raise its overall cost. Common hash
functions such as MD4, and SHA256 require between 7350 and 10868 additional gates,
where passive tags can accommodate roughly 3K gates to implement security features
[38, 70, 87]. Bolotnyy and Robin [10] discuss the possibility of using Physically Unclon-
able Functions (PUF) in the tags that require only 545 gates. However,the downside
is that they are diﬃcult to analyze as they are inﬂuenced by the physical environment.
Another major drawback of PUF is that it can produce ﬂuctuating results based on
operating conditions [87]. Thus, the large-scale implementation of PUF is yet to be a
reality and remains an open problem.
Moreover, the EPC standard limits security operations in passive tags to 16bit CRC
and 16bit PRNG. As the 16bit PRNG is vulnerable to brute-force attacks, the proposed
protocols use 128bit PRNG which is provably secure and requires less than 2K gates
[90, 145, 146]. This is a signiﬁcant advantage considering the limitations of passive tags.
While Avoine [4] argues that ensuring privacy in RFID without using any cryptographic
functions is only a pipe dream, my opinion is that, while it may be challenging to achieve
privacy in passive environments, it certainly need not be a pipe dream. In this thesis,
it is shown that by using lightweight operations such as the 128bit PRNG, XOR and
MOD, both security and privacy in RFID systems can be made a reality. In addition,
transmitting the secret keys during the protocol run using some encryption technique is
a common practice. Hence, there is a heavy reliance on the strength of the encryption
technique for the protocol to be secure. While this may not be an issue with higher-end
tags, it is a challenge to achieve the same level of security with passive tags due to their
limitations. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the following factors when designing
protocols for passive tags:
• Minimize the computational resources required on the tag.
• Achieve the required level of security without using hash functions or other com-
plex encryption schemes.
• Ideally, not transmit the secret key during the protocol run.
Finally, overcoming the security challenges successfully in passive RFID environments
would enable large-scale implementation of RFID systems and gain more public accep-
tance in the process. Thus, from both a security and functionality aspect of multi-tag
passive RFID environments, there is a compelling need to further the research. The
above-mentioned challenges form the major motivation for this work.
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1.6.3 RFID to Fight & Prevent Currency Related Crimes
Counterfeit currency has been a major problem around the world over the past few
decades and it is ever on the rise. To date, there is no fool-proof way to ﬁght this crime.
Many of the existing methods that help detect counterfeit currency take a certain level of
expertise and a trained eye in addition to the automated tools. Thus, most of the coun-
terfeits go undetected by common users. Reports from [62, 76, 109, 131] present a clear
picture on counterfeit currency production and circulation around the world, the im-
pact it has on the world economy and the challenges involved in identifying counterfeits.
Reports from [52, 154, 155] discuss currency related crimes such as retail-store/bank
robberies and the deaths that result from such crimes. Further, the current approaches
to RFID Currency are vulnerable to attacks and they rely on the consumers and the Law
Enforcement Agencies to detect counterfeits thereby compromising consumer privacy.
In this work, a revolutionary approach to paper currency is presented, in a way currency
has not been looked at in this angle to date. The approach is very novel that it defeats
the purpose of counterfeiting and also detects counterfeits eﬀectively using RFID. Ap-
plication of RFID is extended to conducting cash transactions, which is one of the most
widely carried out everyday acts throughout the globe. A full-scale implementation
of these protocols has a strong potential to eradicate counterfeit currency, pick-
pocketing and retail-store/bank robberies which often end in fatal shootings,
thereby saving precious human lives and also possibly curtail money laun-
dering to a considerable extent. These form the major motivation for doing this
work.
1.7 Research Questions
The following are some of the key research questions this work will address:
• How to design grouping proof protocols in RFID that meet all its unique design
requirements and achieve the required security properties while being EPC C1G2
compliant?
• How to achieve forward security in grouping proof, which is an open research issue
[123]?
• How to make grouping proof protocols resistant to active-attacks and resistant to
Denial-of-Proof (DoP) attacks from multiple illegitimate tags?
• How to develop zero knowledge grouping proof protocols in addition to achieving
the above?
• How to design ownership transfer protocols for a multi-tag multi-owner RFID
environment that meet the required security properties while being EPC C1G2
compliant?
• How to provide privacy-among-owners in ownership transfer protocols with multi-
owners?
• How can RFID Enabled Currency possibly assist in ﬁghting and preventing cur-
rency related crimes?
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1.8 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 gives an introduction to RFID and discusses
the scope of the research and the motivation for doing this research. Chapter 2 presents a
literature review for both grouping proof and ownership transfer areas of RFID. Chapter
3 presents the methods used to develop the security protocols and also discusses the
analysis models used to show how the protocols meet the security requirements of RFID
systems. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are dedicated for the two grouping proof protocols.
The ﬁrst method uses XOR and 128bit PRNG functions and the second method uses
probabilistic encryption scheme based on quadratic residuosity. Chapter 6 presents the
multi-tag multi-owner RFID ownership transfer protocol with individual owner privacy,
based on XOR and 128bit PRNG functions. Chapter 7 combines both the grouping
proof and ownership transfer concepts and presents a case-study for RFID Enabled
Currency and ﬁnally, Chapter 8 summarizes the research ﬁndings and concludes this
work.
1.9 Summary
In this chapter, RFID technology and its architecture were introduced ﬁrst followed
by a discussion on the need for security, the security issues and the required security
properties for RFID systems. After brieﬂy explaining the scalability issues in RFID, an
overview of the multi-tag environment was presented and the grouping proof and own-
ership transfer concepts were introduced. The scope of the research was then clearly
outlined followed by the motivation for conducting the research and the research ques-
tions that will be answered in this work were also clearly deﬁned. Finally, an overview
of how this thesis is organized was presented.
Following this introduction to the RFID world, an extensive overview of existing litera-
ture on both grouping proof and ownership transfer is presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter covers an extensive literature review of the existing work in Grouping Proof
and Ownership Transfer. The protocols are described brieﬂy and the vulnerabilities
found by us and others are highlighted. This is followed by a note on how these protocols
fail to meet the security requirements or to comply with the EPC C1G2 standard.
Finally, the key ﬁndings are summarized and recommendations are made based on these
ﬁndings.
2.1 Grouping Proof
One of the important functionalities of an RFID system is the ability to generate ev-
idence that two or more tags have been scanned simultaneously. The “Yoking Proof”
concept that involves only two tags was introduced by Juels [77] in 2004 and since then
it has evolved to grouping proof where more than two tags are involved. Some typical
areas where yoking/grouping proof protocols can be put to use are: in hospitals where
evidence has to be shown that the patients and their respective multiple medications
are given correctly [26]; manufacturers wanting to prove that devices were sold together
with safety caps [9]; in military where multiple weapons have to be associated with a
certain individual[13]; in pharmaceutical industry where medicine and the associated in-
formation leaﬂet have to be together [123]; in banks and airports where security requires
the simultaneous scanning of multiple forms of IDs [9] and other areas as well.
Grouping proof protocols generally operate in two modes viz., oﬄine and online [13, 102,
105, 123]. In this work, the scope is limited to oﬄine protocols since online grouping
proof protocols are more close to mutual authentication protocols. Oﬄine grouping
proof protocol is unique in the sense, the server that veriﬁes the proof to make sure
all the tags involved in the proof are scanned simultaneously is not available all the
time. One general need is that, businesses (hospitals for example) have to gather such
grouping proof evidences and send to the auditing government-body who is the veriﬁer.
The veriﬁer in this case does not participate in the proof collection process and the proof
is sent in bulk (collection of many grouping proofs) to facilitate the veriﬁcation at a later
time. The veriﬁer being oﬄine is a unique scenario for grouping proof and it comes with
its own unique challenges such as: a) detecting illegitimate tags which might prevent the
proof generation or generate invalid proofs causing Denial-of-Proof (DoP) attacks [102];
b) proving simultaneity by creating dependency between the tags [123]; c) eliminating
unwanted tag processing [13]; d) completion of the protocol run within a predeﬁned
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time-window; e) providing forward security which is an open research problem [123] and
ﬁnally, f) synchronizing the keys between the tags and the veriﬁer even though the latter
is oﬄine [123]. Let us now analyze in detail the existing work in grouping work.
2.1.1 Related Work
The yoking proof protocol by Juels [77] requires that a pair of tags be scanned simulta-
neously. The protocol allows to generate a proof that can be veriﬁed oﬄine by a trusted
entity. The scheme assumes that the readers are untrusted; it allows for the proof to be
checked for validity even if the tags were scanned by an adversarial reader; and it uses
timeout mechanism to terminate within a time interval t. The messages from the tags
are interleaved and by maintaining the state on the tags, it is shown to prevent a reader
from corrupting the proof by tampering the messages. A severely truncated version of
Lamport Digital-Signature Scheme named as minimalist Message Authentication Code
(MAC) function is used to encrypt the messages. During the protocol run, the reader
sends the role-indicator “left proof” to the left tag. The left tag computes rA = fxA [CA]
and compiles the partial-proof a = (A,CA, rA), where A indicates the tag A, fx indicates
a keyed-hash function, with x as the secret key and C is the counter on the tag. Tag
A then sends the message a to the reader. The reader forwards this to the right tag
B, with the role-indicator “right proof”. Tag B computes mB = MACxB [a, CB] and
sends its partial-proof b = (B,CB,mB) to the reader which then sends the message b
to the left tag. Tag A then computes mAB = MACxA [a, b] and sends it to the reader.
The yoking proof PAB = (A,B, cA, cB,mAB) is sent to the veriﬁer V which computes
a′, b′ and m′AB using the stored secret keys. If the received messages are the same as
the computed messages, the yoking proof is considered to be successful.
Saito and Sakurai [135] found Juels’ [77] protocol to be vulnerable to replay attack by
using the previous random number. Here, an adversary A sends a query to left tag and
gets rA. He then submits a random number r to the left tag and gets mA. He then gets
mB from the right tag using rA and submit mA and mB to the Veriﬁer thus proving the
yoking proof even if there is only the right tag. It is argued that the attack cannot be
prevented using timeouts since the attacker submits the input to the two tags separately.
An improved version of the protocol was proposed using timestamp TS from the reader,
so the time of producing the MAC could be veriﬁed. The reader gets TS from a trusted
database and sends it to both the tags. The left tag A generates mA = MACxA [TS]
where xA is the secret, and sends it to the reader. The reader forwards it to the right
tag B which computes mB = MACxB [TS,mA]. Tag B sends mB to the reader which
generates the proof PAB = (TS,mB). Also, the yoking proof protocol was enhanced
to include multiple tags and this came to be known as a Grouping Proof. Here, the
timestamp TS is submitted to all the tags and the pallet tag PT . Each tag generates
the MAC using TS and sends it to the reader. All the partial-proofs collected by the
reader are sent to PT which encrypts the messages and sends the ciphertext CP to the
reader. The proof CP is forwarded by the reader to the veriﬁer V which decrypts CP
using the secret key x. It then veriﬁes all the partial-proofs from all the tags, thus
proving the grouping proof. The assumption made in this protocol is that the PT
processes timeouts and has the ability to compute symmetric key encryption.
Piramuthu [127] showed that Saito and Sakurai’s [135] yoking proof protocol is vulner-
able to replay attacks. An adversary repeatedly transmitting messages to the left tag
using diﬀerent timestamps from later point in time can use these messages when the
timestamp actually becomes true, thus producing a yoking proof with the left-tag not
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being present. However, it is noted that the grouping proof protocol is not vulnerable to
this attack. The reason being, mB is dependent on mA and cannot be generated before
mA is generated by the left tag. The improved version of the yoking proof protocol in-
cludes a random number r sent from the veriﬁer to both the tags, to keep track of time
duration between the initial transmission and ﬁnal submission of proof. r also serves
as a seed for generating the random numbers rA and rB by the two tags. The MAC
generated by the second tag depends on this random variable r apart from the message
rA from the ﬁrst tag. The use of rA in generating mB is crucial since it is generated and
used internally by the ﬁrst tag for generating mA. An attacker cannot conduct reply
attacks since r is generated by the veriﬁer, and the dependence on it to generate mB
adds another layer of protection. Also, the use of mB in generating mA by the ﬁrst tag
has signiﬁcance since it has to wait for the second tag to generate mB before it can com-
pute its part of the proof. Also, the second tag cannot generate the proof independently
since it depends on the input rA from the ﬁrst tag which is internally generated and
retained and hence cannot be corrupted by an outside entity. A similar yoking proof
protocol has been proposed by Cho et al. [27] using diﬀerent random numbers for the
diﬀerent tags. However, Burmester et al. [13] argue that these yoking proof protocols
do not satisfy the security guidelines discussed in [13] and are vulnerable to multi-proof
session attacks [121] and concurrency threats.
Tag TA Reader Tag TB
request, r
< −−−
a = (A, rA) request, rA, r
−−−− > −−−−− >
mB =MACxB [rA, r]
mB B,mB, rB
< − < −−−−
mA =MACxB [mB, rA]
mA
− >
PAB = (rA, rB, r,mA,mB)
Figure 2.1: Yoking Proof Protocol by Piramuthu [127]
Bolotnyy and Robins [9] improvised on Juels’ [77] version to include multiple tags and
also introduced anonymous yoking. The protocol is targeted towards EPC C2G2 tags
with the assumption that tags of this category are capable of executing keyed hash
functions. The authors suggest the use of the following: a) to avoid replay attacks,
the veriﬁer should store the previous correct proofs and the counter values of the tags
from the latest correct proof in which the tags participated; b) counters be replaced
with random numbers of 64+ bits to avoid birthday attacks; and c) that the ﬁrst tag
accessed by the reader be able to implement timeout mechanisms. It is noted that
timeouts can be implemented on clock-less RFID tags using a capacitor discharge rate
onboard the tag. Further, the tags update their keys in a forward secure manner using
2.1. GROUPING PROOF 21
one-way hash function and also securely discard the old key. Tag privacy (anonymous
yoking) is achieved by having the tag generate the message using a keyed hash function.
The reader is not trusted in the protocol and the protocol protects against adversarial
readers attempting to create proof without reading all the tags simultaneously. The
protocol creates a circular chain of mutually dependent MAC computations to ensure
reply attacks are not possible if the attacker breaks the chain. This mechanism also
ensures that the attacker cannot create a proof that will be accepted by the veriﬁer.
Tags are assumed to have the ability to compute keyed hash functions and message
authentication codes such as HMAC.
Reader R Tag Ti
Query
−−− > T1 : r1 = fx1 [c1], a1 = (1, c1, r1)
r1, a1
< −−
a1
− > T2 : r2 =MACx2 [c2, a1], a2 = (2, c2, r2)
r2, a2
< −−
a2
− > T3 : r3 =MACx3 [c3, a2], a3 = (3, c3, r3)
r3, a3
< −−
...
...
...
rk−1, ak−1
< −−−−
ak−1
−− > Tk : rk =MACxk [ck, ak−1], ak = (k, ck, rk)
rk, ak
< −−
ak
− > T1 : m =MACx1 [a1, ak]
m
P1,2..k = (1, 2, .k, c1, c2, ..ck,m) < −−−
Figure 2.2: Bolotnyy & Robins’ Anonymous Yoking Proof - [9]
During the protocol run, the ﬁrst tag computes r1 = fx1[c1] and sends a1 = (1, c1, r1)
to the reader, where f indicates the keyed hash function, x is the secret key and c is
the input to the MAC function. a1 is sent to the second tag which computes r2 =
MACx2[c2, a1] and sends a2 = (2, c2, r2) to the reader. a2 is sent to the third tag and
the process continues in a similar fashion for all k tags. The counter in each tag is
incremented by 1 immediately after it sends the message to the reader. Finally, ak
is sent to the ﬁrst tag which computes m = MACx1 [a1, ak] if the time limit has not
expired and sends m back to the reader. The reader compiles the proof P1,2,...k =
(1, 2..k, c1, c2, ...ck,m) and sends it to the veriﬁer. If the veriﬁer is able to reconstruct
the messages the grouping proof is considered to be a success. In order to speed up the
proof creation process, it is suggested to split the tags into diﬀerent groups and identify
them using group IDs. Here, the circular chain of dependent MACs is split into group
of arcs where each arc consists of a sequence of dependent MACs and that the adjacent
arcs are inter-dependent i.e., the ﬁrst element of each arc starts the chain of that arc and
closes the chain of the preceding arc. One of the important weaknesses of this protocol
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is that it uses keyed-hash functions in the tags and EPC C1G2 passive tags do have the
ability to implement hash functions. Hence the protocol is not EPC compliant and is
not suitable for large scale implementations.
Lin et al. [99] identiﬁed the problem of race conditions when multiple readers and
multiple tags are involved and also address the problem of determining the number of
tags. It is argued that race condition can occur when tags respond to multiple readers
and stores the values in memory. When the readers transmit back information to the
tag simultaneously, the tag will not know which stored value to use against the received
values. The authors note that the Piramuthu’s [127] grouping proof is vulnerable to race
condition for multiple tags. To address this issue, the authors propose two techniques
viz., a secure timestamp proof (secTS-proof) with an online veriﬁer OV and a timestamp
chaining proof with an oﬄine veriﬁer. In the former technique, OV generates a random
number r and uses its secret key x to encrypt the timestamp TS and r to compute
the message S = SKx[r, TS], where SK is the encryption function. This is to prevent
the adversarial readers from generating bogus timestamps. The latter technique uses
Haber-Stornetta timestamps to avoid such attacks since the veriﬁer is oﬄine and there
is a chance for an attacker to issue bogus timestamps. Here, each timestamp is formed
by taking a hash and the hash value is used along with the MAC from the previous
timestamps. The reader submits the last timestamp, tag ID and MAC value of the
timestamp computed by the tag to the timestamp database TSD which marks the
timestamp information with a trusted time value. The protocol begins when TSD issues
a random number r to the reader and notes the time RTo. Reader sends timestamp TS1
and r to tag T1 which computes m1 = MACx1 [TS1(r)], where x is the secret key. Tag
1 sends its ID T1 and m1 to the reader which computes ms1 = (T1||TS1(r)||m1). The
reader sends ms1 to the TSD which retains it along with the time RT1. The reader
now sends TS2 and h(ms1) to tag T2 where h() denotes a one-way hash function. T2
computes m2 = MACx2 [TS2(h(ms1))]. The process repeats for the n tags and the
reader generates the ﬁnal proof and sends it to the veriﬁer. The major weakness in this
protocol is that, the tag ID is sent in clear to the reader. An adversary eavesdropping
on the communications could get this sensitive data to conduct tracking attacks and
could potentially compromise the safety of the object/person attached to the tag.
Burmester et al. [13] present a security model based on Universal Composability frame-
work [16], that is speciﬁc to grouping proofs focusing on privacy and forward-security.
The authors have also proposed three protocols in an incremental fashion. The ﬁrst pro-
tocol does not provide anonymity, the second protocol provides anonymity and the third
protocol provides forward secrecy. The protocol proposed is based on PRNG operations
denoted by f , uses group identiﬁers IDgroup and group keysKgroup to prevent faulty tags
from participating in the grouping proof. Each tag maintains its secret key Ktag to facil-
itate authentication. In the ﬁrst phase of the protocol, the reader broadcasts a random
challenge rsys which is generated by the veriﬁer to which the tags respond with the group
ID. The second phase of the protocol happens at the data link layer where the tags are
linked by channels to the reader. In the third phase, the ﬁrst tag TagA initiates the proof.
The counter c stored in the tag determines the current state of the group and is updated
during every protocol run. TagA computes its response rA||SA = f(Kgroup; rsys, c) and
sends rA, c to the reader. It then increments c by 1. The reader retains the received
values and sends them to TagB which computes rB||SB = f(Kgroup; rsys, c) and veriﬁes
if TagA belongs to the group. The protocol is aborted if rA = rB. Otherwise it computes
xB = f(KB; rsys||rB) and sends SB, xB to the reader which forwards SB to TagA. By
checking if SA = SB, tag TagA veriﬁes if the tag TagB belongs to the same group and
if yes, it computes its message xA = f(KA; rsys||rA) and sends it to the reader. The
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proof is generated as PAB = (rsys, IDgroup, c, rA, SA, xA, xB). In the second protocol,
to provide anonymity, group identiﬁers are replaced by randomized group pseudonyms
psgroup. One or more tags maintain their current and previous state of the pseudonyms
to prevent desynchronization attacks. In the third protocol, the secret keys and group
keys of the tags are updated after each protocol run to provide forward secrecy. How-
ever, Peris-Lopez et al. [123] have shown that all three protocols are vulnerable to
multiple-impersonation attacks.
Lien et al. [97] have proposed a reading-order independent grouping proof protocol that
aims at improving eﬃciency and reduce failure rates. The protocol begins when the
reader R broadcasts a random number r to all the tags including the pallet tag PT . Each
tag uses r as the seed to calculate its random number rAi and sends it back to the reader
along with its identiﬁcation code Ai. As soon as the reader gets a response back it sends
the message pairs {APT , Ai, rAi} to PT without regard for the order. PT then generates
a random number rp, uses it secret key Xp and computesmpi =MACXp [rAi , rp]. It then
sends the message {AR, Ai,mpi} to the reader which forwards {Ai,mpi} to the corre-
sponding tag Ti. The tag Ti uses its secret keyXAi to computemAi =MACXAi[mpi , rAi ]
and sends back {Ai,mAi} to the reader which sends {APT , Ai,mAi} to PT without re-
gard for the order. PT computes mp = MACXp [r, rp,mA1 ⊕mA2 ⊕ ...mAn ] and sends
{AR,mp} to the reader which generates the grouping proof Pn. The reader then sends
Pn it to the veriﬁer. Some of key properties of the protocol are: it uses order indepen-
dent XOR operation to compute the proof which saves time and reduces failure rates;
the random number rp generated by PT is not transmitted in clear but included in mpi
which enhances security. The protocol claims not to send tag ID in clear but Ai is used
to identify the tag and is transmitted unencrypted. If Ai is the real tag ID it could be
compromising the tag’s privacy and introduce other possible attacks. It is also suggested
to change Ai every time to avoid tracing attacks but changing the ID of an object intro-
duces several other problems (object could never be traced even by legitimate parties
because it loses its link) and in my opinion, this is not a recommended practice.
Chien and Liu [25] proposed a tree based grouping proof protocol that uses a tree
structure to organize the tags. The paths of the tags are dynamically updated which
are used as secrets to identify the tags. The veriﬁer periodically sends a random number
rsys to the reader using a secure channel which it later uses to verify the proof. The
reader sends rsys to TagA and TagB. The tag TagA chooses a random number rA
and computes P
′
TA
= h(rk) ⊕ path1TA and hA = h(gkGY , rsys, rA) where rk is the root
key, path1 identiﬁes the group of the tag, gkGY is the group key and h indicates the
hash function. TagB performs similar computations. Once the reader receives P
′
TA
and P
′
TB
it derives the path of each tag to ensure they belong to the same group and
sends {hA, hB, h(gkGY , hA, hB)} to both the tags. The tags use this to verify if they
belong to the same group. The reminder of the steps is timed to generate evidence
in a combined fashion to prove the simultaneous presence. The tag TagA computes
P
′′
TA
= h(gkGY , rsys) ⊕ path2TA and a1 = h(lkTA , hA, hB, rsys) where lkTA indicates the
tag’s secret key. The reader receives P
′′
TA
and a1 from TagA and sends a1 to TagB which
performs similar operations as TagA and sends P
′′
TB
and b to the reader. The reader
then sends b to TagA which computes a2 = h(lkTA , hA, hB, b, rsys) and sends it back.
The reader compiles the evidence as PAB = {rsys, P ′′TA , P
′′
TB
, hA, hB, a1, a2, b} and sends
it to the veriﬁer. The major weaknesses of the protocol are: a) TagA performs 5 hash
operations and TagB performs 4 hash operations which could be a signiﬁcant overhead;
b) the reader is trusted with the root and group keys which makes it less secure because
readers could be lost or stolen and c) the protocol does not provide forward security.
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Tag Ti Reader Pallet Tag
1 ≤ i ≤ n (PT)
rAi Query, r Query, r rp
< −−− −−− >
A1, rA1
−−− >
A2, rA2 As soon as R
−−− > Receives Ai, rAi
... APT , Ai, rAi
... −−−−− >
An, rAn mpi =MACpi [rAi , rp]
−−− >
A1,mp1 AR, Ai,mpi
< −−− < −−−−−
mA1 =MACXA1 [mp1 , rA1 ]
A1,mA1
−−− >
A2,mp2
< −−−
mA2 =MACXA2 [mp2 , rA2 ]
A2,mA2
−−− >
...
...
An,mpn APT ,mAi
< −−− −−−− >
mAn =MACXAn [mpn , rAn ] mp =MACXp [r, rp,mA1 ⊕mA2⊕
..⊕mAn ]
An,mAn AR,mp
−−− > < −−−
Pn = (r, rA1 , rA2 , ...
rAn ,mp)
Figure 2.3: Lien et al.’s Reading Order Independent Grouping Proof - [97]
Sun et al. [143] proposed two protocols viz., Oﬄine Simultaneous Grouping Proof (O-SI-
Grouping Proof) and O-SI-Grouping Proof with forward secrecy. This analysis is limited
to the latter, as forward secrecy is of key importance to grouping proof protocols. The
reader ﬁrst computesm = hash(A1||A2...An) where hash() represents the hash function,
A1, A2..An represent the anonymous IDs of the tags. It then sends Query||m to tag Ti
which computes Xi = Encki [m ⊕ ri] where ri is a random number and Enc() is a
symmetric key encryption function. The tag then starts its timer and retains ri and m
and sends Xi to the reader which computes s = hash(X1||X2...Xn). The reader then
sends s||m to tag Ti. If the timer has not expired in the tag, it checks whether the
received m is equal to the saved m. If yes, it computes Yi = Encki [s ⊕ ri]. It then
updates its anonymous ID to A
′
i = Ai ⊕ ri and its key k
′
i = ki ⊕ ri and sends Yi to
the reader. The reader computes the ﬁnal proof Pn = Enckreader(Ai, Xi, Yi) and sends
it to the veriﬁer. The veriﬁer decrypts the message, computes m, decrypts every Xi
using ki to get ri, computes each Yi using keys ki. The proof is valid if all the Yis are
correct. The server then refreshes the ID and the key the same way as the tag. There
are several weaknesses in this protocol: it has the same problem of updating ID as [97];
the protocol is designed to store the computed MAC and the random number ri which
could potentially lead to concurrency issues and race conditions as mentioned in [99];
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tags are expected to have timer capabilities and the protocol uses symmetric encryption
function to provide forward secrecy, both of which are not implementable in passive
tag and hence the protocol is not compliant with EPC C1G2 standard. Also, the tags
update their secret keys during the protocol but the server which is oﬄine, updates its
keys independently. This can lead to a desynchronization attack. If the protocol were
to be run a few times without sending the proof to the server, the keys won’t match
and the server cannot validate the proofs. Finally, m remains constant when the reader
sends Query||m and s||m to the tags in diﬀerent steps. This could potentially lead to
tracking attacks.
Leng et al. [94] proposed a hash based select-response grouping proof protocol where
the reader actively selects the required tags to generate the proof. The protocol begins
when the veriﬁer generates a fresh random number rg, computes cg = H(GID, Sg, rg)
where GID is the group ID and Sg is the group secret. It then broadcasts GID, rg, cg to
the tags through the reader. Each tag computes its own cg to authenticate the message.
The veriﬁer again computes c1 = H(GID, ID1, S1, r1) and sends GID, ID1, r1, c1 to tag
T1 through the reader. The tag T1 calculates c
′
1 to authenticate the message. It then
computes ca1 = H(r1, GID, ID1, S1, Sg, ra1) and sends ca1 , ra1 to the veriﬁer through
the reader, where ra1 is a random number generated by the tag. The veriﬁer checks
the received ca1 . The process is repeated for all the selected tags and if successful,
then the grouping proof is accepted. There are several weakness in this protocol: a)
there is a model ambiguity in the design as the veriﬁer is assumed to be online and is
actively involved in the veriﬁcation instead of waiting for the complete proof. While
online grouping proof may be useful in some cases, the main purpose of grouping proof
protocols is the ability to verify the proof at a later time; b) tag IDs and group IDs are
sent in the clear which can lead to tracking attacks, cloning attacks and also compromises
the safety and security of the object the tag is attached to; and c) tags perform hash
operations which makes the protocol not compliant with EPC C1G2 standard.
Duc and Kim [42] proposed a grouping proof protocol that is based on MAC and Shamir’s
(n, n) secret sharing. The veriﬁer selects a random number x and sends it to the reader
R which chooses (n−1) random numbers y1, y2, ...yn−1 as the ﬁrst (n−1) shared secrets.
The last secret yn is computed as yn = x ⊕ y1 ⊕ y2... ⊕ yn−1. The reader then sends
(x, yi) to tags Ti where i = 1, 2..n. Each tag Ti computes mi =MACKi [yi, x], where Ki
is the secret used in the MAC function. The tag then sends Ti,mi to the reader which
compiles the proof as P = {T1, y1,m1, T2, y2,m2...Tn, yn,mn}. The proof is then sent
to the veriﬁer for validation. Liu et al. [101] have shown the protocol to be vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks, counterfeit attacks and traceability attacks. The attacks
are attributed to factors such as a) insecure construction location of shared-secret; b)
insecure construction method of shared-secret; c) insecure challenge method from the
reader to the tag; d) insecure response method from the tag to the reader and e) both
the main and sub-secrets (x, yi) are sent in the clear to each tag.
Batina et al. [7] proposed a privacy-preserving grouping proof protocol called as Collud-
ing Tag Prevention (CTP) protocol that is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
The protocol begins when the reader sends a “start left” and “start right” message to
the left and right tags respectively indicating their roles. The random number ra and the
corresponding EC point Ta,1 = raP are generated by tag A, which are sent to tag B. The
tag B generates rb and Tb,1 = rbP and computes the response Tb,2 = (rb+x(rsTa,1)sb)Y
using its private key sb, the random number rb, the x-coordinate of the challenge Ta,1
and the random challenge rs sent by the reader. Both Tb,1 and Tb,2 are sent to the
reader which forwards Tb,2 to tag A. The tag A computes Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tb,2)sa)Y
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using its private key sa, the random number ra and the x-coordinate of the challenge
Tb,2. The grouping proof consists of Ta,1, Ta,2, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2 which is sent to the veri-
ﬁer. It is the reader’s responsibility to put the tags’ responses in the correct order for
the proof to be correct. The veriﬁer computes saP = (y
−1Ta,2 − Ta,1)x(Tb,2)−1 and
sbP = (y
−1Tb,2 − Tb,1)x(rsTa,1)−1. This yoking proof is extended to include multiple
tags by simply sending the output of each tag as the input to the next tag and the last
tag in the chain sends its output to tag A which then computes Ta,2. However Cong et
al. [32] have shown the protocol to be vulnerable to compromised tag attack.
Abyaneh [1] discusses a colluding-tags attack scenario on Batina et al.’s [7] CTP protocol.
The assumptions made are that a) the reader is trusted; b) both tags are compromised
and c) tags could exchange messages in advance (via another reader) but do not know
each other’s private key. The attack consists of two phases viz., conspiracy phase and
deceit phase. In the former phase, the two tags secretly negotiate using a rogue reader in
which tag B sends H = sbY to tag A. Now, using H, tag A is able to impersonate tag B
in the CTP protocol. The message Tb,2 includes tag B’s private key which is easily forged
by knowing H. From the above, we know Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)sb)Y and solving this,
we get Tb,2 = (rbY + x(rsTa,1)sbY ) = (rbY + x(rsTa,1)H). Thus, by knowing H, tag B
is successfully impersonated without revealing the private key sb. An improved version
of the protocol has been proposed. Reader sends “start left” to tag TA which generates
random numbers αa and βa and computes the multiplication point on P and Y (EC)
as Ta,1 = αaP , and Ta,2 = βaY and sends them to the reader. The reader then sends
“start right” message to tag TB along with a random number rs and Ta,2 which computes
Tb,1 = αbP , Tb,2 = βbY and a scalar tb,3 = (αb+βb+x(rsTa,2)sb) mod q. After receiving
these messages, the reader forwards tb,3 to TA which computes ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa
mod q. The grouping proof is complied as PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, Ta,3, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2, Tb,3}.
The veriﬁer checks if the following holds true to conﬁrm grouping proof: sa = saP =
x−1(Tb,3)(ta,3P − Ta,1 − y−1Ta,2) and sb = sbP = x−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P − Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2).
Tag A sa Reader Tag B sb
“Start Left”
< −−−−
αa, βa
Ta,1 = αaP
−−−−− >
Ta,2 = βaY
rs “Start Right”, rs, Ta,2
−−−−−−−−− >
αb, βb
Tb,1 = αbP , Tb,2 = βbY
< −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb) mod q
tb,3
< −−
ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa mod q
−−−−−−−−−−−−− >
Figure 2.4: Abyaneh’s Yoking Proof using ECC - [1]
Lv et al. [104] found Batina et al.’s [7] CTP protocol to be vulnerable to tracking attacks.
The adversary captures messages by eavesdropping, impersonates a reader, challenges
the tag B using the captured message and gets the response from tag B. Then, in
a normal session when tag B responds, the messages are blocked and the attacker
forges the messages with the previously captured messages. An improved version of the
protocol is proposed but Ko et al. [84] have shown that the improved version does not
work. The veriﬁer receiving {Ta,1, Ta,2, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2} as a proof, has to compute saTa,1
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and sbTb,1 but without the knowledge of sa and sb this cannot be done. In the case
where saTa,1 = saraP = raSa and sbTb,1 = sbrbP = rbSb, the veriﬁer has Sa and Sb but
not ra and rb to verify the proof. In the improved version, the reader sends “start left”
to tag A which generates two random numbers na and ra and computes Ta,1 = raP .
It then generates a random number rs and sends it along with Ta,1 to tag B. Now,
the tag B generates two random numbers nb and rb and computes Tb,1 = rbP and
Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)(sb + rb))Y . Once the reader receives Tb,1 and Tb,2, it sends the
latter to tag A which computes Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tb,2)(sb + rb))Y and sends it back to the
reader. The reader compiles the proof {Ta,1, Ta,2, na, nb, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2} and sends it to the
veriﬁer. The veriﬁer computes Sa + naP = (y
−1Ta,2 − Ta,1)x(Tb,2)−1 and Sb + nbP =
(y−1Tb,2−Tb,1)x(rSTa,1). Lin and Zhang [100] proposed an improved version of Batina et
al.’s [7] protocol where each tag computes only one point multiplication on E instead of
two as in [7]. The argument is that, point multiplication consumes most time in ECC and
that Batina et al.’s [7] protocol might work for a yoking proof but for multiparty system
with n tags where n > 2, timeouts could occur easily. However, Hong-Yan [66] has
shown that [100] is vulnerable to tracking attacks. The attack technique is the same as
the one used by Lv et al. [104] to break Batina et al.’s [7] CTP protocol. In the revised
version, ta,2 and tb,2 are changed to (ra1 + tb,2sara) mod n and (rb1 + x(rsTa,1)sbrb2)
mod n where ra1, ra2 and rb1, rb2 are random numbers generated by tag A and tag B
respectively, thus preventing the attack. In essence, the above-discussed ECC based
protocols [1, 7, 66, 84, 100, 104] are not suitable for passive tags as the implementation
of ECC would require between 8.2K and 15K equivalent gates [6, 91].
Periz-Lopez et al. [121] proposed a clumping proof based on the assumption that tags are
capable of executing keyed MAC function and a lightweight Nun function to generate a
random pseudonym of a tag ID. The protocol begins when the veriﬁer sends an encrypted
timestamp t = gxv(TS) to the reader where gxv() denotes the keyed hash function using
the secret key xv. The reader divides t into two parts tMSB and tLSB, where MSB
and LSB represent the most and least signiﬁcant digits respectively. The reader then
sends tMSB to tag TA which computes its pseudonym ID as a1 = Nun[IDA, counterA]
and a2 = MACxA [tMSB ⊕ a1] where counterA indicates the internal state of TA and
xA is the secret key of TA. The tag TA sends back a1, a2, counterA to the reader and
increments it counter by 1. The reader sends tLSB, a2 to tag TB which performs similar
operations as TA except that b2 is computed as b2 =MACxB [a2, tLSB⊕b1]. Tag TB sends
b1, b2, counterB to the reader and the counter is incremented by 1. The reader forwards
b2 to tag TA which computes mAB = MACxA [a2, b2] and sends it to the reader. The
proof is complied by the reader as PAB = (a1, a2, counterA, b1, b2, counterB,mAB, t) and
it sends it to the veriﬁer. Lo and Yeh [102] identiﬁed three weaknesses in this protocol:
a) The protocol is not resistent to Denial of Proof (DoP) attack. If an attacker adds
one or more counterfeit tags along with the legitimate ones, the proof will not pass the
veriﬁcation as the identity pseudonyms of the counterfeit tags are invalid and the veriﬁer
cannot ﬁnd its correct secret; b) The protocol does not provide forward secrecy. If a
tag were to be compromised, the attacker can trace the previous communications by
examining the historical proof evidences with the exposed tag identity and secret key;
and c) The protocol cannot prevent the occurrence of authentication sequence disorder
when multiple readers interact with the tags simultaneously because the tag TA does not
have suﬃcient information to know which partial proof message to use when computing
the ﬁnal proof, leading to race condition issues.
Lo and Yeh [102] proposed an improved version of the protocol to address these is-
sues. The reader gets timestamp TS1 from the timestamp module. The encrypted
version of the timestamp a1 is forwarded to Tag1 which computes its key value k1 =
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Get TS1,
a1 = gkt(TS1)
from TTM
Tag 1 :
Update a1
K1 = PRNG(K1 ⊕ ID1) < −−
c1 = c1 + 1
Compute Tag 2 :
P1 = Nun[ID1, a1] a1, b1 Update
b1 =MACK1 [a1, ID1] −−− > K2 = PRNG(K2 ⊕ ID2)
c2 = c2 + 1
c1, b1, P1 Compute
−−−− > P2 = Nun[ID2, a1]
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:
:
:
Tag n :
an, bn−1 Update
−−−− > Kn = PRNG(Kn ⊕ IDn)
cn = cn + 1
Compute
cn, bn, Pn Pn = Nun[IDn, a1]
< −−−− bn =MACKn [bn−1, IDn]
Tag 1 : a1, bn
Update < −−
K1 = PRNG(K1 ⊕ ID1)
cn+1 = c1 + 1
Compute
Pn+1 = Nun[ID1, a1]
bn+1 =MACK1 [bn, ID1]
cn+1, bn+1, Pn+1
−−−−−−−− >
Figure 2.5: Lo & Yeh’s Grouping Proof Protocol - [102]
PRNG(k1 ⊕ ID1), counter c1 = c1 + 1, pseudonym P1 = Nun[ID1, a1] and the par-
tial existence proof b1 = MACk1 [a1, ID1]. Tag1 sends b1, P1, c1 to the reader which
sends a1, b1 to Tag2. Similar operations are performed for all the tags and after all the
partial proofs are received from all the n tags, the reader sends a1, bn to Tag1 which
returns bn+1, Pn+1, cn+1 to the reader. bn+1 is sent to the tamper-resistent timestamp
module and it obtains bn+2 = gkt(bn+1, TS2) and TS2, where gkt is a keyed hash func-
tion using kt as the key. The proof is composed as P1...n = (IDr, a1, TS1, P1, b1, c1, ...
Pn+1, bn+1, cn+1, bn+2, TS2) and is sent to the veriﬁer. A weak assumption has been
made by the authors i.e., an attacker would use least amount of his resources to achieve
a successful attack. Hence the protocol is resilient only with 1-illegitimate tag (1-DoP).
While the use of “minimum resources” assumption is generally acceptable it is not always
true. With tag prices being so low, it does not cost much to produce even 100 illegiti-
mate tags and add them among a 1000 legitimate ones. The other assumption made in
the protocol is that, a reader has to be authenticated in advance before executing the
protocol. This brings in the dependence of the protocol on the veriﬁer being available.
There is some model ambiguity here, since in grouping proof protocols, veriﬁers are
typically oﬄine and participate only at a later time when verifying the proofs.
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Several application speciﬁc grouping proof protocols have been proposed recently. Peris-
Lopez et al. [124] proposed a grouping proof protocol speciﬁc to improving inpatient
medication safety. The protocol is shown to be vulnerable to illegitimate tag attack by
Yen et al. [175] resulting in generating invalid proofs and an improved version has been
proposed. It is also shown to be vulnerable to passive secret disclosure attack [134] and
full-disclosure attack [119]. Similar inpatient medication safety speciﬁc grouping proof
protocols have been proposed in [20, 22, 69, 100, 126, 125]. Huang and Ku [68] pro-
posed a grouping proof protocol for inpatient safety that uses pseudo-random number
generator (PRNG) and cyclic redundancy check (CRC). The reader begins the protocol
run by sending timestamp TS to both tag 1 and the pallet tag PT . Tag 1 computes
r1 ← PRNG(TS), c1 ← PRNG(PIN1) and m1 ← CRC(EPC1, c1) ⊕ c1 ⊕ r1 where
PIN1 represents the secret key of tag 1 and EPC represents its Electronic Product Code.
After replacing PIN1 to c1, tag 1 sends EPC1 andm1 to the reader. m1 is transmitted to
tag 2 which computes similar operations as tag 1 except that r2 uses m1 as input instead
of TS. The process is repeated for all n tags. The reader transmits mn to the pallet tag
which computes cpallet ← PRNG(PINpallet) and P ← CRC(TS,EPCpallet,mn, cpallet).
P and EPCpallet are sent back to the reader. During the veriﬁcation phase, the veriﬁer
computes m
′
i and checks if it matches with mi and similarly if P
′ = P . If all veriﬁca-
tions are successful, the proof is accepted. The authors may have made an incorrect
assumption, that in the medical industry, protocols should focus on data integrity and
authentication rather than on the security aspects. In my opinion, security should be
an integral part of any system including the medical industry as insecure protocols can
not only compromise the systems but also put the safety of the patients in jeopardy.
Chien et al. [26] showed that Huang and Ku’s [68] grouping proof protocol is vulnerable
to DoS attacks and replay attacks. They also pointed out the model ambiguity in
the protocol since the veriﬁer is online. It is argued that conventional authentication
protocols would be more eﬃcient in such cases as the veriﬁer can directly authenticate
and verify the presence of each tag but the purpose of grouping proof protocols is to
have the ability to verify the proof oﬄine for simultaneous scanning. DoS attack occurs
in [68] since the tags update their respective PINs whether the request was genuine or
not. A simple fake request by a malicious reader would desynchronize the PIN between
the tags and the legitimate reader. Chien et al. [26] proposed an improved version of
[68]. Both online and oﬄine versions are proposed but the discussion here is limited to
the oﬄine version. The protocol begins when the veriﬁer sends an encrypted timestamp
t = EKv(timestamp) to the reader where Kv represents the secret key shared with the
veriﬁer and E is the encryption function. The reader sends t to tag 1 and the pallet tag.
Tag 1 computes m1 = PRNG(EPC1 ⊕ PRNG(t) ⊕ PRNG(PIN1)) and sends EPC1
and m1 to the reader. m1 is sent to tag 2 which performs similar operations as tag 1
except it uses m1 instead of t. The process continues for all n tags. Finally, the reader
sends mn to the pallet tag which sends back mpallet and EPCpallet. The reader sends
the proof P as (t, EPC1,m1, ...EPCn,mn, EPCpallet,mpallet) to the veriﬁer.
Wickboldt and Piramuthu [164] pointed out that the above two protocols send EPC
which is the tag identiﬁcation code in clear and hence are vulnerable to tracing attacks.
Any malicious reader could simply send a timestamp TS and get back the EPC code.
From then on, the attacker would be able to track the tag. Replay attack pointed out
by Chien et al. [26] in Huang and Ku [68] is actually shown not to work by Wickboldt
and Piramuthu [164]. Chien et al. [26] argue that replay attack occurs when an attacker
sends future timestamps TS to the tags to collect its response and replay it later when
the timestamp actually becomes true. But, it is pointed out in [164] that the attack will
not work since the tag would have updated its PIN and the reader expects a diﬀerent
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t = EKV (timestamp)
< −−−−−−−−−
T1 :
m1 = PRNG(EPC1⊕
PRNG(t)⊕ PRNG(PIN1))
EPC1,m1
−−−− >
m1
< −−
T2 :
m2 = PRNG(EPC2⊕
PRNG(m1)⊕ PRNG(PIN2))
EPC2,m2
−−−− > :
:
:
mn−1
< −−
Tn :
mn = PRNG(EPCn ⊕ PRNG(m(n−1))
⊕PRNG(PINn))
EPCn,mn mn
−−−− > −− >
mpallet, EPCpallet
< −−−−−−−−−
Figure 2.6: Chien et al.’s Grouping Proof Protocol - [26]
PIN . Also, it is shown that Chien et al.’s [26] protocol is vulnerable to tag impersonation
attack [164]. In the online-veriﬁer version, every tag in sequence is exposed to the
vulnerability because of the independent way in which the tags are authenticated. When
the reader sends the random number r, every tag responds with mi = PRNG(EPCi ⊕
PRNG(PINi)⊕PRNG(r)⊕PRNG(ri)), EPCi, ri. The PRNG function is known to
the adversary and PRNG(EPCi⊕PRNG(PINi)) is constant because either of them is
not updated and an adversary observing an authentication round can replay the message
to the reader thereby impersonating any tag.
Yu et al. [179] proposed a grouping proof protocol to avoid medication errors and
improve patient safety. The protocol is based on Lightweight Mutual Authentical Pro-
tocol (LMAP) and uses logic gates AND, XOR, ADD. The protocol begins when the
reader sends a “Hello” message to tags A and B. The tags reply with their index-
pseudonyms IDSa and IDSb respectively. The reader then connects to the server
to retrieve the keys Ka1,Ka2,Kb1,Kb2, generates a random number r and computes
Aa = IDSa⊕Ka1⊕r, Ba = IDSa∨Ka2+r, Ab = IDSb⊕Kb1⊕r and Bb = IDSb∨Kb2+r.
It then sends Aa||Ba and IDSb to tag A and Ab||Bb and IDSa to tag B. Tag A
computes ma = [IDSa + IDSb + (IDa + Xa)] ⊕ r and sends it to the reader which
forwards it to tag B. Tag B computes mb = [(IDb + Xb) + ma] ⊕ r and sends it
to the reader. The proof consists of PAB = (IDSa, IDSb, r,ma,mb). The tags up-
date their keys as Kn+11 = K
n
1 ⊕ r ⊕ (Kn2 + ID), Kn+12 = Kn2 ⊕ r ⊕ (Kn1 + ID) and
IDSn+1 = IDSn+(r⊕Kn2 )⊕ID. Barasz et al. [5] have found vulnerabilities in LMAP
and have shown how a passive attacker could ﬁnd the ID/secrets after eavesdropping
on a few consecutive LMAP rounds. This makes Yu et al.’s [179] protocol prone to the
same vulnerabilities (also pointed out in [67]). Huang [67] also showed Yu et al.’s [179]
protocol to be vulnerable to forgery attack. If an attacker replaces IDSb with IDSa+1
during the authentication phase of the reader to tag A and ma is replaced with 0 during
the authentication phase of the reader to tag B, then:
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m
′
a = [IDSa + IDSb + (IDa +Xa)]⊕ r
= [IDSa + (IDSa + 1) + (IDa +Xa)]⊕ r
= [0 + (IDa +Xa)]⊕ r
= (IDa +Xa)⊕ r
m
′
b = [(IDSb +Xb) +ma]⊕ r
= [(IDSb +Xb) + 0]⊕ r
= (IDSb +Xb)⊕ r
The attacker then obtains the proof as PAB = (IDSa, IDSb, r,m
′
a,m
′
b) and also (IDa+
Xa), (IDb + Xb), IDSa and IDSb. Although the protocol updates IDS,K1 and K2,
the values of (IDa +Xa) and (IDb +Xb) will remain the same during the next round
thereby enabling a forged proof generation during the next protocol run.
Tag Ta Reader Tag Tb
Hello, t Hello, t
< −−− −−− >
IDSa, ra, va IDSb, rb, vb
−−−−− > < −−−−−
αa, IDSb, t
< −−−−
βa,ma αb, IDSa,ma
−−− > −−−−−− >
βb,mb
< −−
Pab = (IDSa, IDSb, t,ma,mb)
Figure 2.7: Wu et al.’s Binding Proof Protocol - [165]
Wu et al. [165] proposed an improved version of the protocol that addresses these issues.
The protocol is based on 16-bit PRNG and XOR operations. The reader sends “Hello”
and timestamp t to the tags Ta and Tb. Tag Ta responds back with {IDSa, ra, va =
F (F (Ya) ⊕ F (t) ⊕ ra)}, where IDSa is the index pseudonym, Ya is the current secret
key, ra is a random number, F is the random permutation function built upon PRNG
and XOR and va is the authenticator. Tag Tb sends back a similar response. The
reader forwards the messages along with t to the server which checks if the timestamp
is within the threshold. If yes, it then veriﬁes va and vb. If successful, it generates two
keys Ka = F (F (F (Ya)) ⊕ ra), Kb = F (F (F (Yb)) ⊕ rb) and computes Y ′a = F (Ya ⊕ ra),
IDS
′
a = F (Y
′
a ⊕ IDSa), Y
′
b = F (Yb ⊕ rb), IDS
′
b = F (Y
′
b ⊕ IDSb). It then updates
Ya, IDSa, Yb, IDSb with Y
′
a , IDS
′
a, Y
′
b , IDS
′
b respectively. The two keys Ka,Kb are sent
to the reader which computes αa = F (Ka ⊕ F (t) ⊕ IDSb) and sends {αa, IDSb, t}
to tag Ta which uses its secret key Ya to compute Ka and veriﬁes if αa matches. If
yes, it computes ma = F (IDSa ⊕ IDSb ⊕ F (t) ⊕ Xa) and βa = F (F (Ka) ⊕ ma) and
sends them to the reader. Tag Ta updates Ya and IDSa the same way as the server.
After authenticating βa, the reader computes αb = F (Kb ⊕ F (t) ⊕ IDSa) and sends
{αb, IDSa,ma} to tag Tb. Tag Tb uses its secret key Yb to compute Kb and checks if αb
matches. If yes, it computes mb = F (IDSb⊕IDSb⊕ma⊕Xb) and βb = F (F (Kb)⊕mb)
and sends them to the reader. It then updates its values Yb and IDSb the same way
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as the server. After receiving mb and βb, the reader veriﬁes if βb matches and if yes,
it conﬁrms that both the tags exist in the ﬁeld simultaneously. It compiles the proof
Pab = (IDSa, IDSb, t,ma,mb) and sends it to the server. In my opinion, the protocol
has a weak construction as the messages (for e.g., va = F (F (Ya)⊕F (t)⊕ra) and vb) are
constructed using two parameters ra, t that are sent in the clear. Hence, the security of
the message relies only on Ya and the permutation functions, invalidating the purpose
of the two variables. Also, the protocol actively involves a server to validate and send
keys which makes it an online yoking proof protocol. Also, since the timestamp is
sent in clear, replay attacks are possible when an attacker sends the tags timestamps
from the future and plays the messages later when the timestamp becomes true. More
importantly, the server updates its secrets independently and if the message ﬂows to
the tags were blocked by an attacker, it will result in desynchronization of keys. The
authors have pointed out this but the protocol is not designed to handle the scenario.
Periz-Lopez et al. [123] identiﬁed several weaknesses in many of the protocols: mul-
tiple impersonation attacks in [13], traceability attacks and subset replay attacks in
[26] and forged proof attacks in [26, 68]. Based on their ﬁndings, several useful design
guidelines are given that are to be taken into consideration when developing group-
ing proof protocols. One aspect where there may be impracticality is, creating de-
pendence based on the inputs from all the previous tags instead of just the previous
one tag in order to prove simultaneity. In my opinion, this could become a scalabil-
ity issue when there are thousands of tags participating in grouping proofs. Also, it
is pointed out forward security is still an open research problem due to the complex-
ities brought in by the oﬄine nature of the veriﬁer. A yoking proof protocol named
as Kazahaya has been proposed based on their guidelines. The reader sends an en-
crypted timestamp tn = EKv(T imestampn) to TagA, where E denotes the encryption
function with a secret key Kv. TagA generates two random numbers rTA , r
′
TA
and com-
putes M1group = PRNG(IDgroup ⊕ rTA ⊕ PRNG(Kgroup) ⊕ PRNG(tn)) and MTA =
PRNG(IDTA ⊕ r
′
TA
⊕ PRNG(KTA) ⊕ PRNG(tn + 1)), where IDgroup,Kgroup, IDTA
and KTA represent the group ID, group key, tag ID and tag key respectively.. It then
sends {rTA , r
′
TA
,M1group,MTA} to the reader which forwards {tn, rTA ,M1group,MTA} to
TagB. TagB computes M
1∗
group using the stored and received values and veriﬁes if
it matches with M1group. If yes, it knows that the other participant is in the same
group as this. It then computes M2group,MTB similar to TagA but uses M
1
group in-
stead of tn in the ﬁrst message and MTA instead of tn + 1 in the second message. TagB
sends {rTB , r
′
TB
,M2group,MTB} to the reader which forwards {rTB ,M2group,MTB} to TagA.
TagA performs similar group check and computes the proof MTAB = PRNG(IDTA ⊕
MTA⊕PRNG(MTB )⊕PRNG(KTA+1)). The reader generates the evidence as eTABn =
{IDTA , IDTB , tn, r
′
TA
, r
′
TB
,MTAB} and sends it to the veriﬁer. The authors note that
their protocol does not provide forward security. Ma et al. [105] extended this yoking
proof protocol to grouping proof protocol but have not addressed the forward security
issue. Also, it relies on an active clock tag which is assumed to be uncompromisable. In
my opinion, this assumption is not correct as any given tag is subject to the same type
of attack especially where there is a signiﬁcant participation of the tag in the protocol
which is true in this case.
From the above discussion, it is clear that many of the grouping proof protocols are
vulnerable to known attacks on RFID. They are also not compliant with EPC C1G2
standard due to use of hash functions or other complex encryption schemes, making
them not viable for large scale implementation. Further, the existing approaches do not
meet the unique design requirements of grouping proof. Below is a summary of these
ﬁndings and the recommendations made to build a robust grouping proof protocol.
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2.1.2 Findings and Recommendations
• As seen, grouping proofs has a wide range of industrial application such as in hos-
pitals, manufacturing, military, pharmaceutical, bank and airport. This research
ﬁnds that the potential of grouping proof can be put to use in yet another appli-
cation i.e., in bulk cash transactions of RFID enabled currency. It is imperative
that a protocol that has a vast impact in our everyday life should be robust, meet
the security requirements and resilient from attacks. Yet, it is seen that this is not
the case for the following reasons.
• Protocols that use hash functions such as [9, 20, 25, 94] or ECC such as [1, 7,
32, 65, 66, 84, 85, 100, 104] are not viable for large scale implementations that
use EPC C1G2 passive tags, as they are highly resource constrained in terms of
computational abilities. Use of light-weight cryptography that can achieve the
required security and also facilitate large scale implementations is recommended.
• Protocols that are based on simple operations PRNG,XOR,CRC,AND,OR,NOT
have also been shown to be vulnerable to several attacks but they are mostly due to
the incorrect usage of the functions and not necessarily the weaknesses of the func-
tions by itself. However, the PRNG based protocols use the 16-bit PRNG. As
16-bit PRNG is prone to brute-force attacks, use of 128-bit PRNG that increases
security and are still implementable in low cost passive tags is recommended.
• Many of the protocols send their tag ID in clear which is not recommended. An
adversary simply eavesdropping on the communication can get the real tag ID
and can use it to conduct tracking attacks. This could potentially compromise
the safety and security of the object attached to the tag (especially if the tags are
attached to humans e.g., in hospital settings). It is imperative that the tag IDs
are encrypted strongly so an adversary cannot decipher them.
• The current approaches to grouping proof protocols do not verify the integrity of
the messages received during the protocol run. This makes the protocols vulnerable
to active attacks and also leads to invalid proof generation.
• Forward Secrecy remains an open research issue in grouping proof due to the oﬄine
nature of the veriﬁer.
• In many of the current approaches to grouping proof, the reader is used only to
transmit and receive messages. The capacity of the reader is under utilized and it
is recommended that the reader participates actively in the protocol to assist in
thwarting active-attacks and also prevent invalid proof generation.
• Finally, even though much work has been done in grouping proofs, the following
are true: a) many of the protocols fail to meet the security requirements; b) they
have been shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks; c) they do not comply with
EPC C1G2 standard due to the use of expensive cryptographic functions/hash
operations that cannot be implemented in low cost passive tags; and d) they
are incomplete in terms of meeting the unique requirements of grouping proof.
A grouping proof protocol that is complete both in terms of functionality and
security requirements is yet to be seen.
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2.2 Ownership Transfer
One of the important features of an RFID system is the secure ownership transfer of
objects from one owner to another. For example, objects change hands frequently in
diﬀerent stages of a supply chain from manufacturing, to distribution, to warehousing,
to retailing, to end-customers. It is imperative to make this transfer happen in a secure
fashion and that the internal state of the RFID tag reﬂects these changes accurately.
Ownership transfer requires that control (i.e., communication capabilities) of a tag is
transferred from the current owner(s) to the new owner(s). To elaborate, ownership
transfer should ensure that only the new owners are able to interrogate the tag and
the previous owners are prevented from communicating with the tag. However, in
order to prevent against compromise of the ownership transfer process, security of the
process needs to be guaranteed. Secure ownership transfer requires at a minimum the
establishment of shared secrets between the tags and the new owners. In order to
achieve this, it is important that the establishment of new secrets is achieved in a
secure fashion thus preventing the previous owner from communicating with the tag
after the ownership transfer. It is also important that the new owner is not able to
compromise previous communications of the tag. It is therefore imperative that any
ownership transfer scheme incorporates security requirements and protects the privacy
of both the new and previous owners of the tag. Formal deﬁnitions for secure ownership
and ownership transfer are provided by van Deursen et al. [156] and the deﬁnition of
“ownership” and “secure ownership” used in this thesis is based on this. Ownership is
deﬁned as the ability of an agent to successfully complete a “ownership test” protocol
with a tag. Here, “ownership” implies “exclusive ownership” with reference to ownership
transfer. A protocol is said to provide secure ownership transfer if an agent becomes
the owner of a tag only after successful execution of the ownership transfer protocol.
An overview of the common terminologies used in the context of tag ownership/delegation
is presented here as observed by Deursen et al. [156]. A formal model is prescribed for
stateful security protocols which is used to deﬁne ownership and ownership transfer in
terms of concepts and security properties. Stateful Security Protocols: This approach is
based on the model for stateless protocols by Cremers and Mauw [33] which is extended
by adding support for stateful protocols. A Protocol is deﬁned as a map from an n-tuple
of distinct roles to an n-tuple of role speciﬁcations. A role speciﬁcation deﬁnes the role
of an honest agent executing a role. Typical roles are the reader and tag roles. A par-
ticular execution of a protocol role by an agent is called a run. An event is either the
sending or receiving of a message (referred as read event). The term signals is used to
indicate that a certain point in the protocol has been reached. The exchanged messages
between roles consist of terms which are built using nonces, constants etc. Variables are
of two kinds viz., local variables and global variables. The former models the stateless
part of the protocols whose values assigned through read events and reassigned every
run and their values do not change. The stateful part of protocols is modeled by global
variables which receive values through explicit assignments and their values are main-
tained across diﬀerent runs. A collection of agents execute a set of protocols denoted
by traces (
∏
). A trace is a list of events occurring in interleaved execution of protocol
runs. A system state is a ﬁve-tuple containing the set “A” that is used to record active
runs. Each run contains an identiﬁer, name of the executing agent, list of events that
are yet to be executed and the local variable assignments. The current state of global
variable assignments is stored in G. Messages sent by agents are placed in send buﬀer
SB and agents read messages from read buﬀer RB. The intruder’s knowledge is kept
in I. Message sequence charts are used to represent protocol speciﬁcations graphically.
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Ownership: Two types of views are discussed on tag ownership. The ﬁrst is the system
view in which the ownership of a tag means the ability to interact with the tag in a
pre-deﬁned manner. In other words, it is the ability to execute a protocol with the
tag (e.g., mutual authentication protocol). This protocol is called as the ownership
test protocol. This test protocol does not have to be implemented on the tag. It is
merely used to deﬁne what constitutes an owner and hence can be a virtual protocol.
Ownership is tested in a virtual environment with the necessary elements and without
the presence of adversarial inﬂuence. In some context, the knowledge of a key may
be the deﬁning notion of ownership while in others, it may be ability to execute some
protocol. The notion of ownership transfer is relative to the test protocol. To model
the testing of ownership, the notion of micro traces is used by allowing only one run
for each of the parties involved and disallowing intruder activities. This is denoted by
μtracesP (a1..an)(s) for a protocol P (a1..an are agents starting from an initial state s).
The second view is the agent view in which each agent records in a local data structure,
the tag it believes to be the owner of. Agent view of ownership is deﬁned using tag
holders. Tag Owner is deﬁned as an agent R that owns a tag T with respect to the
protocol P , if in the absence of all adversarial activity, R and T can successfully complete
the protocol P . In this context, R is called the owner of T with respect to P and T is
called R’s property with respect to P . A Tag Holder is an agent which, based on its
protocol executions and local data structure, believes it is the owner of a tag. An agent
holding a tag T with respect to test protocol P is represented by the variable holds(P, T ).
By modeling tag-holding explicitly, it is noted that an agent shall not transfer ownership
of a tag unless it actually holds the tag. The role changes the value of the holds variable
with two signals: obtain which indicates an assignment of true to the holds variable and
release which indicates an assignment of false to the holds variable.
Secure Ownership occurs when the protocols ensure that whenever an agent is a holder
of a tag, it is also the owner of that tag. Secure ownership provides a guarantee to the
owner that it cannot be “disowned” as long as it holds a tag but it does not guarantee
that no other agent can have simultaneous ownership of the tag which brings the notion
of exclusive ownership. Exclusive Ownership is deﬁned as the requirement that if an
agent holds a tag no other agent is the owner of the tag. A Ownership Protocol is where
the executing agent Q can become the owner of a tag, if it has not been the owner of
the tag. Secure Ownership Transfer is said to have occurred if whenever an agent R
becomes the owner of a tag if it was the result of an execution of an ownership transfer
protocol - in other words, the transfer must be intentional. A protocol P is said to be
de-synchronization resistant, if a tag never loses all its owners with respect to P .
To summarize, ownership is deﬁned as an agent’s ability to successfully complete a
“ownership test” protocol with a tag. Here, “ownership” implies “exclusive ownership”
w.r.t ownership transfer. A protocol provides secure ownership transfer if an agent
becomes the owner of a tag after successful execution of the ownership transfer protocol.
2.2.1 Related Work
Ownership transfer protocols can be broadly classiﬁed as schemes that rely on a trusted
intermediary (Trusted Third Party (TTP)) [81, 117] and schemes that do not [51, 142].
In the former, ownership transfer is achieved based on shared secrets between the TTP,
the servers and the tag. While in the latter, secret(s) will need to be negotiated between
the tag and the new server prior to ownership transfer.
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One of the earliest schemes proposed for ownership transfer was by Osaka et al. [117]
based on hash function and symmetric key cryptosystem. In the ﬁrst phase of the
protocol, the manufacturer generates the symmetric key k and writes Ek(ID) to the
tag. The authentication phase begins with the reader broadcasting the query along
with a random number r to the tag. The tag computes a = H(Ek(ID)⊕ r) and sends it
back to the reader. The reader sends a, r to the database which computes a using its own
Ek(ID) and received r. It then veriﬁes it with the received a. If successful, it decrypts
Ek(ID) to ﬁnd the ID as Dk(Ek(ID)). It then retrieves the associated details for the
ID from the database and sends it to the reader. For transferring the ownership, the
owner broadcasts the new symmetric key k′ to the database. In addition to performing
the above steps, the database encrypts the ID with the new symmetric key k′. It
then computes e = Ek(ID) ⊕ Ek′(ID) and updates k ← k′ and Ek(ID) ← Ek′(ID).
Finally, it sends back e and Info(ID) to the reader which forwards e to the tag. The
tag computes Ek′(ID) from e and Ek(ID) and updates Ek(ID) to Ek′(ID). Now, the
current owner gives k′, ID, Info(ID) to the new owner who then changes k′ ← k′′ to
prevent the previous owner from accessing the tag from that point.
Two vulnerabilities have been identiﬁed in Osaka et al.’s [117] scheme in [74, 92, 177].
Each one has suggested slightly varying solutions. It is argued that the original scheme
does not provide forward security and does not resist DoS attacks. It is noted that
when the secret data Ek′(ID) of the tag is disclosed, all past secret data of Ek(ID) will
also be disclosed and hence the previous communication messages will be exposed. Dos
attack is shown to be possible by tampering the message e sent to the tag which the
tag uses to update the secrets. The tampered message causes the server and the tag to
have diﬀerent secrets thereby causing de-synchronization and thus DoS attack. In [177],
it is assumed that an attacker compromises a tag and obtains the secret Ek′(ID). The
attacker also eavesdrops on the communications and obtains e = Ek(ID) ⊕ Ek′(ID).
It is now a simple matter of performing e ⊕ Ek′(ID) which gives Ek(ID). Using the
same method, the attacker can extract all previous secret data thereby causing forward
secrecy issue. The DoS attack is made possible by replacing the message e with a
random number x and transmit x to the tag. The tag updates its secret to x⊕Ek(ID).
During the next authentication phase, the secrets would not match with the database
and the tag is not authenticated. The suggested ﬁx is that the database computes
e = H(Ek(ID)) ⊕ Ek′(ID) and also mac = H(Ek(ID) ⊕ Ek′(ID)), where H is a hash
function. Both e and mac are sent to the tag. The tag extracts Ek′(ID) = e⊕Ek(ID)
and computes mac′ = (Ek(ID) ⊕ Ek′(ID)) using the extracted Ek′(ID). If mac and
mac′ match, the tag updates the secret data, otherwise it does not. As the database uses
hash function to compute e, the attacker cannot get the secret data thereby preserving
forward secrecy and since the tag checks the integrity of the message received usingmac,
it prevents the DoS attack.
Tag Killing is pointed out as a security ﬂaw in Osaka et al.’s scheme in [74]. Technically
they refer to the same problem of tampering the message e (replacing it with a random
number x) thereby causing the tag and the server to have diﬀerent secrets. The authors
also point out that the integrity of the message not being validated and a single bit
error during transmission could make the tag useless. The ﬁx is very similar to the one
discussed above. The diﬀerence is only in how the messages are constructed. Here, m1
which is actually e in the original protocol is computed as m1 = Ek(ID) ⊕ Ek′(ID)
and m2 (which is the mac discussed previously) as m2 = H(Ek′(ID)) ⊕ rdb), where
rdb is a random number. Lei and Cao [92] discuss one additional vulnerability which
is traceability. It is argued that if the key k is not changed after every round, the tag’s
location privacy could be compromised. The attack is made possible when the attacker
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Owner Database Reader Tag
ID, k,Ek(ID) r Ek(ID)
Query, r
−−− > a = H(Ek(ID)⊕ r)
a, r a
k′ < −− < −−
−− >
If computed a = received a
Dk(Ek(ID))→ ID
e→ Ek(ID)⊕ Ek′(ID)
Ek(ID)→ Ek′(ID)
k → k′
Info(ID), e e
−−−−− > −− > e⊕ Ek(ID) = Ek′(ID)
Figure 2.8: Osaka et al.’s Ownership Transfer Protocol - [117]
transmits the same random number r to the tag. The tag’s response a is computed
only using Ek(ID) and the attacker’s r. The attacker will receive the same response
a allowing the tag to be tracked. A ﬁx is suggested with the tag’s response for the
query. The tag generates a random number s and computes a = H(Ek(ID) ⊕ r ‖ s)
and transmits r, s and a to the database. The database’s response e remains the same
as seen above but m is computed as m = H(Ek(ID) ⊕ s ‖ e). The tag veriﬁes m and
if it is correct, it computes Ek′(ID) from e ⊕H(Ek(ID)) and updates its key. It then
computes b = H(Ek′(ID) ‖ e ‖ s) which is sent to the server. The database validates b
and if it is validated, it updates k = k′ and Ek(ID) = Ek′(ID). Here, forward secrecy is
preserved by using the hash function which prevents the attacker from getting Ek(ID).
Replay attack is prevented by having both the reader and the tag generate random
numbers. DoS attack is prevented by having the database update its values after the
tag has successfully updated its own values. Japinnen and Hamalainen [74] proposed
an improved version of [117] by using a hash function to protect the integrity of the key
being transferred but Kapoor and Piramuthu [80] have shown that scheme suﬀers from
desynchronization problems.
Fouladgar and Aﬁﬁ [51] proposed an ownership delegation and ownership transfer pro-
tocol based on pseudonyms without the need for a centralized database. The authors
propose two implementations of the protocol one using hash function and the other
based on symmetric cryptographic function. In the ownership transfer protocol, the
reader’s query and the tag’s response are forwarded to the database D along with an
ownership transfer ﬂag OT and its credentials. If the credentials are valid, D sends
back H(NT | Kp | Ku) where NT is the nonce, Kp is the pseudonym key used to create
pseudonyms and Ku is the update key used to renew keys. The reader R transmits this
to the tag T along with OT . After veriﬁcation, the tag forces counter C to be Cmax
and initiates the update process. The new owner Dnew updates the keys by generating
a random number δ and using NT . It encodes δ with the symmetric key cryptographic
function f and old key Ku before sending it to the tag. When the tag gets δ it updates
its keys. Once the update completes, the previous owner Dold and its readers cannot
identify/authenticate the tag anymore. As noted earlier, the use of hash function or
keyed encryption functions is not in compliance with EPC C1G2 standard. Also, in
both the schemes, the update of the secret keys Ku and Kp is not protected against
desynchronization. An attacker can cause DoS by blocking the ﬁnal ACK message to
the tag leading to the back-end database and the tag having diﬀerent keys. The authors
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argue that it is an issue that is not inherent to the scheme but rather due to the nature
of the wireless channel, which in my opinion is not a valid argument.
Seo et al. [138] proposed a lightweight protocol that is based on PRNG function. The
protocol uses a proxy for individual and universal re-encryption. The proxy P is referred
to as the RFID GUARDIAN in Rieback et al. [129], which is a reader that can be
integrated into cell phone. It is assumed that PKI is established and that P exists
around its own tags i.e., within the reading range of 1-2 meters. P stores the private
key, tag identiﬁer, PIN , server location and Access Control List (ACL). Tag T has
PRNG capabilities and stores PIN and C, where C is the ciphertext created using
ElGamal encryption algorithm. The server S stores the private key, public key, EPC,
Tag ID, Tag Owner and other relevant data. The private key (SK) and public key (PK)
corresponding to the SK are generated and managed by the server. For the ownership
transfer from A to B, owner A sends E(PKB,MA ‖ SL ‖ PIN) to owner B where SL
represents the server location. MA indicates E(PKS , SigA(m ‖ cmd) ‖ CertA) where
cmd represents the ownership command, SigA and CertA represent the signature and
certiﬁcate of A respectively. Owner B decrypts the message to get the server location
and PIN and sends E(PKS , SigB(MA) ‖ CertB) to S. S decrypts the message with its
private key. If the ownership transfer is identiﬁed to be an authorized one, S updates
previous key pairs with new key pairs for the tag and the ownership of the tag from A
to B. S then sends E(PKB, x ‖ m) to B. B then computes G(PIN) to generate PIN ′,
where G is the PRNG function. It then selects a random encryption factor r = (ko, k1)
and generates the ciphertext C = [(α0, β0); (α1, β1)] = [(my
′k0 , gk0); (y
′k1 , gk1)]. B then
sends (C ‖ PIN ′)⊕G(PIN) to T and updates PIN to PIN ′. Tag T computes G(PIN)
using the PIN stored in its memory, performs (C ′ ‖ PIN ′)⊕G(PIN) to obtain C ′ and
PIN ′. It then updates PIN to PIN ′ and C to C ′.
Koralalage et al. [86] proposed a protocol named POP (Product-ﬂow with Ownership-
Transfer Protocol) that ensures the privacy and security of the tags throughout the prod-
uct life cycle. The scheme uses the lightweight Grain1 stream cipher algorithm. The
reader generates the nonce NI and sends the message {Initial,NI , IDI , S, IDT },Ka
where IDI represents the reader ID, IDT represents the tag ID, S is the shared secret,
Ka is the authentication key and Initial is the publicly deﬁned initialization message.
The tag checks for the correctness of Initial and decrypts the message. It then gen-
erates a nonce NT and responds back with the message IDI , {IDI , NI , NT },Ka. After
veriﬁcation, the reader sends one of the messages back to the tag depending on the
type of request made by the user using the input ﬂag Fu. The tag veriﬁes the message
from the reader and generates the response R based on the ﬂag Fu. It then generates
the message IDI , {NI , IDI , R},Ka and sends it back to the reader. The reader veriﬁes
and decrypts the message to perform a database lookup for the EPC or do a database
update for the EPC. The POP method deﬁnes the ownership by storing two secrets (Ka
and S) inside the tag. Transferring the ownership means changing those two secrets to
K ′a and S′. Before purchase, those two keys act as authentication key and shared secret
and after purchase they act as username and password. The protocol is shown to be
vulnerable to tracking attacks [81].
Lim and Kwon [98] proposed an authentication protocol that satisﬁes both forward
and backward traceability and supports complete tag ownership transfer. The authors
emphasize on traceability as an important issue and state that when the adversary has
access to the tag memory content giving full capability of the tag, it is very important to
see how the past and the future transactions of the tag are related based on the current
internal state of the tag at the time of memory break-in. Their proposed protocol is
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based on a one-way hash key chain that is used to evolve a tag secret in response to
every query request. The back-end database maintains a key chain of length m evolved
from the tag secret of the last successful authentication. The tag secret is evolved in two
diﬀerent ways: if the authentication is successful, both the tag and the database refresh
the tag secret probabilistically using the exchanged random numbers; if the protocol
run fails, tag updates its secret deterministically. To prevent the de-synchronization a
reverse-order key chain is maintained by the database and veriﬁed by the tag and also
by keeping two key chains based on old secret and new secret.
In the initialization phase, the server chooses a random secret si for the tag Ti, evaluates
(m− 1) evolutions of si, extracts the key identiﬁers tji for sji using the extract function.
The server also chooses a random ui for each tag Ti and computes a key chain wi of
length n, used in the reverse order to authenticate the server and to trigger the refresh of
the tag secret. The tag stores the pair tag secret, server authenticator as (si, wi,T ) and
initializes the counter to 0. The server makes two entries in its database for the tag Ti
viz., Dold[i] and Dnew[i]. In the authentication phase, the reader picks a random number
r1 and sends it to the tag. The tag chooses a random number r2, computes ext(si, l2) and
σ1 = ext(f(si, r1 ‖ r2), l1) and sends (ti, r2, σ1) to the reader which is forwarded to the
server along with r1. Here, where ext(x, l) denotes a simple extract function returning
l bits out of x; l1, l2 represent bit length of random challenges/response and bit length
of the tag secret respectively; and f represents the pseudorandom function to generate
authenticators. The server looks for a match to the received ti and computes the tag
secret to tji by s
′
i = g(si)
j , where g() represents a pseudo random function to build the
forward key chain used to evolve the tag secrets. It then computes σ2 = f(s
′
i, (r2 ‖ r1)) ⊕
wi,S . The server moves the data found in the identiﬁed entry toDold[i] and generates new
data for Dnew[i]. The reader forwards σ2 to the tag, which after veriﬁcation, updates its
secret and authenticator pair. If the validation fails, the failure counter is incremented
by 1. In order to accomplish the ownership transfer, the new owner is required to use
her mobile reader to securely communicate with the server and receive all the relevant
information from the server. The new owner can then take ownership of the tag by
simply reading the tag via her mobile reader. This will make the tag refresh its secret
based on the randomness shared with the new mobile reader and no one else can read
the tag from then on. The protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracking attacks [81].
Molnar et al. [112] proposed an ownership transfer protocol that addresses the in-
vasion of privacy issue through the use of pseudonym protocol and Trusted Center
(TC). The protocol allows for time-limited delegation where the reader receives the
ability to recognize the next q pseudonyms for that tag. The protocol requires only
limited cryptographic functionality. The tag interrogates the tag which responds with
a pseudonym. When a reader ﬁrst sees a tag it is unable to recognize, the reader can
send the pseudonym it received to the TC. If the reader is authorized for this tag, the
TC returns the tag’s identity and a secret that allows the reader to access the tag for
a limited time. The protocol is based on a tree of secrets of depth d = d1 + d2. Each
node in the tree has its own k-bit secret key. The ﬁrst d1 levels of the tree contain node
secrets that are chosen uniformly and independently at random by the TC. Each node
at depth d1 corresponds to a unique tag. Level d2 contains secrets that are derived
using a tree construction recommended by Goldreich et al. [56], where each node is
labeled with a secret and the secrets for the children are derived by applying a pseu-
dorandom generator. The tag keeps a counter T.c which identiﬁes a leaf at level d of
the tree and each counter value corresponds to a new pseudonym for this tag. The
tag responds to a query by generating a random number r and sending a pseudonym
(r, p) = (r, (Fh(c1..1)(r), Fh(c1..2)(r), ..., Fh(c1..d)(r))) where F is the pseudorandom func-
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tion and h(c1..i) represents the secrets along the path in the tree of secrets from the
root to the tag’s current leaf T.c. Since the tag increments the counter c for each query,
it will use a diﬀerent path of secrets and hence a diﬀerent pseudonym for every query.
This is what enables delegation since a reader can be given a subtree of secrets that will
expire after a certain number of tag reads. Given the pseudonym, the TC can identify
the tag’s real ID using a depth-ﬁrst search to ﬁnd a path in the tree that matches the
response p. The TC then decides whether to reveal the ID to the reader or not based
on the privilege settings.
A reader can be delegated to access a certain tag by prescribing the tag’s counter to
an interval [L,R], 1 ≤ L ≤ R ≤ 2d. To delegate access to leaves in an interval [L,R],
the TC determines the smallest set S ⊆ {0, 1}≥d1 of tree nodes that cover the interval.
The TC then sends H |S to the reader along with the tag ID where H represents a
function chosen by the TC and S represents a preﬁx-closed set S = {t1..l, ..., t1..d1}. Now
the reader no longer needs to communicate with the TC since H |S contains everything
it needs to know to perform the search. After the tag updates itself past the leaf R,
the reader can no longer recognize the subsequent pseudonyms from this tag since the
counter T.c will have updated past the subtree of secrets known to the reader. The
reader’s access to the tag has eﬀectively expired at this point.
If a reader has not been delegated access to a tag, the ownership transfer is simple. The
TC is notiﬁed of the transfer which updates the privacy policy of the tag. When the
previous owner tries to access the tag, the TC checks for privileges and since the previous
owner no longer owns the tag, access is denied. If a reader has been delegated access
to a tag then one of the two following methods can be used to perform the ownership
transfer. Soft Killing is when the new owner learns from the TC how many leaves are
delegated to the previous owner. If this number is k, the new owner then reads the
tag K + 1 times which will have updated past the previous owner’s access making the
previous owner not able to recognize the pseudonyms anymore. The advantage to this
method is that it does not require shared secrets between the tag and the reader but it
requires many tag reads. Soft killing also opens up the possibility of DoS attack if an
adversary reads the tag many times. The second method is the Increasing Tag Counter
method. Here, the new owner increases the counter on the tag from c to c′. The new
owner sends the tag a random seed r, after which a mutual authentication is performed
and a secure channel is established using the shared secret Fh(c)(r). The new owner
then sends c′ plus a proof that he knows the secret for the leaf c′ to the tag over a secure
channel. By doing so, the owner can jump over the previous owner’s delegated leaves
and can be sure that the previous owner cannot read the tag anymore. The advantage
to this method is that it requires only one read but also requires the tag to implement
a more complex protocol. The protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracking attacks
because several tags share common bits of information which is a liability when one of
the tags is compromised [81].
Jin et al. [75] proposed a hash based ownership transfer protocol (HBOT) for lightweight
RFID tags. The protocol is not EPC compliant due to the use of hash function. The
authors point out some vulnerabilities and disadvantages in the ownership transfer pro-
tocols proposed by others. Molar et al.’s [112] protocol is based on the hypothesis that
the previous and the new owners must trust the same Trusted Center (TC) and the TC
controls all the secret information. Saito et al.’s (2005) scheme uses symmetric cryp-
tosystem which has a vulnerability that when a tag is compromised, it exposes the secret
key shared between the TTP and the tags. Osaka et al.’s [117] scheme based on hash
function and symmetric key cryptosystem does not prevent DoS attacks and does not
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provide untraceability because the reader receives the same response from the tag if an
attacker queries the tag twice using the same random number. Fouladgar and Aﬁﬁ’s [51]
protocol based on hash functions is vulnerable to replay attacks since the tag’s response
is basically a combination of the secret Kp and a random number generated by the tag
and an adversary can reuse the tag’s response to impersonate a tag. Also, the protocol
does not change Kp and Ku which leads to traceability threats. The protocol by Lei
and Cao [92] is shown to be vulnerable to asynchronous attack.
Dimitriou [36] proposed an ownership transfer scheme named “RFIDdot”, based on
random nonces and a keyed encryption function. The protocol makes the assumption
that key updates are performed in a “private” environment. In my opinion, such an
assumption is not always practical. The protocol provides only one-way authentication
i.e., the reader authenticates the tag but the tag does not authenticate the reader.
The reader initiates the request to the tag which generates a random number rT and
computes M = ti ⊕ rT and N = fti(rT ), where f is the encryption function with the
key ti. It then sends M,N to the reader which then forwards it to the new server. The
new server forwards it to the old server via a secure channel. The old server veriﬁes
N = fti(M ⊕ ti) and if it ﬁnds a match it authenticates the tag. It then forwards the
tag’s token (si, ti) to the new server. The secrets of the tag are updated by the new
server by generating a new random number s
′
i and computes t
′
i = h(ti). This updated
information is forwarded to the new reader which authenticates the tag and completes
the protocol. The authors claim that the protocol protects from forward/backward
privacy, replay attack, DoS and MitM attacks. But the scheme has been shown to
suﬀer from desynchronization attacks due to selective blocking by an attacker leading
to permanent DoS [40] and it does not guarantee the privacy of the new owner [80].
Pagey and Hua [120] proposed a protocol named RFCommerce and presented a pay-
ment atomic protocol TagPay that facilitates payments and ownership transfer. Some
highlights of the previous work discussed in this paper are: In the protocol by Lim and
Kwon [98], it is noted that upon successful authentication, the tag’s secret is refreshed
probabilistically using the exchanged random numbers and upon failure, it is updated
deterministically. Pagey and Hua argue that this does not prevent an adversary from
permanently de-synchronizing the tag. The issue is resolved by introducing another
one-way key chain. Leinweber et al. [93] proposed a protocol that minimizes the cryp-
tographic eﬀort on a RIFD tag without the need for a back-end database record for
each tag and transfers ownership in a secure way. The protocol is based on public key
cryptography. It is noted that the diﬃculty with cryptographic security stems from the
reuse of keys. The use of one-time pad is an ideal solution that has as much random
key data as plaintext so every part of the ciphertext is encrypted independently. To
eliminate the need for a back-end database, the authors have chosen to use public key
cryptography on the tags. Elliptic Curve processors for 131 bit keys have been designed
with approximately 15K gates. Replay attacks are prevented by changing the session
key. One main drawback of the protocol as observed by the authors is, that the tags
themselves are not authenticated and so a reader can fool an owner about the existence
of a tag or a fake tag can fool a reader and owner. This however can be prevented by
storing a secret on every tag.
Zuo [188] proposed an ownership transfer protocol for a group of tags in one session.
A key feature of this protocol is that it solves the problem of dual ownership (which is
otherwise called as the windowing problem) where two entities possess the authentication
information of the same tag for a certain period during the ownership transfer process.
In the proposed protocol, the current and new owners are not allowed to simultaneously
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possess the same set of valid secrets of any tag in a group. The protocol is based on two
areas of RFID viz., tag ownership transfer and grouping proofs. The authors note that
it is important to ensure the atomic characteristic of a group ownership transfer, which
means that the tag ownership much be either transferred entirely as a group or aborted
altogether. Grouping proofs are used to prevent interleaving attacks. The authors claim
that the protocol provides resistance against attacks such as tag information leakage,
eavesdropping, tag impersonation, replay attacks and DoS/de-synchronization attacks.
The privacy of the new owner snew is ensured since it chooses new secret keys at its
discretion. The new keys are delivered to the tags securely by masking them with a
random number generated by snew. The current owner has no way to learn the masks
and hence cannot retrieve the new keys. Also, the previous owner privacy is ensured
since snew is not involved in any other in-between steps during the process when the
tag keys are updated, thereby preventing the new owner from learning anything about
the previous keys of the tags. Authorization recovery is supported by simply switching
the roles of snew and scurrent and letting the latter choose new keys and running the
protocol one more time.
Chen et al. [17] proposed an anti-counterfeit ownership transfer protocol that uses
lightweight computation via online authentication. The authors claim that the protocol
meets the EPC compliance, since it does not use any complex hash computations on
the tag side. This may be true but the protocol has two major vulnerabilities. The ﬁrst
vulnerability is in step 2 of the protocol where the reader sends a request message Mreg
to the tag and the tag responds with IDT , EPCT , SN where IDT is the tag ID, EPCT
is the electronic product code, SN is the serial number and SGT is the signature of the
tag. As per the protocol assumption, only the channel between the server and the reader
is assumed to be SSL enabled. The channel between the reader and the tag is insecure
and the messages from the tags to the reader are sent in clear. It is trivial to eavesdrop
on the communication between the tag and the reader and the tag ID and EPC code.
Using them, an adversary can conduct attacks such as DoS, reply/tag impersonation
and tracking attacks. The second vulnerability is that the reader is not authenticated
by the tag before it replies. Any rogue reader can query the tags to get the vital data
and could launch these attacks.
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Figure 2.9: Kulseng et al.’s Ownership Transfer Protocol - [88]
Kulseng et al. [88] proposed two lightweight ownership transfer protocols, one with a
TTP and another without a TTP, that are based on Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUF) and Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR). The setup phase in ownership
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transfer involves the previous owner giving IDS, ID and Gn+1 to the new owner where,
IDS is the index to the tag’s ID, Gn is the greeting shared by the reader and the
tag, Gn+1 is the greeting for the next round stored in the reader. The TTP is also
informed about the veriﬁcation pair (Gn, Gn+1). A secret PIN is shared between the
TTP and the tag, which is revealed neither to the previous owner nor to the new owner.
In the ownership transfer phase, the new reader sends a secure request to the TTP
using Gn+1 as a proof that it has access rights to the tag. After authenticating the
reader, TTP sends Kn ⊕ Gn ⊕ PIN to the reader where Kn is computed as F (PIN),
where F is the random permutation function. This is then forwarded to the tag which
computes Gn using the received data and compares it with the one it stores. If they
match, the tag knows that the message is from the TTP . The tag now generates a
new pair (G
′
n, G
′
n+1) to replace the old pair as G
′
n = P (Gn+2) and G
′
n+1 = P (G
′
n),
where P is the PUF function. To protect the new pair from being eavesdropped by
the previous owner during transmission, the tag generates two more random numbers
K
′
n = F (Kn) and K
′′
n = F (K
′
n). The tag then computes K
′
n ⊕ G
′
n+1, K
′′
n ⊕ G
′
n+2 and
LFSR(Gn⊕Gn+1). All three messages are sent to the reader which are then forwarded
to the TTP . After veriﬁcation, the TTP computes K
′
n and K
′′
n to obtain G
′
n, G
′
n+1
and sends them through a secure channel to the new reader. Now, the new reader can
perform mutual authentication with the tag. Both the TTP and the tag can update the
PIN internally using the F function and the old Gn as PINnew = F (PINold ⊕Gn).
The authors also discuss the possibility of ownership transfer without the involvement
of the TTP . One additional assumption in this case is that the tag-to-reader commu-
nications (backward channel) is much smaller than the reader-to-tag range and is not
intercepted/eavesdropped by the adversaries. The setup phase is the same as described
above and after two mutual authentication rounds, the previous owner no longer has
control over the tag since the last message is only heard by the new owner. Analysis
reveal that both the protocols are vulnerable to attacks. As noted in [88], the protocol
with TTP suﬀers from permanent desynchronization when an attacker selectively blocks
messages; while the protocol without a TTP is designed based on the assumption that
an attacker is not able to eavesdrop on the transmission over the wireless channel. This
is not a valid assumption as noted by Kapoor et al. [80].
Lopez et al. [122] and Cai et al. [15] discuss the vulnerability in Song et al.’s (2008)
ownership transfer scheme. It is shown that the secret update protocol is vulnerable
to de-synchronization attack by blocking the ﬁrst message (r1,M1,M2) from reaching
the tag, where r1 is the random number, M1 = fti(r1) ⊕ t
′
i and M2 = si ⊕ (t
′
i >> l/2)
are the messages. The adversary then forges a second message (r1,M
′
1,M
′
2) that will
be accepted by the tag which results in the tag’s secret be updated to a value that the
legitimate server does not know. Henceforth, the legitimate server cannot access the
tag resulting in de-synchronization. As a ﬁx, it is suggested that M2 is modiﬁed to
si ⊕ h(t′i) on the server side. Then on the tag side, si ←M2 ⊕ (t
′
i >> l/2) is revised to
si ←M2 ⊕ h(t′i), where h() is a hash function.
Song et al. [142] proposed a further revised version of Cai et al.’s [15] protocol in which
M2 = ft(r1 ‖ r2) remains unchanged and M3 is changed to s⊕ ft(r2 ‖ r1). Additionally,
the authors also propose a RFID pseudonym protocol. The protocol uses a pre-computed
lookup table for tag authentication resulting in O(1) work to identify and authenticate a
tag as opposed to O(n) in some other protocols. The look-up table contains a number of
entries (determined by the hash-chain length m) for each tag, one for each element of a
tag-speciﬁc hash-chain. Elements from this hash-chain are used as tag identiﬁers. In the
initialization phase the server S chooses l (bit-length of tag identiﬁer), lr (bit-length of a
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Figure 2.10: Periz Lopez et al.’s Ownership Transfer Protocol - [122]
random string), lm (bit-length of integer m), e, f and g as keyed-hash functions and h a
hash function. To build the look-up table, S chooses l-bit string s and computes the key
k = h(s). S chooses a random l-bit string x0 and computes the hash-chain xi = ek(xi−1)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m . Each value in the hash-chain is used as a one-time tag identiﬁer. S
stores s, k and the identiﬁers x0, x1 ... xm as the entries for the tag T in the look-up
table. Following the tag authentication, the secret update takes places if x = xm where
the secrets are updated from (s−1, k−1, s, k, x0, x1, ..., xm) to (s, k, s′, k′, x, x
′
1, x
′
2, ..., x
′
m).
When S wants to delegate tag T to an entity, it transfers the secret k and the identiﬁers
x0, x1 ... xm to the entity via a secure channel. Then the entity can authenticate the
tag a maximum of m times but cannot update the tag secrets since it does not know s.
For the tag ownership transfer, the secret update is accomplished as follows: Server S
chooses new secret s′, a random string r and an integer m′ . It then computes k′ = h(s′)
and Ms = gk(x ‖ r)⊕ (s ‖ k′ ‖ m′) and sends r,Ms to tag T . T computes (s ‖ k′ ‖ m′)
= Ms ⊕ gk(x ‖ r). If h(s) = k, then S is authenticated and T updates its secret from
k to k′ and its counter c to m′. T then computes MT = fk(r ‖ x) using the new secret
k and sends MT to S. If MT = fk′(r ‖ x), S now knows that T has received the new
secret k′ , and updates secrets s and k for T to s′ and k′ respectively. S computes the
hash-chain values, xi = ek(xi−1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m′, where x0 is set to x. Otherwise, S
starts over again. In the case of the Authorization Recovery Protocol, the old and new
owners need to store the pair of the tag secrets provided by the old owner. The protocol
allows the server to make T change its secret back to the value it had when S took
ownership of T from the old owner. Tag Information Privacy is provided since only
the server has access to the secrets of the tag which are required to identify a tag. Tag
Location Privacy is achieved since a tag’s reply is anonymous to an eavesdropper who
does not know k. Tag Impersonation is also not possible without the knowledge of k.
Reply Attacks cannot be accomplished because of the freshness of the random numbers.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack is prevented because of the use of the secrets k and s and the
random number r. For DoS Attacks, even if the keys are de-synchronized, the server
will detect the event because the tag will send as identiﬁer the value x0 in the server’s
look-up table. Thus the server can recover synchronization with the tag.
Erguler and Anarim [46] investigated the security vulnerabilities in the protocol pro-
posed by Song and Mitchell (2008) and suggest improvements. The main vulnerabilities
identiﬁed by them are the tag impersonation and de-synchronization attacks in addition
to the ﬂaw which allows a delegated entity to keep its delegation rights even after it
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expired. The tag impersonation attack is based on the assumption that the ability of an
adversary to compromise a delegated reader and obtain all the data stored in the reader.
By compromising a delegated reader, the attacker gets all the secrets of the tags that
this reader has rights to, which allows the reader to easily impersonate a tag. With this
information, the attacker ﬁrst chooses the tag to impersonate and initiates conversation
with another delegated reader. The delegated reader sends a random nonce rR to the
adversary who then generates MT = fk(rR ‖ x0), where f() is a keyed one-way hash
function and x0 is a random l-bit string. The adversary then transmits rR, x1 and MT
to the delegated reader. The reader searches its look-up table for a value xt equal to
the received x1. It ﬁnds a match and identiﬁes the tag, thus authenticating the attacker
as a tag. Thus, the attacker can fool another delegated reader. The de-synchronization
attack is carried out by ﬁrst authenticating as a legitimate tag by initiating conversa-
tion with an online legitimate reader. The adversary transmits rR,M1 = fk(rR ‖ rT ),
M2 = rT ⊕ xm and SecReq, where SecReq represents a request for an update of the
secrets. Since the server is able to verify all credentials, it updates its secrets. The
adversary receives rR and Ms = gk(rR ‖ rT ) ⊕ (s ‖ k′ ‖ m′), where s′ is a random
l-bit string, k′ = h(s′) and m′ is a sequence of identiﬁers. Using them, the adversary
obtains s of the targeted tag. The attacker now initiates a conversation with the tar-
geted tag by transmitting some random nonce rA and it repeats the process until the
tag responds with M ′1,M ′2 and SecReq. The adversary obtains r′T from M2 ⊕ xm and
since s is available to him, he computes Ms = gk(rA ‖ r′T ) ⊕ (s ‖ k′ ‖ m′) where k′
and m′ are randomly produced values. The tag computes M ′s⊕ gk(rA ‖ r′T ) and obtains
(s ‖ k′ ‖ m′). Now, the check h(s) = k succeeds and the tag accepts the modiﬁed
secrets k′ and m′. Thus, the secrets are de-synchronized and the server is unable to
authenticate the tag in the future interactions. The attacker is also able to continue the
attacks even after the delegation period of the reader expires. To achieve this, the attack
is conducted similar to the above described. The server is made to believe that Ms did
not reach the tag correctly in the previous session and that the tag did not update its
secrets. As the credentials are veriﬁed successfully, the server sends the updated secrets
to the adversary which allows the attacker to be able to carry out attacks even after the
delegation period has expired.
The ﬁx to the protocol is given as follows. The authors introduce the use of a secret
z shared between the server and the tag and z is diﬀerent for each tag. Also, in the
improved version, each reader has a unique ID denoted as IDR. For delegation, in
addition to transferring the tag secrets to the delegated reader, a stamp computed by the
server, δ = dz(IDR ‖ k) is also transferred, where d() represents a keyed hash function.
The notable diﬀerence is the involvement of the secret z in generation of the identiﬁers
xt = ek(xt−1 ‖ z). The delegated readers cannot produce the identiﬁers without the
knowledge of z. Tag impersonation is not possible because only a registered tag can
compute δ = dz(IDR ‖ k) while a delegated reader cannot do this without knowing z.
Also, since the delegated reader removes the used identiﬁers from its look-up table the
vulnerability is ﬁxed. The de-synchronization attack is also prevented because only an
entity that has z can convince the back-end server to initiate the secret update process.
Also, the future security of the tags are ensured because of the secret value z since
the adversary cannot succeed in a secret update. Hence, after the secret update, if the
server revokes a delegation of a reader, the reader will not have the rights anymore
thereby ﬁxing the vulnerability. As for tracking attack, in the oﬀ-line authentication,
the delegated reader authenticates the tag but the tag does not. Hence, an adversary
can still trace the tags whose secrets are known to the attacker due to the compromised
reader. This attack is possible only until the server refreshes the tags’ secrets.
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Kapoor and Piramuthu [81] proposed two ownership transfer scheme: one with a TTP
and one without a TTP. The schemes are based on keyed hash and keyed encryption
functions. The protocol with TTP suﬀers from desynchronization as the tag updates
its secret even before the new secret is given to the new owner by the TTP [40]. This
means that the attacker can cause desynchronization by blocking any of the messages
after the update. The non-TTP version also suﬀers from vulnerabilities that can lead
to forward secrecy compromise and tag cloning attacks [40]. Further, the EPC Global
standard restricts the use of hash functions on passive tags. Hash functions such as
SQUASH have been proposed by Shamir [140] for implementation on passive RFID
tags. Shamir’s scheme is based on the Rabin Cryptosystem and is designed to serve as
a message authentication code (MAC). It is therefore not protected against information
leakage [140] and so not suited for environments such as RFID systems where the privacy
of the tag is to be preserved. In addition, Shamir’s scheme was proven to be not secure
by Ouaﬁ and Vaudenay [118]. It was also shown by Gosset et al. that implementation
of SQUASH would require up to 6K gates [59]. Hence the scheme proposed by Kapoor
and Piramuthu is not only vulnerable to attacks but also not viable for passive tags.
Zhou et al. [183] proposed a tag ownership transfer protocol with a Third Party Logis-
tics provider (TPL) and a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for a distributed supply chain
environment. The scheme uses two keys viz., one main key for the owner and a sub-key
for the TPL. The sequence of events that take place in the ownership transfer process
are: 1) The current owner possesses or obtains from the TTP the main key K to the
item of interest; 2) The tag, the current owner and the TPL provider obtain the sub-key
ki for the item at the origin location; 3) The item is transported from the origin to the
destination location; 4) The new owner obtains the main key from TTP. 5) The new
owner, the TPL provider and the tag obtain the updated sub-key from the TTP. The
owners have to have knowledge of both the main and sub-keys to communicate with
the tag and the composite key is represented by K ⊕ ki. It is noted by the authors
that the protocol: 1) does not guarantee forward secrecy since none of the messages are
encrypted by any hash function and 2) does not protect from relay attacks due to the
absence of cryptographic manipulations by the attacker.
TTP
[s, s′,K,K ′, kT ,
secret: kL, ki−1, ki]
p← 0, 1m
Step 1 Step 2
Ownerj o, fo⊕s(K||ki−1) p, fp⊕s′(K ′||p) Ownerj+1
−−−−−−− > −−−−−−−−− >
secret: [s,K, ki−1] fs(o⊕ ki−1) o′, fs′⊕o′(p⊕ ki) secret: [s′,K ′, ki]
o← {0, 1}m < −−−−−− < −−−−−−−−− o′ ← {0, 1}m
Step 3 Step 4
TPL Provideri Tag
secret: [ki, kL] p, fkL(ki ⊕ p) p, fkT⊕p(ki||ki−1||K ′) secret:
l← {0, 1}m < −−−−−−−− < −−−−−−−−− [K,K ′, ki−1, ki, kT ]
l, fl⊕kL(ki) t, ft⊕kT (K
′) t← {0, 1}m
−−−−−− > −−−−−−−− >
Figure 2.11: Zhou et al.’s Ownership Transfer Protocol - [183]
Zhou and Primamuthu [182] proposed a protocol for verifying the simultaneous presence
of multiple tags for the ownership transfer. There are ﬁve loops in the protocol. The
notations used are: H is the one-way hash function; NJ is a random l-bit nonce generated
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by the entity J ; si is the shared key between and among entities; fk and f
′
k are the
keyed encryption function with the key k; ti is the shared secret between the tagi and
TTP and ri is the shared secret between the reader Ri and the TTP. The ﬁrst loop is
between the TTP and the ﬁrst tag. The messages (NP , f
′
(NP⊕ti⊕sij)
(si2)) and the response
NTi , H(ti⊕NTi )(s
i
2 ⊕ NP ) accomplish the generation and transfer of new shared key to
the tag. The nonce NTi generated by the ﬁrst tag is used in the second tag, the nonce
generated by the second tag is used by the third tag and so on to ensure dependency
among the set of tags. The new shared keys sj2, s
k
2... are sent to 2
nd, 3rd... tags in the
second loop and the TTP veriﬁes the acknowledgment. In the third loop, the TTP sends
the new owner the new secret keys and receives the acknowledgment Hr2(s
i
2⊕ sj2⊕N
′
P ).
In the fourth loop, the new owner authenticates the tags by sending NR2 , f
′
s2(NR2) and
receives N
T
′
i
, HN
T
′
i
⊕si2(NR2 ⊕ si2). When the TTP receives the acknowledgment it sends
the last message to the previous owner stating that their keys are no longer valid. The
authenticity, secrecy and data integrity and forward security are guaranteed by the use
of one-way hash functions and encryptions where necessary. DoS/de-synchronization
attacks are prevented through the requirement of acknowledgement in all the ﬁve loops
in the protocol. Replay attacks are prevented by freshly generating nonce in every loop.
Figure 2.12: Zhou and Piramuthu’s Ownership Transfer Protocol - [182]
Yin et al. [176] proposed a hash-based ownership transfer method named TPOT. Here,
the tag stores its static ID and K, where K is the shared secret between the reader and
the tag. The protocol begins when the reader transmits a random number Rr to the
tag. The tag generates its own random number Rtag and sends it to the reader. It then
computes H = H(K ‖ Rr ‖ Rtag), where H() is the one-way hash function. H is then
divided into HLeft, HMiddle and HRight. The reader computes H = H(Kold ‖ Rr ‖ Rtag).
The reader divides H into HLeft, HMiddle and HRight. It then sends HLeft to the tag. If
the received HLeft is equal to its calculated HLeft the reader is authenticated and the
tag calculates the dynamic ID as DID = HMiddle⊕ ID. The tag then sends HRight and
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DID to the reader. If the received HRight is the same as its calculated one, the tag is
authenticated and the reader recovers the tag ID as ID = HMiddle ⊕ DID. After the
tag is veriﬁed with the back-end server, the reader generates another random number
Rrr and sends it to the tag along with the update message. When the tag receives an
update request it computes Ktemp = H(K ‖ Rrr ‖ Rtag) and updates its secret from K
to Ktemp. The reader computes Ktemp the same way and sends ID, Ktemp and other
necessary data to the new reader via a secure channel. The new reader stores the tag
ID and Ktemp and sends the delete request to the previous reader. The previous reader
deletes the tag ID and Ktemp after receiving the delete request. The second phase of
the protocol is the same as the previous one with minor changes. The reader computes
H using Ktemp instead of Kold. The tag computes Knew instead of Ktemp and updates
k = Knew. The reader also computes Knew using Ktemp instead of Kold. The protocol
protects new owner privacy by changing the secret from Ktemp to Knew. Previous
owner’s privacy is protected by changing k to Ktemp. Protection from desynchronization
attack is implicity achieved since there is no need for synchronized updating of keys.
Replay attacks are prevented by the freshly generated random numbers Rr and Rtag.
Impersonation/spooﬁng attacks are prevented by the use of hashed messages which
cannot be calculated without knowing the secret K.
Kapoor et al. [82] proposed a shared ownership transfer protocol with a TTP. Here,
the ownership of a tag Ti is transferred from the current owner (or a group of current
owners) to the new owner (or a group of new owners). When the TTP receives the
ownership transfer request, it generates a new key s2, a fresh nonce Np and sends f
′
encrypted with Np⊕ ti⊕ s1 where s1 is the current key. This authenticates the TTP to
the tag which then updates s1 ← s2. The tag acknowledges it by generating and sending
a fresh nonce NT . The following steps are repeated once for each owner in the current
and the new group of owners. The TTP informs the current owners that their privileges
are being revoked by sending a revoke message. Then, it grants privileges to the new
owners by freshly generating a nonce N
′
p, encrypted with the key r2i shared with the
new owner and the TTP. The new owners send an acknowledgement with the new key
using a hash function. The new owners then establish contact with the tag and the tag
acknowledges it, mutually authenticating each other. The protocol does not address the
situation where the previous owner eavesdrops on the communication between the TTP
and the new owner, to obtain the new secret key thereby continue to have access to
the tags even after the ownership has been transferred. Also, the protocol is not EPC
compliant due to the use of hash operations and encryption functions.
Huixian et al.’s [71] protocol uses only the CRC function which is known to be very weak
due to its linearity problems and proved to be vulnerable to tracking attacks [133]. Zuo
[188] proposed a group ownership transfer protocol but it is found vulnerable to desyn-
chronization attack [73]. Chen and Chien [18] proposed an ownership transfer scheme
for mobile RFIDs but it is found vulnerable to server, reader and tag impersonation
attacks and traceability attack [114]. The protocol proposed by Wei et al. [167] relies
on the tag to generate a new secret using PRNG. In my opinion, passive tags cannot be
relied upon to perform this critical function due to their limitations.
From the above discussion, it is clear that many of the ownership transfer protocols are
vulnerable to known attacks on RFID. They are also not compliant with EPC C1G2
standard due to use of hash functions or other complex encryption schemes, making
them not viable for large scale implementation. Further, the existing multi-tag multi-
owner protocols do not provide individual-owner-privacy. Below is a summary of these
ﬁndings and the recommendations made to build a robust ownership transfer protocol.
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2.2.2 Findings & Recommendations
• Ownership transfer has critical applications in hospitals, car-sales/rental and even
in houses with smart-fridges. This research ﬁnds that the potential of ownership
transfer can be put to use in yet another application i.e., in everyday cash trans-
actions of RFID enabled currency. It is imperative that a protocol that has a vast
impact in our everyday life should be robust, meet the security requirements and
resilient from attacks. Yet, it is seen that this is not the case for the following
reasons.
• Ownership transfer protocols such as [23, 44, 50, 53, 60, 83, 96, 103, 159, 160,
166, 173, 168, 184, 185, 186] are not suitable for passive tags because they use
hash functions or ECC or keyed encryption functions. Hence these protocols are
not viable for large scale implementations that use EPC C1G2 passive tags, as
they are highly resource constrained in terms of computational abilities. Use of
light-weight cryptography is recommended, methods that can achieve the required
security and also facilitate large scale implementations.
• Yang and Hu [172] suggest the use of light-weight symmetric key cryptographic
schemes such as Grain, but it is shown to be vulnerable to key recovery attacks
[8] and also requires 4K gates for security implementation, while the EPC C1G2
tags can only roughly accommodate 2.5K to 3K gates.
• Protocols that are based on simple operations such as PRNG,XOR have been
shown to be vulnerable to attacks but they are mostly due to the incorrect usage of
the functions and not necessarily the weaknesses of the functions by itself. Also,
as stated earlier, 16-bit PRNG is prone to brute-force attacks, use of 128-bit
PRNG that increases security and are still implementable in low cost passive tags
is recommended.
• The current approaches to ownership transfer protocols do not verify the integrity
of the messages received during the protocol run. This makes the protocols vul-
nerable to active attacks.
• Schemes such as [19, 40, 106, 113, 167, 172] do not handle the multi-tag multi-
owner scenario and also do not provide individual owner privacy.
• Multi-tag/Multi-owner schemes as [82, 182] are shown to be vulnerable to attacks,
are not EPC compliant and also they do not provide individual owner privacy.
• The application of ownership transfer concept has not been explored thus far for
RFID enabled currency. To my knowledge, this thesis is the ﬁrst work to apply the
concept in this area, possibly showing the way to solve/curtail some of the major
crimes in the world such as counterfeit currency, bank/retail-store robberies, pick-
pocketing and money laundering.
• Finally, even though much work has been done in this area, the following are
true: a)many of the protocols fail to meet the security requirements; b) they
have been shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks; c) they do not comply with
EPC C1G2 standard due to the use of expensive cryptographic functions/hash
operations that cannot be implemented in low cost passive tags; and d) they
do not handle the multi-tag, multi-owner scenario with individual owner privacy.
An ownership transfer protocol that meets this functionality requirement and the
security/privacy requirements is yet to be seen.
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2.3 Summary
In this chapter, a clear picture of how grouping proofs and ownership transfers are
accomplished was ﬁrst presented through an extensive literature review of the existing
work in the two areas. The discussion then highlighted how, many of these protocols
are found to be vulnerable to one or more attacks; how they are incomplete in terms of
the design requirements; how they do not meet the security requirements of RFID; and
how the protocols that do meet these requirements, do not comply with the EPC C1G2
standard due to the use of expensive hash operations and other complex encryption
schemes making them not implementable on passive tags which are highly resource
constrained. Finally, some of the key ﬁndings from the literature review and possible
solutions to overcome these vulnerabilities were presented. The methods used to design
the proposed protocols and the analysis models used in evaluating the security of the
proposed schemes are presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
Methods & Analysis Models Used
This chapter discusses the methods used in the research to design the protocols and also
discusses the formal analysis models that are used to show how the protocols meet the
security requirements of RFID systems. The chosen methods to solve the research prob-
lems speciﬁcally target low cost passive tags to facilitate large-scale implementations.
The analysis models used have been widely accepted in the RFID research arena.
3.1 Methods Used in the Protocol Design
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, passive tags are highly resource constrained and have
very minimum computational capabilities. This makes it highly challenging to design
protocols for passive tags, that would meet the security requirements of RFID and also be
compliant with the EPC C1G2 standard. The reasons as to why hash functions or other
complex encryption schemes cannot be implemented on passive tags was discussed in
Section 1.6.2. In this thesis, the security and EPC compliance challenges are overcome
by utilizing some eﬀective techniques. The proposed protocols use simple XOR and
128bit PRNG functions and number theory concepts. These techniques and how they
meet the security requirements of RFID and achieve EPC compliance are explained
below.
3.1.1 XOR & 128bit PRNG Functions
The EPC standard mandates security operations in passive tags to a 16bit Cyclic Redun-
dancy Check (CRC) and 16bit Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNG). However,
the latter is vulnerable to brute-force attacks. The proposed protocols use 128bit PRNG
which is provably secure and requires less than 2K gates [90, 145, 146]. This is a sig-
niﬁcant advantage considering the limitations of passive tags. Lee and Hong [90] have
proposed an authentication protocol that achieves the required security using 128bit
PRNG with only 1435 gates (within 517 clock cycles and 64B memory). The protocol
uses a Self-Shrinking Generator (SSG) based on a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
to generate the PRNG, an algorithm designed by Meier and Staﬀelback [108]. Improved
version of SSG by Molina-Gil et al. [111] resolve the linearity issues in SSG and Tasheva
et al. [151] proves the resistance to exhaustive search and entropy attacks. Burmester et
al. [12] have formally shown that by using the universal composability (UC) framework
[16], 128bit PRNG meets the security requirements of RFID. Burmester and Munilla
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[14] have extended this work to show that PRNG is resistent to active attacks such as
online man-in-the-middle relay attacks. Hence, from a security perspective, the use of
a 128bit PRNG is well supported.
3.1.2 Number Theory Methods
Number theory is the branch of mathematics that studies the properties of and the
relationships between particular types of numbers, speciﬁcally ‘primes’. Two such prop-
erties viz., Quadratic Residues and Probabilistic Encryption Scheme are studied and
implemented in this thesis. The two methods are described below.
• Quadratic Residues (QR) property is formally deﬁned as follows [132]: If n is
a positive integer, then R is said to be the quadratic residue of n if (n,R) = 1 and
the congruence x2 = R mod n has a solution. Suppose that n = pq where p and
q are distinct large primes and that the congruence x2 = R mod n has a solution
x = xo. From the Chinese Remainder Theorem, there are exactly four incongruent
solutions of the congruence x2 = Rmod n (i.e., R has four incongruent square roots
modulo n). However, in order to be able to compute these solutions, knowledge
of p and q is required. Due to the diﬃculty of factoring n, it is computationally
infeasible to ﬁnd x satisfying x2 = R mod n without knowing p and q [21, 132].
Without loss of generality, if x is replaced with x2, and if a solution exists for
(x2)2 = R mod n, it is clear the solution is required to be a perfect square (x2).
However, of the four possible solutions (obtained using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem), only one of those would be a quadratic residue modulo n satisfying
x2 = R mod n [132].
The proposed scheme in Chapter 7 is based on QR which uses only 128bit PRNG
and MOD operations. Modular squaring takes only a few hundred gates [24, 38,
39] and with 1.5K gates for the 128bit PRNG, a protocol can be implemented
in less than 2K gates, which is a signiﬁcant advantage for passive tags and it
makes the protocol viable for large-scale implentations. EPC C1G2 compliance is
achieved since no hash functions or other complex encryption schemes are used in
the protocols. Moreover, the QR property guarantees an attacker cannot decipher
the messages without the knowledge of the prime numbers which only the server
knows, thereby guaranteeing the security of the protocol. Our earlier works [38,
147, 149] show that QR is resistent to known attacks on RFID.
• Probabilistic Encryption Scheme (PES) is formally deﬁned as follows [57]:
Let h be the product of two large primes e and f and let w be the pseudosquare
represented as w  Q˜h . Both h and w are public and the problem of quadratic
residuosity is known to be hard. Assume A has secret information Ts represented
by a sequence of numbers Ts1 , Ts2 , Ts3 ... Tsk . The quadratic residuosity based
probabilistic encryption scheme [57] allows A to convince a veriﬁer B it has the
secret information Ts1 , Ts2 , Ts3 ... Tsk without actually revealing it. Assume A
wants to transmit Ts3 to B and the binary notation of Ts3 is T
1
s3 , T
2
s3 , T
3
s3 , ... T
t
s3 .
For i = 1 to t, A randomly chooses an integer ri; if T
i
s3 = 0 then A sends a
random square (ri)
2 mod h to B; otherwise if T is3 = 1 then A sends a random
pseudosquare w.(ri)
2 mod h to B. B is able to distinguish random squares from
random pesudosquares modulo h since B has knowledge of the factors of h i.e., e
and f . An adversary cannot determine the same in probabilistic polynomial time
knowing only h and w [57].
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The proposed scheme in Chapter 5 is based on PES which uses only 128bit PRNG
and MOD operations. EPC C1G2 compliance is achieved since no hash functions
or other complex encryption schemes are used in the protocol. Moreover, PES
is based on the quadratic residuosity property which ensures an attacker cannot
decipher the messages without the knowledge of the prime numbers which only
the server knows. Further more, PES also provides ‘Zero Knowledge Proofs’. This
allows a prover, who has the secret information, to convince a veriﬁer he has this
secret information without revealing the information to the veriﬁer. The proba-
bility is extremely small that someone who does not have this secret information
can successfully cheat the veriﬁer. The veriﬁer does not learn anything (secret)
other than the prover has the secret. The foundation of ‘Zero Knowledge proofs’ is
the prevention of information leakage, especially secret information. The privacy
problem in general and in RFID Systems in particular, occurs due to information
leakage that can lead to security attacks and privacy compromise. This thesis
shows that secure protocols based on number theory properties such as these can
serve as a basis for securing RFID systems.
3.2 Formal Analysis Models
The security and privacy requirements of the proposed schemes are analyzed using formal
analysis models. To prove the security correctness of the schemes, GNY Logic [58] is
used and the security and privacy properties are proved using Avoine’s adversarial model
[4]. These two models are described below in detail.
3.2.1 GNY Logic
The GNY mechanism by Gong et al. [58] enables a systematic means of understanding
the working of cryptographic protocols. It distinguishes between what one possesses
and what one believes. Beliefs and possessions are monotonic within a given session
and the only universal assumption made is that the principals P do not reveal their
secrets. Speciﬁcally, the principals are not assumed to be trustworthy and redundancy
is always explicitly present in the encrypted messages. The GNY model enables the
expression of diﬀerent trust levels and implicit conditions behind the protocol steps.
GNY is an improvement on Burrows et al. (1989), referred to as BAN Logic in [58].
Some advantages from the improved work are that it does not require several universal
assumptions like BAN logic. It also incorporates a new notion of recognizability which
captures a recipient’s expectation of the contents of the messages he receives. A dis-
tinction is made between what one possesses and what one believes, which enables the
separation of treatment between the content of a message and the information implied
by such a message. The two main objectives in using GNY are that messages received
by each entity come from a trusted source (belief) and that messages are fresh.
Some of the signiﬁcant aspects of the model are outlined as follows: A distributed en-
vironment consists of principals connected by communication links,with messages on
these links being the only means of communicating between these principals. A protocol
is a distributed algorithm that determines what messages should be sent by the partic-
ipating principals. A run is a particular extension of a protocol and a protocol run is
referred to as a session. Each principal in a session maintains two sets: a belief set that
includes all the current beliefs of the principal, and a Possession set that includes all
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the formulae available to the principal. Principals begin a session with certain initial
beliefs and possessions. After this, it can obtain new beliefs and expand its belief set
when it receives new messages. Beliefs and possessions are monotonic in a given session,
which means if a belief or a possession is a member of a respective set at any phase of
some session then it is a member of that set during any subsequent phase of that session.
The term formula is more like the name of a variable. A not-originated-here formula is
denoted by preﬁxing the formula with a star (*). Not-originated-here means a principal
is told a formula that was not previously conveyed by him in the current run.
The logical postulates are categorized into six divisions:
1. Being-Told Rules - deals with formulae a principal receives which is regarded
as “being told” to that principle. For example, P X means principal P is told of
formula X.
2. Possession Rules - speciﬁes formulae that a principal possesses or is capable of
possessing. An sample representation is given as P ∈ X
3. Freshness Rules - speciﬁes a formulae a principal can believe is fresh given his
beliefs about the freshness of other formulae. An sample representation is given
as P |≡ #(X).
4. Recognizability Rules - states a formulae a principal can believe is recogniz-
able, given his beliefs about the recognizability of other formulae. An sample
representation is given as P |≡ φ(X)
5. Message Interpretation Rules - enables principals to advance their beliefs
about other principals by examining the messages they receive.
6. Rationality Rule - states the set of postulates can be expanded to permit rea-
soning about a principal’s beliefs regarding the state of other principals.
For a complete list of postulates and their purposes please refer [58]. The messages sent
between principals are transformed to attain a form suitable for direct manipulation
using a protocol parser. One important thing to note is that protocol descriptions do
not make a distinction between X and ∗X (not-originated-here). The parser is designed
in a way to explicitly insert the stars wherever applicable to avoid a more complex form of
logic. Beliefs about Others’ Beliefs - means a principal cannot draw any conclusion about
beliefs held by other principals. Protocols are veriﬁed for consistency by performing two
checks: 1) Possession Consistency - which means a principal should only be able to
include a formula he possesses in any message he sends, and 2) Belief Consistency -
which means a message extension should include only beliefs held by the sender at the
time the message is sent.
The GNY postulates used to prove the security correctness is brieﬂy explained as follows.
T1 is a Being-told Rule denoted by P  X means that a principal P is being told of a
formula X (e.g.,variable, constant, secret). P1 is a Possession Rule denoted by P  X
means “P possesses or is capable of possessing X”. P2 is the second possession rule
that states if a principal P possesses two formulae, then he is capable of possessing the
formula constructed by concatenating the two formulae as well as a computationally
feasible function F of both formulae. F1 is a Freshness Rule denoted by P |≡ #(x)
means “P believes in the freshness of X”. I1 is an Interpretation Rule which states
that: suppose for a principal P all of the following conditions hold: P receives a formula
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consisting of X encrypted with a key K and marked with a not-originated-here mark;
P possesses K; P believes K is a suitable secret for himself and Q; P believes formula
X is recognizable; P believes that K is fresh or that X is fresh - then, P is entitled to
believe that: Q once conveyed X; Q once conveyed the formula X encrypted with K;
Q possesses K. J1 is the Jurisdiction Rule which states that: if P believes that Q is an
authority on some statement C and that Q believes in C, then P ought to believe in C.
It is important to note that a majority of RFID protocols (e.g.,[55, 61, 115, 161, 170,
172, 185]) use GNY logic [58] to prove the security correctness of the proposed schemes.
3.2.2 Adversarial Model for RFID
Avoine [4] proposes an adversarial model suitable for RFID environments. The security
and privacy of the proposed schemes are studied using this model. The notations used
below are based on this model and are used to prove the protocol meets the following
security requirements: a) Existential-UNT-QSE - which means an adversary is never
capable of tracking a tag by interacting with the tag and the reader or eavesdropping
on the communications, and b) Forward-UNT-QSER - which means even by physically
compromising a tag that reveals its internal secrets, an adversary is unable to track
its communications from the past. Choice of this privacy model is motivated by the
ﬂexibility of Avoine’s model and the drawbacks associated with more recent models,
such as those proposed by Vaudney [157] and Hermans [64] as noted in [31].
In Avoine’s model, the notions of existential and universal untraceability are deﬁned,
access to communication channels from a set of oracles are modeled and a formal analysis
of the protocols in terms of traceability occurs. In this adversarial model, it is noted
that more than anything else, an adversary has more to beneﬁt from the communication
channel between the reader and the tag and also from the contents of the memory of
the tag. This particular channel is subdivided into three as shown in Figure 3.1. These
are the forward channel (reader → tag), the backward channel (tag → reader) and the
memory channel (memory of the tag). It is considered an adversary will be able to read
the memory channel only once. Limiting access to the memory channel strongly relates
to the notion of forward untraceability.
Figure 3.1: Information Channels of an RFID System [4]
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Means of an Adversary - It is noted that formalization of the adversarial model is
required in every security proof and that model consists of the means of an adversary Aˆ
and its goals. Means are represented using oracles, the tag is denoted by T , the reader
is denoted by R and a protocol is denoted by P . The reader and the tag can run several
instances of P . Tag instances are denoted by πiT and reader instances are denoted by
πjR, where (i, j = 1..n), where n indicates the number of instances of P . In the below
oracles,the forward channel represents the transfer of messages from the reader to the
tag, and the backward channel represents the transfer of messages from the tag to the
reader.
• Query (Q) (πiT ,m1,m3) - This query models Aˆ sending a requestm1 to T through
the forward channel, and subsequently sends m3 after receiving its answer.
• Send (S)(πjR, m2) - This query models Aˆ sending the message m2 to R through
the backward channel.
• Execute (E) (πiT , πjR) - This query models Aˆ running an instance of P between T
and R, and obtaining the messages exchanged in both the forward and backward
channels.
• Execute* (E*) (πiT , πjR) - This query models Aˆ running an instance of P between
T and R, and obtaining the messages exchanged in the forward channel only.
• Reveal (R) (πiT ) - This query models Aˆ obtaining the content of T’s memory
channel which can be used only once so Query (Q), Send (S), Execute (E) and
Execute* (E*) cannot be used any longer.
A protocol resistant to an attack A is denoted by A-Oˆ when the adversary Aˆ has access
to the oracles of Oˆ ⊂ {Q,S,E,E∗, R}. The result of an application of an oracle is
denoted by ωi(T ) so that ωi(T ) ∈ {Query(πiT , ∗), Execute(πiT , ∗), Execute ∗ (πiT , ∗),
Reveal(πiT )}.
Goals of an Adversary - The notion of untraceability (UNT) is introduced and is
characterized by two fundamental points.
• Interaction is deﬁned as a set of executions on the same tag at a time when the
adversary is in a position to physically identify it. It is represented as: ΩI(T ) =
{ωi(T ) | i ∈ I} ∪{Send(πi∗, ∗) | i ∈ J} where J ⊂ ℵ. By deﬁnition, the length of
an interaction ΩI(T ) is | T | where I is a sub-interval of ℵ
• An adversary in a position to trace a tag can do it in a temporary way or in
a deﬁnitive way. These cases lead to the notions of Existential and Universal
untraceability.
After having interacted with a target T and possibly some readers, thus obtaining an
interaction ΩI(T ) whose length is less than a given parameter Adversary lref , an adver-
sary Aˆ needs to ﬁnd the target among the two tags T1 and T2. Adversary Aˆ can query
both the tags and obtain two interactions; ΩI1(T ) and ΩI2(T ), whose lengths are less
than a given length lchal. The manner in which I1 and I2 are deﬁned diﬀerentiates ex-
istential and universal traceability. If there exists I1 and I2 so that Aˆ is able to succeed
then it is existential traceability. If the adversary is able to win for all I1 and I2, then it
is universal traceability.
3.2. FORMAL ANALYSIS MODELS 57
Existential Untraceability - Parameters: lref , lchal, Oˆ
1 Aˆ requests Challenger thus receiving the target T
2 Aˆ chooses I and calls Oracle(T, I, Oˆ) where | I |≤ lref then receives ΩI(T )
3 Aˆ requests the Challenger thus receiving her challenge T1 and T2
4 Aˆ chooses I1 and I2 so that | I1 |≤ lchal, | I1 |≤ lchal and I1 ∪ I2) ∩ I = ø
5 Aˆ calls Oracle(T1, I1, Oˆ) and Oracle(T2, I2, Oˆ),and then receives ΩI1(T1) and
ΩI2(T2)
6 Aˆ decides which T1 or T2 is T , then outputs her guess T
′
Universal Untraceability - Parameters : lref , lchal, Oˆ
1 Aˆ requests Challenger thus receiving the target T
2 Aˆ chooses I and calls Oracle(T, I, Oˆ) where | I |≤ lref then receives ΩI(T )
3 Aˆ requests the Challenger thus receiving her challenge T1, T2, I1 and I2
4 Aˆ chooses I1 and I2 so | I1 |≤ lchal, | I1 |≤ lchal and I1 ∪ I2) ∩ I = ø
5 Aˆ calls Oracle(T1, I1, Oˆ) and Oracle(T2, I2, Oˆ), then receives ΩI1(T1) and ΩI2(T2)
6 Aˆ decides which T1 or T2 is T , then outputs her guess T
′
As seen above, the diﬀerence between the two is in step 3. In the former, the adversary
chooses I1 and I2 and in the latter, the challenger provides them. It is useful to restrict
the choice of I1 and I2 made by an adversary (existential) or by a challenger (universal)
so that I ≤ I1, I2 (resp. I > I1, I2) denoted by Existential+ (resp. Existential−) and
Universal+ (resp. Universal−). Universal− is particularly relevant when the oracle
R is used and it meets the notion of forward privacy referred to as Forward-UNT. The
advantage of Aˆ for a protocol P is given by AdvUNTP (Aˆ) = 2Pr(T
′ = T )− 1, where the
probability space is over all the random tags. If Aˆ’s advantage is negligible with the
parameters lref and lchal and Oˆ, P is said to be UNT -Oˆ.
Implications and Separations - One can mix and match the goals Existential-UNT,
Forward-UNT, Universal-UNT of an adversary and his means Oˆ ⊂ {Q,S,E,E∗, R}.
The relations called implication and separation are given as follows: A → B: a proof
that if protocol P meets the notion of security A then P also meets the notion of security
B. AB: a protocol that provably meets the notion of security A but provably does not
meet the notion of security B. The relations can be clearly deﬁned as: Existential-UNT
→ Forward-UNT → Universal-UNT.
The relationships between the means of the adversary is given as UNT-E → UNT-E* but
UNT-E*  UNT-E. Moreover, ∀A,B ∈ {Q,S,E,R}, UNT-A  UNT-B. However, QS → E
and E  QS. The implication comes from the fact that when an adversary has access to
Q and S oracles, E can be stimulated using a man-in-the-middle attack. The separation
comes from the fact that an adversary is passive when using the E oracle and therefore
cannot modify the messages to Q and S. Another important implication is: (∀Oˆ, Oˆ’
⊂ {Q,S,E,E∗, R}, Oˆ’ ⊂ Oˆ) =⇒ (UNT-Oˆ → Oˆ’). If an adversary is not able to track
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a tag with a set of oracles Oˆ, then the adversary cannot succeed with a smaller set
of oracles. Thus, the focus is only on UNT-E, UNT-Q, UNT-QSE and UNT-QSER. Thus,
UNT-QSER → UNT-QSE → | UNT-E, UNT-Q.
It is clear that a protocol should be both UNT-Q and UNT-E, meaning an adversary should
not be able to track a tag simply by querying it or by eavesdropping on the channels.
In practice, a protocol must be Existential-UNT-QSE and Forward-UNT-QSER. This
means an adversary is never capable of tracking a tag when he can interact with both
the target tag and the readers, or when he can eavesdrop executions between the tag
and readers. Also, obtaining the content of a tag by tampering with it does not allow
the adversary to track its past. In this thesis, it is shown that the proposed schemes are
both Existential-UNT-QSE and Forward-UNT-QSER.
3.3 Summary
This chapter started with a discussion on the methods used in the design of the protocols
that target passive tags to facilitate large-scale implementations. Highlights were then
presented as to how the protocols meet EPC C1G2 compliance while meeting the security
requirements of RFID. The discussion then focused on the industry accepted formal
analysis models that are applied to the proposed protocols to prove the security and
privacy claims. The ﬁrst of the two grouping proof protocols is presented in the next
chapter.
Chapter 4
Grouping Proof - Protocol I
In this chapter, a Grouping Proof protocol is proposed based on simple XOR and 128bit
PRNG operations. An overview of the unique design requirements of grouping proof
is presented ﬁrst followed by the motivation for the work and a summary of the con-
tributions. The workings of the protocol is then described at length, followed by the
detailed security analysis using the formal analysis models described in Chapter 3. A
discussion as to how the proposed protocol meets the design requirements of grouping
proof is then presented, followed by a simulation study that shows the performance of
the proposed protocol in a simulated environment. Finally, the chapter is concluded
with the recommended parameter settings for the proposed scheme.
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 introduced the grouping proof concept and presented an extensive coverage
of the existing work in this area. Here, after a quick recap of the deﬁnitions, the design
requirements of grouping proof are presented and the motivation behind this work is
summarized. For a complete understanding on grouping proofs and the related work in
this area, please refer to Chapter 2.
The “Yoking Proof” concept that involves the simultaneous scanning of only two tags
was introduced by Juels [77] in 2004. Since then it has evolved to grouping proofs where
more than two tags are involved. Grouping proof protocols generally operate in two
modes viz., oﬄine and online. The scope is limited to oﬄine protocols since online
grouping proof protocols are more close to mutual authentication protocols. Oﬄine
grouping proof protocol is unique in the sense, the server that veriﬁes the proof is not
available all the time. The veriﬁer does not participate in the proof collection process
and the proof is sent to it in bulk (many grouping proofs) to facilitate the veriﬁcation
at a later time. The unique design requirements of grouping proofs are outlined below.
4.1.1 Design Requirements
The unique design requirements for grouping proofs can be summarized as:
• Creating dependency between tags so they cannot be processed independently in
the proof [127].
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• Eliminating unwanted (but valid) tag processing where not all tags in a tag group
are required to participate in the proof [13].
• Detecting illegitimate tags that might prevent the proof generation or generate
invalid proofs causing Denial-of-Proof (DoP) attacks [102].
• Proving simultaneity which conﬁrms that all tags involved in the proof were
scanned simultaneously [123].
• Completing the protocol run within a predeﬁned time-window [123].
• Preventing race condition when multiple readers are involved simultaneously in
proof generation [99].
• In my opinion, the protocol should allow for verifying the integrity of the mes-
sages by each tag and the reader/s, to prevent the generation of invalid proofs by
tampering with the messages during transmission.
4.1.2 Protocol Application
The proposed protocol has a wide range of applications such as:
• In hospitals, where evidence has to be shown that the patients and their respective
multiple medications are given correctly [26].
• In manufacturing, where manufacturers wanting to prove that devices were sold
together with safety caps [9].
• In military, where multiple weapons have to be associated with a certain individual[13].
• In pharmaceutical industry, where medicine and the associated information leaﬂet
have to be together [123].
• In banks and airports, where security requires the simultaneous scanning of mul-
tiple forms of IDs [9].
• As shown in this research, the protocol can be used in bulk cash transactions of
RFID enabled currency where a bundles of currency notes have to be transferred
simultaneously to an entity like a bank.
4.1.3 Motivation
As detailed in Section 2.1.2 many of the current approaches to grouping proofs: a) do
not meet the security requirements of RFID; b) are vulnerable to certain known attacks
in RFID; c) are not viable for large scale implementations and d) are not compliant
with EPC C1G2 standards due to the use of hash functions or other complex encryp-
tion schemes and e) they do not meet the above-mentioned unique design requirements
of grouping proofs. The proposed protocol aims to address these important gaps in
grouping proofs. By adopting a holistic approach, the protocol addresses the above-
mentioned unique design requirements for grouping proofs and also meets the necessary
security requirements as described in Section 1.3.3. Only a summary of the motivation
is presented here. For more details, please refer to Section 1.6.
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Figure 4.1: Grouping Proof Collection Shown for 2 Tags and Repeats for All m Tags
4.1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as:
• A secure grouping proof protocol that meets all the unique design requirements
that has been identiﬁed thus far by the research community. To my knowledge,
none of the existing protocols verify the integrity of the messages, thus mak-
ing them vulnerable to active-attacks or invalid proof generation. The proposed
protocol is resistent to active-attacks; provides forward security solving the open
research issue [105, 123]; and is resilient to m-DoP attacks (where m represents
multiple illegitimate tags) as opposed to 1-DoP [102].
• A secure grouping proof protocol that is ultra-lightweight in terms of the use of
simple XOR and 128bit PRNG operations while meeting the security requirements.
The security correctness and privacy properties are proved using formal analysis
models and shown to achieve the highest level of security.
• A secure grouping proof protocol that does not use hash functions or other complex
encryption schemes and achieves compliance with EPC C1G2 standard. This
makes it a viable option for large-scale implementations on low-cost passive tags
which are highly constrained in computational resources.
4.2 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, an abstract version of the proposed protocol is presented ﬁrst, followed by
a detailed description of the three phases of the protocol (initialization phase, grouping-
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proof collection phase and proof-veriﬁcation phase). The grouping proof collection phase
is broken down into two parts. To enhance readability, clarity and easier understanding,
the ﬁrst part is further broken down into four steps giving a thorough explanation for
each step. Figure 4.1 gives a high-level overview of this phase for two tags. Table 4.1
provides a brief description for the notations that are used in the proposed protocol. The
following assumptions are made: a) All entities of the RFID system have polynomially
bounded resources b) The setup phase is carried out in a secure environment and c) A
Trusted Timestamp Server (TTS) is used which is secure.
Table 4.1: Notations used in the Protocol
Notation Description
TGID,Gid Tag Group ID and pre-computed value of h(TGID, S1)
TID, Tid Unique Tag ID and pre-computed value of h(TID, S2)
RID,Rid Unique Reader ID and pre-computed value of h(RID, S3)
S1, S2, S3 Unique Secrets used to compute Gid, Tid, Rid respectively; known only
to the veriﬁer
RVs Secret key unique to each reader in the system, shared with the veriﬁer
TGs Shared secret between the tags in a tag group
Ts Secret key unique to each tag in the system
R, V, TTS Reader, Veriﬁer, Trusted Timestamp Server respectively.
Gidx Represents the x
th tag group; (x = 1, 2...p); p indicates the number
of tag groups that a reader R is authorized to run the grouping proof
protocol for.
V Ts, V T
′
s V Ts is the current secret for the protocol run shared between the veriﬁer
and a tag and changes after each run. V T
′
s is the previous value of V Ts.
RTs, RT
n
s RTs is the current secret for the protocol run shared between the reader
and a tag and changes after each run. RTns is the next value of RTs.
Vr, Rr Pseudo-random numbers generated by the veriﬁer and reader respec-
tively
T ir Pseudo-random number generated by the Tag i, (i = 1, 2...m); m indi-
cates the number of tags in the group.
TSr Future Timestamp (TS) in unencrypted format generated by the veriﬁer
for each run
TSv TSr stored in encrypted format; indicates the timestamp used by the
ﬁrst tag for that run.
ΔTS Time window before which grouping proof should end
Ektv(CTS) Encrypt current timestamp CTS using secret key ktv shared between
veriﬁer and TTS
TSc Stores the result of Ektv(CTS) (encrypted current timestamp)
Ekrv(P ) Encrypt proof P using secret key krv shared between veriﬁer and the
reader
4.2.1 Protocol Synopsis
In the initialization phase, the tags and readers are setup with their IDs, private/shared
secrets between diﬀerent entities and other information required to run the protocol.
The access list AL is generated for the reader which contains all the information that
are required to run the protocol including the time schedule TSr when the protocol has
to be run.
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In part I of the grouping proof collection phase, the reader gathers partial-proofs from
each tag in the tag-group. Step 1 begins whenever the timestamp TSr stored in the
reader becomes true. The reader computes a fresh challenge, gets the current timestamp
from TTS and sends them to the ﬁrst tag in the group along with the other pre-computed
information required by the tag. In Step 2, the tag authenticates the reader and veriﬁes
the integrity of all the incoming messages. If the veriﬁcation results in a valid reader
ID, then the tag knows that the messages are received from a legitimate reader and also
that the messages are not tampered during transmission. The tag then veriﬁes if the
messages are addressed to it by matching its IDs with the received Group ID and Tag ID.
If successful, the tag computes its response and sends it back to the reader. In Step 3,
the reader authenticates the tag and veriﬁes the integrity of the messages received. The
reader’s role is not to verify the actual tag or its group (since the tag/group IDs are not
stored in the reader) but it can verify a tag and its group in a diﬀerent fashion. Since the
reader generates a fresh pseudo-random number for each tag, it will use that pseudo-
random number to check the response from that tag. Also, due to the dependency
property required by grouping proofs, only one tag is processed at a time and hence
only one tag will respond back. When the received response is veriﬁed, if it does not
result in a valid reader ID, the reader will abort the process. Otherwise, it knows the
appropriate tag has responded back and will proceed further. The reader then computes
a fresh challenge, gets the current timestamp from TTS and sends it to the second tag
in the group along with the other pre-computed information and the partial-proof from
the ﬁrst tag. The partial-proof is used to create dependency between tags and also
verify if its predecessor belongs to the same group as this tag. In Step 4, the second tag
performs similar operations as the ﬁrst tag. It also uses the partial-proof from the ﬁrst
tag to compute its proof and sends back its response to the reader. The reader repeats
the process for all m tags in the tag-group in a similar fashion. Part II of this phase
involves compiling the proof P using the partial-proofs from all tags and encrypting it.
The proof is then sent to the veriﬁer immediately or at a later time when more proofs
have been collected.
In the veriﬁcation phase, the veriﬁer validates the received proofs. After decrypting
the proof P , the veriﬁer performs the exact same operations as that of each tag in the
tag-group, from tag 1 to tag m, using its own information. During this process, the
veriﬁer also checks if the proof collection for each tag was completed within the allotted
time-window ΔTS . If the veriﬁer is able to successfully compute the same messages as
that of the corresponding tags, it proves that the tags have participated successfully in
the grouping proof collection.
4.2.2 Initialization Phase
Let T(Tid1 , Tid2 , ...Tidm) be the tag-group with m tags in the group. Let n be the
number of protocol runs pre-authorized for a reader. During the initialization phase,
the veriﬁer pre-computes information for n protocol runs. This is shown in Table 4.2
and is described below:
1. Each tag in the tag-group is initialized with a secret V Ts.
2. The future timestamp TSr when the protocol is to be run is generated, followed
by a pseudo-random number Vr. It is ensured that the timestamp generated for a
given run is greater than the timestamp of the previous run.
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Table 4.2: Initialization Phase
For j = 1 to m, initialize V Tsj ← PRNG(), where m is no. of
tags in tag-group.
For i = 1 to n
Generate future timestamp TSri
Vri ← PRNG()
For j = 1 to m
V 1j = Tidj ⊕ Tsj ⊕ PRNG(V Tsj ⊕ Vri)
μj = Tidj ⊕ V Tsj ⊕ Vri
TSv = PRNG(Tidj ⊕ V Tsj )⊕ Vri ⊕ TSri . This is
done only for the ﬁrst tag i.e., when j = 1.
V Tsj ← PRNG(V Tsj )
Next j
V 2i = Gid ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vri)
Next i
3. Then, for each tag j in the tag-group, messages V 1j , μj are computed as shown in
Table 4.2. The timestamp TSr is then encrypted in TSv. This is done only for the
ﬁrst tag, since this timestamp is used only by the ﬁrst tag. V Tsj is then updated
as PRNG(V Tsj ).
4. The tag-group ID is encrypted in V 2.
5. Steps 2− 4 are repeated for n protocol runs.
Data storage in each entity is described below:
• The veriﬁer stores all the pre-computed information apart from storing the IDs and
secrets. Each tag stores the tuple {Gid, TGs, Tid, Ts, V Ts, V T ′s}, where V T
′
s = V Ts
initially. In addition, the tag also stores {Rid, RTs, R−1r } for each reader that is
authorized to access this tag. R−1r is the pseudo random number sent by the reader
in the previous round and is used to prevent replay attack.
• All the pre-computed encrypted information required to run the protocol at the
scheduled times, for the n protocol runs are securely transferred to the reader
(after authenticating it using RVs), for the tag-groups that a reader is autho-
rized to gather grouping proof. The reader stores {Rid, RVs} once, and one tuple
{Gid, TSr, TSv, V 11..m, V 2, μ1..m, RTs1..m , RTns1..m} per run, for the n protocol runs.
A sample data-set stored in the reader is shown in Table 4.3. After completing all
the n runs, the reader has to contact the veriﬁer to get authorization for further
access. The reader is not trusted in the proposed protocol. The security analysis
for the encrypted information stored in a reader is shown in Section 4.3.
4.2.3 Grouping Proof Collection Phase
Once the setup phase is complete, the connection to the veriﬁer is not needed anymore.
The reader can function independently since it is equipped with all the necessary in-
formation to gather grouping proofs whenever required. This makes the veriﬁer totally
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Table 4.3: Sample Dataset Stored in a Reader
GID TSr TSv V 11..m V 2 μ1..m RTs1..m RT
n
s1..m
Gid1 TSr1 TSv1 .. .. .. .. ..
Gid1 TSr2 TSv2 .. .. .. .. ..
Gid1 TSr3 TSv3 .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gid1 TSrn TSvn .. .. .. .. ..
Gid2 TSr1 TSv1 .. .. .. .. ..
Gid2 TSr2 TSv2 .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gidp TSr1 TSv1 .. .. .. .. ..
Gidp TSr2 TSv2 .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
oﬄine. As noted earlier, the collection phase has two parts. The details are presented
below.
PART 1: Here, the reader collects partial-proofs from each tag for all m tags and is
composed of 4 steps. Steps 1 and 2 are depicted in Figure 4.2, and Steps 3 and 4 are
depicted in Figure 4.3.
Step 1: Reader computes its challenge, gets the current timestamp from TTS, and
sends it along with the pre-computed server challenge to tag 1. This step is described
below.
• Reader generates a fresh pseudo-random number Rr and computes δ1 = PRNG(
Rid ⊕RTs)⊕Rr, δ2 = PRNG(Rid ⊕RTns )⊕Rr.
• The pre-computed veriﬁer messages V 11, V 2, μ1, TSv are randomized using Rr.
As seen in the initialization phase, these messages are suﬃciently randomized by
the veriﬁer and they would be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for each tag and for each run.
But, if a protocol run was interrupted for some reason and the reader had to rerun
it, it will use these same pre-computed messages for that run. But, as they are
randomized again using the freshly generated Rr, an attacker won’t be able to
distinguish the messages, even if they were sent again for the same run.
• The reader then requests a timestamp from the TTS. The TTS gets the current
timestamp CTS, encrypts it using the secret key ktv as TSc = Ektv(CTS). It then
sends TSc to the reader. As soon as TTS sends the ﬁrst timestamp, it marks the
beginning of the protocol run.
• The reader then computes R1 = Rid ⊕ PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕Rr)
• It sends V 11, V 2, μ1, R1, δ1, δ2, TSv and TSc to tag 1.
Step 2: Tag 1 validates the incoming messages, authenticates the reader, computes its
partial-proof and sends it back to the reader. This step is described below.
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Reader Step 1
Generate Rr for Tag 1; Using RTs, RT
n
s of Tag 1 Compute:
δ1 = PRNG(Rid ⊕RTs)⊕Rr; δ2 = PRNG(Rid ⊕RTns )⊕Rr;
V 11 = V 11 ⊕Rr; V 2 = V 2⊕Rr;
μ1 = μ1 ⊕Rr; TSv = TSv ⊕Rr;
Get TSc from TTS (Marks the beginning of the protocol run)
R1 = Rid ⊕ PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕Rr)
Send V 11, V 2, μ1, R1, δ1, δ2, TSv, TSc to Tag 1
Tag 1 Step 2
Extract: PRNG(Rid ⊕RTs)⊕ δ1→ Rr
If (Rid = R1⊕ PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕Rr))
Reader Authenticated
Message Integrity of R1, δ1, TSv and TSc Veriﬁed
else
Use δ2 to extract Rr and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
If Rr = R
−1
r then abort; else R
−1
r ← Rr
Extract: V 11 ⊕Rr → V 11; V 2⊕Rr → V 2;
Extract: μ1 ⊕Rr → μ1; TSv ⊕Rr → TSv
Extract: Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕ μ1 → Vr
If (Gid = V 2⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) and
Tid = V 11 ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr))
Group ID and Tag ID Authenticated
Message Integrity of V 11, V 2 and μ1 Veriﬁed
else
Use V T
′
s to extract Vr and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
(Use V Ts or V T
′
s from here based on the match)
Extract: PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts)⊕ Vr ⊕ TSv → TSr
Generate T1r
M1 = PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕ TSc ⊕ T1r)
β1 = T1r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)
Y 1 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr)⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕Rr)
Rc = Rid ⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr)
If Tid matched using V Ts then:
V T
′
s ← V Ts; V Ts ← PRNG(V Ts);
If Rid matched using δ1 then RTs ← PRNG(RTs)
Send M1, β1, Y 1, Rc to Reader
Figure 4.2: Proposed Oﬄine Grouping Proof Protocol - Step 1 & Step 2
• Using stored {Rid, RTs}, Rr is extracted from δ1 as PRNG(Rid⊕RTs)⊕δ1→ Rr.
• Then, using Rr and other stored/received values, the tag veriﬁes if Rid = R1 ⊕
PRNG(TSv⊕TSc⊕Rr). If successful, it authenticates the reader and also conﬁrms
the message integrity of R1, δ1, TSv, TSc. Otherwise, the above two steps are
repeated using δ2. If either one results in a successful match for Rid, the protocol
proceeds, otherwise it aborts.
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• The tag then checks if Rr = R−1r . If yes, it does not respond and the protocol
aborts. This is to make sure that an attacker is not replaying the message from
the previous run. This attack cannot be attempted using the messages from the
runs before that, since the Rid is matched only using RTs or RT
n
s and everything
else will fail. Messages from a genuine reader will always be fresh since Rr is
freshly generated every time. If it is not a replayed message, the tag updates R−1r
as R−1r ← Rr.
• The original pre-computed messages of the veriﬁer are extracted by xor-ing Rr1
with V 11, V 2, μ1, TSv.
• The tag then extracts Vr from μ1 as Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕ μ1 → Vr.
• Now, the tag veriﬁes if (Gid = V 2 ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) and Tid = V 11 ⊕ Ts ⊕
PRNG(V Ts⊕Vr)). If the veriﬁcation fails, it uses V T ′s and repeats the operation.
If either one results in a Gid, Tid match, it conﬁrms that the messages are for this
tag and also conﬁrms the message integrity of V 11, V 2, μ1. Otherwise the protocol
aborts. Depending on whether V Ts or V T
′
s resulted in a match, the tag will use
that when it continues the operation.
• The tag then extracts the Timestamp TSr as PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts)⊕Vr⊕TSv → TSr.
• It then generates a pseudo-random number T1r and computes M1, β1, Y 1, Rc as:
– M1 = PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕ TSc ⊕ T1r)
– β1 = T1r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)
– Y 1 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr)⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕Rr)
– Rc = Rid ⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr)
• Finally, tag 1 updates V T ′s ← V Ts and V Ts ← PRNG(V Ts). This is done only
if Tid was matched using V Ts. If V T
′
s was used, this update is not performed. It
also updates RTs as RTs ← PRNG(RTs) if Rid was matched using δ1.
• Finally, tag 1 sends M1, β1, Y 1 and Rc to the reader.
Step 3: Here, the reader validates the response from tag 1, computes the reader challenge,
gets the current timestamp from TTS and sends them to tag 2 along with the pre-
computed server challenge and the partial-proof from the ﬁrst tag.
• Using the stored Rid, RTs and the received values, the reader veriﬁes if Rid =
Rc ⊕ PRNG(M1 ⊕ β1 ⊕ Y 1 ⊕ RTs ⊕ Rr). If successful, it authenticates the tag
and also conﬁrms the integrity of the messages M1, β1, Y 1. Otherwise, the above
step is repeated using RTns . If either one results in a successful match for Rid, the
protocol proceeds, otherwise it aborts.
• Using RTs or RTns , the reader extracts Y 1 as Y 1 = Y 1 ⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕ Rr).
This ensures that the tag group information is kept intact. Tag 2 will use Y 1 to
authenticate tag group and also to ensure that its predecessor is from the same
group.
• The reader then updates RTs ← RTns and RTns ← PRNG(RTns ).
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Reader Step 3
If Rid = Rc ⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr)
Tag Authenticated
Message Integrity of M1, β1, Y 1 and Rc Veriﬁed
else
Use RTns above and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
Y 1 = Y 1⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕Rr) (Or use RTns , based on match)
RTs ← RTns ; RTns ← PRNG(RTns );
Generate Rr for Tag 2; Using RTs, RT
n
s of Tag 2 Compute:
δ1 = PRNG(Rid ⊕RTs)⊕Rr; δ2 = PRNG(Rid ⊕RTns )⊕Rr;
V 12 = V 12 ⊕Rr; μ2 = μ2 ⊕Rr;
Get TSc from TTS
R1 = Rid ⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ TSc ⊕Rr)
Send V 12, μ2,M1, Y 1, R1, δ1, δ2, TSc to Tag 2
Tag 2 Step 4
Extract: PRNG(Rid ⊕RTs)⊕ δ1→ Rr
If (Rid = R1⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ TSc ⊕Rr))
Reader Authenticated
Message Integrity of M1, R1, δ1 and TSc Veriﬁed
else
Use δ2 to extract Rr and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
If Rr = R
−1
r then abort; else R
−1
r ← Rr
Extract: V 12 ⊕Rr → V 12; μ2 ⊕Rr → μ2;
Extract Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕ μ2 → Vr
If (Gid = Y 1⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) and
Tid = V 12 ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr))
Group ID and Tag ID Authenticated
Message Integrity of V 12, Y 1 and μ2 Veriﬁed
else
Use V T
′
s to extract Vr and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
(Use V Ts or V T
′
s from here based on the match)
Generate T2r
M2 = PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ TSc ⊕ T2r)
β2 = T2r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)
Y 2 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr)⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕Rr)
Rc = Rid ⊕ PRNG(M2⊕ β2⊕ Y 2⊕RTs ⊕Rr)
If Tid matched using V Ts then:
V T
′
s ← V Ts; V Ts ← PRNG(V Ts);
If Rid matched using δ1 then RTs ← PRNG(RTs)
Send M2, β2, Y 2, Rc to Reader
Figure 4.3: Proposed Oﬄine Grouping Proof Protocol - Step 3 & Step 4
• For the next tag, the reader generates a fresh Rr. This is done for each tag to
prevent tag impersonation attacks. Then, using RTs, RT
n
s of tag 2, the reader per-
forms similar operations as in Step 1. Finally, it sends V 12, μ2,M1, Y 1, R1, δ1, δ2
and TSc to tag 2.
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Step 4: Tag 2 validates the incoming messages, authenticates the reader, computes its
partial-proof using the partial-proof from tag 1 and sends it back to the reader. As the
operations are similar to tag 1, only the minor variations are pointed out below.
• Reader authentication and message integrity check is accomplished using M1 by
verifying if Rid = R1⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ TSc ⊕Rr).
• To verify group, tag 2 uses Y 1 instead of V 2, as in: if (Gid = Y 1⊕PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)
and Tid = V 12 ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr)). This way, tag 2 ensures that the other
participant belongs to the same group.
• After generating a pseudo-random number T2r, it computes M2 = PRNG(Tid ⊕
Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕ RTs) ⊕ PRNG(M1 ⊕ TSc ⊕ T2r). Note that M2 uses M1 of tag 1,
thereby satisfying the dependency property.
• Tag 2 then updates V Ts, RTs using the same principles described in Step 2. Finally,
it sends M2, β2, Y 2 and Rc to the reader.
The same procedure is repeated for the remaining tags, with the mth tag taking inputs
V 1m, μm,M(m−1), Y (m−1), R1, δ, TSc. After receiving the messages from the last tag
Mm, βm, Ym and Rc, the reader gets the ﬁnal timestamp TSc from TTS which marks
the end of the protocol run.
PART 2: The reader compiles all the partial-proofs to form the grouping proof and
encrypts them. The proof is sent to the veriﬁer either immediately or when more proofs
have been generated at a later time.
• The reader compiles the proof P as P = {Gid, Rid, (M1, β1, Rr, RTs, RTns , TSc, Rc),
(M2, β2, Rr, RTs, RT
n
s , TSc, Rc), ...(Mm, βm, Rr, RTs, RT
n
s , TSc, Rc).
• The proof P is then encrypted as Ekrv(P ) using the secret key krv that it shares
with the veriﬁer.
4.2.4 Veriﬁcation Phase
The veriﬁer performs the following with the grouping proofs:
• Proof P is decrypted using the shared secret key krv.
• Now, the veriﬁer knows to which tag group the proof belongs to, from the Gid it
received. Also, the veriﬁer knows which run of the protocol it should be using the
proof for, since all previous successful runs are marked as complete. Using these
two pieces of information, the veriﬁer retrieves the stored information such as the
tags in the group, their IDs, secret for that run and so on.
• Starting from ﬁrst tag and for each tag involved in the process the veriﬁer does
the following:
– TSc is decrypted using the shared secret key ktv.
– Verify if | TSc − TSr |< ΔTS . This conﬁrms that the partial-proof collection
process ran within the allowed time-window. Otherwise, the proof is not
accepted.
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– The pseudo-random number T1r is extracted as PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)⊕
β1→ T1r
– Message M1′ is constructed the same way as M1 using the stored and ac-
quired information. If M1′ = M1, the veriﬁer knows that tag 1 has suc-
cessfully participated in the grouping proof collection process and it proceeds
further.
• The veriﬁcation process continues for all the messages received in a similar fashion
using the right parameters - i.e., M2′ =M2, M3′ =M3, ... M ′m =Mm. The veri-
ﬁer also checks if the timestamp for the (i+1)th tag is greater than the timestamp
of the ith tag. Thus, if all messages are correctly veriﬁed and if all timestamps
(including the ﬁnal timestamp) are within the allowed time-window, the grouping
proof protocol run is considered to have completed successfully.
4.2.5 Missing Tags Scenario
If one or more tags leave the tag-group for some reason (e.g., faulty tags, tampered
tags, tags removed for genuine reasons) the protocol gathers proof from the available
tags. As seen in the protocol, the reader waits for the partial-proof from the current
tag which has to be included in the messages sent to the next tag. If the reader does
not receive a response from the currently processed tag within a stipulated time, the
partial-proof received from the previous tag will be sent to the next tag in the queue.
For example, say tag 3 failed to send M3, β3, Y 3, Rc to the reader. The reader will send
V 14, μ4,M2, Y 2, R1, δ1, δ2, TSc to tag 4. Note that the reader uses the partial proof
M2, Y 2 from tag 2 to send to tag 4. The reader will keep track of the tags that left the
group during a given protocol run and notify the veriﬁer at the end of the protocol run.
The veriﬁer will check if the tags left the group for a valid reason and if not, it can take
any necessary action.
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed. The security correct-
ness of the proposed scheme is proved ﬁrst, followed by the privacy properties of the
scheme.
4.3.1 Security Correctness
The security correctness of the proposed scheme is veriﬁed using GNY Logic [58]. The
following GNY postulates are used in the analysis. T1 which is a Being-told Rule,
P1 and P2 which are Possession Rules, F1 which is a Freshness Rule, I1 which is an
Interpretation Rule and J1 which is the Jurisdiction Rule. For more details on GNY
Logic, please refer to Section 3.2.1. The veriﬁer and TTS are secure and trusted entities
in the protocol and hence it is assumed that they ensure the freshness of the pseudo-
random numbers and the required encryptions. The focus here is only for the messages
transmitted by the tags and the reader. The security correctness for one tag/reader
transmission is shown. The rest can be proved in a similar fashion, since they follow a
similar message structure. Protocol messages are shown in Table 4.4, assumptions used
in the analysis are shown in Table 4.5, goals of the analysis are shown in Table 4.6, and
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the security correctness is shown in Table 4.7. The proof of goals G1 - G7 and G8 - G11
are shown by the veriﬁcation steps SC4 and SC8 respectively.
Table 4.4: GNY Logic - Protocol Messages and parser outputs
Protocol Messages Protocol Parser Output
V 1, V 2, μ,R1,
δ1, δ2, TSv, TSc
T  ∗(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Rr), ∗(Gid ⊕
PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕Rr), ∗(Tid⊕V Ts⊕Vr⊕Rr), ∗(Rid⊕
PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕ Rr)), ∗(PRNG(Rid ⊕ RTs) ⊕ Rr),
∗(PRNG(Rid⊕RTns )⊕Rr), ∗(PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts)⊕Vr⊕
TSr ⊕Rr, ∗(TSc)
M1, β1, Y 1, Rc R  ∗(PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕ RTs) ⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕
TSc⊕T1r)), ∗(T1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts⊕RTs)), ∗(Gid⊕
PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕ Rr)), ∗(Rid ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
Table 4.5: GNY Logic - Assumptions Used in the Analysis
No. Assumption Notation Assumption Description
A1 V  Vr, V Ts V Possesses Vr, V Ts
A2 V |≡ #Vr, V Ts V believes that Vr, V Ts are fresh
A3 T  T1r T Possesses T1r
A4 T |≡ #T1r T believes that T1r is fresh
A5 T  V Ts, RTs T Possesses V Ts, RTs
A6 T |≡ #V Ts, RTs T believes that V Ts, RTs are fresh
A7 V |≡ V TGs←→ TG V believes TGs is a suitable secret between
itself and tags in the tag-group TG
A8 V |≡ V Ts←→ T V believes Ts is a suitable tag-secret between
itself and tag T
A9 R  RTs R Possesses RTs
A10 R |≡ #RTs R believes that RTs is fresh
A11 R  Rr R Possesses Rr
A12 R |≡ #Rr R believes that Rr is fresh
A13 V |≡ V S1,S2,S3←→ TG, T,R V believes S1, S2, S3 are suitable secrets be-
tween itself and Tag-Group, Tag and Reader
to generate Gid, Tid, Rid respectively
A14 TG, T,R |≡ TG, T,R S1,S2,S3←→
V
Tag-Group, Tag and Reader believe
S1, S2, S3 are suitable secrets between itself
and V to generate Gid, Tid, Rid respectively
A15 TG |≡ TG TGs←→ V Tag-Group believes TGs is a suitable secret
between itself and the reader V
A16 T |≡ T Ts←→ V T believes Ts is a suitable secret between it-
self and the reader V
4.3.2 Privacy Properties
Here, the privacy properties of the proposed scheme are studied using Avoine’s adver-
sarial model [4] by applying the oracles Query (Q) (πiT , m1, m3), Send (S)(π
j
R, m2),
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Table 4.6: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Goals
No Goal Notation Goal Description
G1 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕
PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr)⊕Rr)
T believes R conveyed #(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕
PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr)⊕Rr)
G2 T |≡ R |∼ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕
Vr)⊕Rr)
T believes R conveyed #(Gid ⊕
PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr)⊕Rr)
G3 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕ Vr ⊕Rr) T believes R conveyed #(Tid⊕V Ts⊕Vr⊕
Rr)
G4 T |≡ R |∼ #(Rid ⊕ PRNG(TSv ⊕
TSc ⊕Rr))
T believes R conveyed #(Rid ⊕
PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕Rr))
G5 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(Rid ⊕ RTs) ⊕
Rr)
T believes R conveyed #(PRNG(Rid ⊕
RTs)⊕Rr)
G6 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(Rid ⊕RTns )⊕
Rr)
T believes R conveyed #(PRNG(Rid ⊕
RTns )⊕Rr)
G7 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts) ⊕
Vr ⊕ TSr ⊕Rr)
T believes R conveyed #(PRNG(Tid ⊕
V Ts)⊕ Vr ⊕ TSr ⊕Rr)
G8 T |≡ R |∼ #(TSc) T believes R conveyed #(TSc)
G9 R |≡ T |∼ #(PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕
V Ts ⊕RTs)⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕ TSc ⊕
T1r))
R believes T conveyed #(PRNG(Tid ⊕
Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕ RTs) ⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕ TSc ⊕
T1r))
G10 R |≡ T |∼ #(T1r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕
V Ts ⊕RTs))
R believes T conveyed #(T1r ⊕
PRNG(Tid ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs))
G11 R |≡ T |∼ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(TGs ⊕
Vr)⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕Rr))
R believes T conveyed #(Gid ⊕
PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr)⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕Rr))
G12 R |≡ T |∼ #(Rid ⊕ PRNG(M1 ⊕
β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
R believes T conveyed #(Rid ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
Execute (E) (πiT , π
j
R), Execute* (E*) (π
i
T , π
j
R) and Reveal (R) (π
i
T ). For more details
about the adversarial model, please refer to Section 3.2.2.
Theorem 1: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is Existential-UNT-QSE.
Proof: Consider that an adversary has access to the Q-oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈
{Query(πiT1 , ∗)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗)}. For any protocol interaction Ii whose
length is ≤ Pchal, based on the output m2{(M1, β1, Y 1, Rc)} of the Q-oracle, M1 is
guaranteed to be not connected sinceM1 = PRNG(Tid⊕Ts⊕V Ts⊕RTs)⊕PRNG(TSr⊕
TSc ⊕ T1r), where T1r is a freshly generated pseudo-random number (hidden during
transmission), Ts is the tag secret, RTs and V Ts are updated after each run, and the
XOR operation between Tid, Ts, V Ts and RTs is further randomized using the PRNG
function (also with TSr, TSc, T1r). By a similar argument, Y 1 is also not connected
since Y 1 = Gid⊕PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕PRNG(RTs⊕Rr) where Vr, Rr are freshly gener-
ated pseudo-random numbers (hidden during transmission), RTs is updated after each
run, and TGs is a shared-secret. The same principle applies to β1 and Rc. As seen,
TID,RID are not sent during the communication. Tid and Rid are well enciphered in
the messages. Rid cannot be obtained from δ1, δ2, R1 without the knowledge of RTs
and Rr. Tid cannot be obtained from V 11, μ1, TSv,M1, β1 without the knowledge of
Ts and RTs, Rr, V Ts, Vr, T1r which change during each protocol run. Thus, the protocol
guarantees tag/reader anonymity and tag/reader location privacy. In the forward chan-
nel, an adversary cannot impersonate the reader without the knowledge of RTs and Rr
which serve as challenges to the tag so it can authenticate the reader. If the veriﬁcation
Rid = R1 ⊕ PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕ Rr) is successful, the tag conﬁrms that the reader is
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Table 4.7: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Proof
No Proof Notation GNY Postulate
SC1 T  (Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Rr), (Gid ⊕
PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕Rr), (Tid⊕V Ts⊕Vr⊕Rr), (Rid⊕
PRNG(TSv⊕TSc⊕Rr)), (PRNG(Rid⊕RTs)⊕Rr),
(PRNG(Rid⊕RTns )⊕Rr), (PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts)⊕Vr⊕
TSr ⊕Rr), (TSc)
V 1, V 2, μ,R1, δ1, δ2,
TSv, TSc, / ∗ T1 ∗ /
SC2 T  (Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Rr), (Gid ⊕
PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕Rr), (Tid⊕V Ts⊕Vr⊕Rr), (Rid⊕
PRNG(TSv⊕TSc⊕Rr)), (PRNG(Rid⊕RTs)⊕Rr),
(PRNG(Rid⊕RTns )⊕Rr), (PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts)⊕Vr⊕
TSr ⊕Rr), (TSc)
SC1, P1
SC3 T |≡ #(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Rr), (Gid ⊕
PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕Rr), (Tid⊕V Ts⊕Vr⊕Rr), (Rid⊕
PRNG(TSv⊕TSc⊕Rr)), (PRNG(Rid⊕RTs)⊕Rr),
(PRNG(Rid⊕RTns )⊕Rr), (PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts)⊕Vr⊕
TSr ⊕Rr), (TSc)
SC2, F1
SC4 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Rr),
(Gid⊕PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕Rr), (Tid⊕V Ts⊕Vr⊕Rr),
(Rid⊕PRNG(TSv⊕TSc⊕Rr)), (PRNG(Rid⊕RTs)⊕
Rr), (PRNG(Rid⊕RTns )⊕Rr), (PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts)⊕
Vr ⊕ TSr ⊕Rr), (TSc)
SC3, A2, A10, A12,
A15, A16, I1, P2
SC5 R  (PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕ RTs) ⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕
TSc⊕T1r)), (T1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts⊕RTs)), (Gid⊕
PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕ Rr)), (Rid ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
M1, β1, Y 1, Rc, / ∗
T1 ∗ /
SC6 R  (PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕RTs)⊕ PRNG(TSr ⊕
TSc⊕T1r)), (T1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts⊕RTs)), (Gid⊕
PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕ Rr)), (Rid ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
SC5, P1
SC7 R |≡ #(PRNG(Tid⊕Ts⊕V Ts⊕RTs)⊕PRNG(TSr⊕
TSc⊕T1r)), (T1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕V Ts⊕RTs)), (Gid⊕
PRNG(TGs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ PRNG(RTs ⊕ Rr)), (Rid ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
SC6, F1
SC8 R |≡ Ti |∼ #(PRNG(Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ V Ts ⊕ RTs) ⊕
PRNG(TSr ⊕ TSc ⊕ T1r)), (T1r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕
V Ts⊕RTs)), (Gid⊕PRNG(TGs⊕Vr)⊕PRNG(RTs⊕
Rr)), (Rid ⊕ PRNG(M1⊕ β1⊕ Y 1⊕RTs ⊕Rr))
SC7, A2, A4, A7,
A8, A12, I1, P2
legitimate since only an entity with the knowledge of RTs and Rr can compute a valid
R1. In a similar fashion, in the backward channel, the tag challenges the reader by
using RTs and Rr in Rc. The reader conﬁrms that the tag is legitimate since only an
entity with the knowledge of RTs and Rr can compute a valid Rc. Hence, the protocol
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is resistent to both tag and reader impersonation attacks. Therefore, with the Q-oracle,
the advantage of the adversary is negligible as the adversary does not learn any useful
information. Hence the protocol is Existential-UNT-Q.
Now, consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,
∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m22)} where m2{(M1, β1,
Y 1, Rc)}. The adversary on sending m2 as a response to the reader, does not receive
anything back from the reader. Hence the adversary is not presented with any additional
advantage. Thus the protocol is Existential-UNT-QS.
Finally, consider the adversary having access to QSE-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(
πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute (πiT1 , π
j
R)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2),
Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R)}. The use of RTs, Ts, V Ts, Vr and Rr, T1r (both hidden during trans-
mission), and the further randomization of the XOR operation guarantees that the
messages are unique each time the protocol is run. Also, V Ts is pre-computed during
the initialization step, it would be diﬀerent for each round. Hence V Ts or V T
′
s cannot
be reused several times and if the attacker replayed the previously captured messages,
the protocol will fail in the tag ID veriﬁcation step due to a mismatch in V Ts. If the
adversary were to replay the message from the reader, from the previous round, the
tag would know that the messages are not fresh when it extracts the pseudo-random
number Rr and checks if Rr = R
−1
r . If they are the same, the tag does not respond and
the protocol aborts. An attacker cannot try this attack using the messages from the
rounds before that, since the Rid is matched only using RTs or RT
n
s and everything else
will fail. Thus, by eavesdropping on multiple instances of the protocol the adversary is
not presented with any advantage over the QSE-oracle, thereby being resistent to re-
play attacks. Thus the protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE which is the strongest security
requirement when the attacker cannot tamper the tag.
Theorem 2: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Proof: In addition to the QSE-oracles, consider that the adversary also has access
to the R-oracle such that, ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R),
Reveal(πiT1)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R), Reveal
(πiT2)}. By executing the R-oracle, the adversary obtains {Gid, TGs, Tid Ts, V Ts, V T
′
s,
Rid, RTs, R
−1
r }, where RTs changes after each protocol run. However, V T
′
s, R
−1
r are
updated to the current V Ts, Rr after each protocol run and Gid, TGs, Tid, Ts, Rid remain
constant. Hence, by using them, if the adversary can link with previous communications
of the tag, then the protocol is not Forward-UNT-QSER. It is now shown that, though
the tag stores the current and previous secrets V Ts and V T
′
s, an adversary still cannot
trace the previous communications of the tag. The messages M1, β1, Y 1 and Rc are
computed using a freshly generated pseudo-random number T1r which is not a resident
data on the tag. In order to obtain T1r from β1, the adversary would have to know
RTs (from the previous run) which is also not a resident data on the tag. The tag only
stores the current RTs and is updated after each protocol run. Hence, without these
two unknowns, the attacker cannot decipher any of the contents of M1, β1, Y 1 and
Rc. The freshness guarantees that the messages are unique each time and the further
randomization of the XOR operation in all these messages provides additional security.
Hence, an adversary cannot trace the previous communications of the tag using the
current resident data on the tag.
Now, assume that an adversary executes the R-oracle on the reader and he gets {Rid, RVs}
and {Gid, TSr, TSv, V 11..m, V 2, μ1..m, RTs1..m , RTns1..m}. It is important to note that Gid
and Rid are already in a pre-computed encrypted form using S1, S3 respectively, which
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are known only to the veriﬁer. RVs is used only during the initialization phase and not
during the protocol run. Rid is well enciphered in δ1, δ2 and R1 using RTs, Rr where
both RTs, Rr change for every protocol run and they are not sent in the clear. Also, Rr
is not a resident data on the reader. V 11..m contains Tid1..m which cannot be deciphered
without knowing Ts, V Ts and Vr which are not resident data in the reader. Also, V Ts
and Vr change for every protocol run and they are not sent in the clear. Hence, without
the knowledge of these secrets/pseudo-random numbers, an attacker cannot decipher
the tag ID from V 11..m. Similarly, Tag ID is well-protected in μ1..m using V Ts and Vr.
Gid is not sent directly during the protocol run and is well protected in V 2 using TGs
and Vr. Both are not resident data in the reader and Vr changes for every protocol run.
The unencrypted timestamp TSr acts as a scheduler for the reader so it can start the
protocol run at appropriate times and is not transmitted during the protocol run. TSv
contains the timestamp TSr but is well protected using V Ts and Vr. RTs1..m , RT
n
s1..m are
diﬀerent for each tag and they are also updated after each protocol run. Hence, all the
information stored in the reader are well protected and an adversary cannot use them
to decipher any information about any of the tags or trace the previous communications
of the reader using the current resident data on the reader. Note: The same principles
can be applied to ensure security, if the attacker were to capture these messages by
eavesdropping the forward channel, when the reader sends them to the tags (instead of
executing the R-oracle on the reader).
Therefore the advantage presented to the adversary by using the R-oracle on the tag or
the reader is negligible and the protocol is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Theorem 3: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is resistant to desynchronization
attacks.
Proof: An adversary can cause Denial of Service (DoS) attack by desynchronizing RTs
between the reader and the tags, by blocking certain messages. Consider that the adver-
sary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)} where
m2{(M1, β1, Y 1, Rc)}. The adversary, on blocking m2 from reaching the reader, would
cause the tag to update its secret RTs but the reader would not, causing desynchro-
nization of keys. When the protocol is run the next time, the tag would ﬁrst use δ1
in order to authenticate the reader, which would not result in a match since the keys
are diﬀerent. This would prompt the tag to authenticate the reader using the δ2 which
would result in a match. In the last step, the tag updates the secret RTs only if the
match was made using the δ1. If the reader did not receive m2, it would retry the
step using the same RTs, RT
n
s in δ1, δ2. When the reader receives the response from
the tag, it updates the secret on its end, thereby synchronizing the key. Therefore,
by blocking m2, the adversary cannot cause a DoS attack. Finally, if a protocol run
were to abort halfway for any reason, some tags would have updated RTs but not all.
The proposed protocol is resilient to incomplete runs. If the reader had to restart the
same run, the tags that had already updated RTs will not update again because now
the ID will be matched using RTns . Only the tags that missed the run will perform
this update. Same principle is applied for the secret V Ts to prevent desynchronization
between the server and the tag. Also, from Theorem 1, it is seen that the protocol
achieves the strongest security requirement of Existential-UNT-QSE which proves that
an attacker cannot successfully complete a protocol run. Using these principles both
DoS and de-synchronization attacks are completely prevented.
Theorem 4: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is resistant to active-attacks.
Consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,m11),
Send(πiT1 ,m
1
2)}. Assume that the adversary with the ability to modify messages changes
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the Q-Oracle m11 to m
′1
1 by introducing some random message denoted by γ, to one or
more of the messages in m11 {V 11, V 2, μ1, R1, δ1, δ2, TSv, TSc} (e.g., V 11 ← V 11 ⊕ γ).
When the tag receives m′11 , it will not be able to authenticate the reader when it veriﬁes
if Rid = R1 ⊕ PRNG(TSv ⊕ TSc ⊕ Rr)) using its stored Rid, RTs. A valid reader ID
will not be returned if the attacker were to modify even any one of the messages in
{R1, δ1, δ2, TSc, TSv}. In a similar fashion, a valid Group ID/Tag ID will not be re-
turned if the attacker were to modify even any one of the messages in {V 11, V 2, μ1} when
the tag veriﬁes if (Gid = V 2⊕PRNG(TGs⊕Vr) and Tid = V 11⊕Ts⊕PRNG(V Ts⊕Vr)),
using its stored IDs and secrets. The protocol will abort in either case. Thus, the in-
tegrity of all the incoming messages are veriﬁed by the tag and an attacker cannot
successfully run the protocol by modifying the messages in the Q-Oracle in the forward
channel. In the backward channel, assume the attacker modiﬁes m12 {M1, β1, Y 1, Rc}
to m′12 . The reader veriﬁes the integrity of the incoming messages using its own reader
ID and the Rr that was sent to the tag. If the attacker were to tamper even any one of
the messages {M1, β1, Y 1, Rc} it will not return a valid Rid when the reader veriﬁes if
Rid = Rc⊕PRNG(M1⊕β1⊕Y 1⊕RTs⊕Rr). These checks are performed by each en-
tity every time a message is received during the entire protocol run. Hence the attacker
cannot successfully run the protocol by modifying the messages in the QS-Oracle. An
adversary with access to QSE-Oracle does not gain anything by repeatedly executing
multiple instances of the protocol by tampering the messages each time. Thus, the
protocol is completely resistent to active-attacks.
4.4 Design Requirements Analysis
Here, an analysis is presented as to how the protocol achieves the unique design require-
ments discussed in Section 4.1.1.
• Dependence between the tags is achieved by having the input of one tag derived
from the results computed by its preceding tag. This does not apply for the ﬁrst
tag which receives its input from the reader.
• Eliminating unwanted (but valid) tags: Group IDs are used to ensure that only the
tags that belong to the same group participate in the protocol run. Also, the tags
proceed with the run only if the incoming message is addressed to it, by checking
the tag ID. This eliminates unwanted (but valid) tags from participating in the
protocol.
• Denial-of-Proof (DoP) Resistance: Verifying both group ID and tag ID helps
detect illegitimate tags, thereby addressing the DoP attack. This prevents the
generation of invalid proofs and the proposed protocol is resilient to any number
of illegitimate tags (m-DoP).
• Simultaneity: Each tag uses its own encrypted timestamp received from the reader,
thereby ensuring that all tags were scanned simultaneously.
• Completing within a time-window: The veriﬁer maintains a time-window before
which the proof generation has to be completed and checks if each tag’s timestamp
is within that window. If not, the proof is rejected.
• Race Condition is prevented by having the tags not store any computational re-
sults. Also, by identifying the reader, it knows which reader it is addressing the
messages to.
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• Message Integrity Check is accomplished by having each entity validate the incom-
ing messages before using them. This prevents the generation of invalid proofs.
4.5 Performance Study
In order to study the scalability of the proposed scheme, the protocol was implemented
in a simulation environment using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2). The metric of interest
was end-to-end delay which is calculated from the time the ﬁrst message is sent by the
reader to the ﬁrst tag, to when partial proofs for allm tags are gathered. The end-to-end
delay time includes two main parts, the network delay and the processing time in the
reader and the tags. The number of tags in the transaction was varied from 100K to
1Million. The results of the simulation experiments are presented in Fig. 4.4. Each data
point corresponds to the average of 20 simulation runs. The results show that it takes
only 4.5 minutes to process up to 100K tags. These results prove that the proposed
scheme is eﬃcient and scalable, and achieves the required security properties without
compromising system performance.
Figure 4.4: Simulation Results for the Proposed Grouping Proof Protocol
4.6 Parameter Setting
Typically, low-cost EPC C1G2 passive RFID tags have non-volatile (EEPROM) memory
of 1000bits to 1kilobyte (KB) [59]. However, recent RFID application proposals such as
plans by Airbus to track ﬂyable aircraft parts and components, as well as store data, such
as information regarding a part’s initial construction and maintenance demands have
introduced passive RFID tags with even higher memory capabilities (4KB to 8KB) [162].
Also, Atmel Corporation has introduced passive RFID tags that can support memory
of between 1KB and 64KB [41].
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The main requirements of the proposed approach is the storage of {Gid, TGs, Tid, Ts, V Ts,
V T
′
s} and 128bit PRNG, once per tag. The tag also stores {Rid, RTs, R−1r } for each
reader that is authorized to access the tag. Depending on the memory capabilities of
the tag, An appropriate key length is chosen to achieve a desired level of security. Let
the storage requirement for each ID be 96bits (e.g., Tid = 96bits), secret be 256 bits
(e.g., Ts = 256bits) and 128 bits for each pseudo-random number. Thus the storage
requirements are (96 + 256 + 96 + 256 + 128 + 128 + 128) = 1088/8 = 136bytes once
per tag; and 96 + 128 + 128 = 352/8 = 44bytes per reader. This is not excessive for
applications using low cost tags that require security. Hence a tag with 8KB storage
capability can store up to a maximum of 167 readers (8192− 136)/44 = 183.
Given the length L of 256bits for Ts, the probability of an attacker correctly guessing
Ts is 2
256. Another consideration is the length of the key required to support a certain
number of tags. The design of the scheme requires that the value of Ts is unique for each
tag in the system. This means that with a key length of L = 256bits, the number of tags
that can be supported in the system is limited to 2256. This is more than suﬃcient for
a majority of applications. Finally, it is noted that the use of the XOR operator raises
the expectation that its operands have equal bit lengths in order to prevent information
leakage. As all the parameters are not of equal length, a simple modiﬁcation to the
standard XOR operation is suggested to meet the requirements. As an example, in
the computation V 1 = Ts ⊕ Tid ⊕ PRNG(V Ts ⊕ Vr), the operand lengths are unequal.
Here, it is recommended that the largest operand is XOR-ed with a concatenation
of the XOR of the other operands. In this instance, the implementation would be
V 1 = Ts⊕(Tid⊕PRNG(V Ts⊕Vr) ||Tid⊕PRNG(V Ts⊕Vr)|| ... Tid⊕PRNG(V Ts⊕Vr)).
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, a robust grouping proof protocol for EPC C1G2 tags was proposed,
based on simple XOR and 128bit PRNG functions. The protocol does not use hash
functions which makes it viable for large scale implementations using low-cost passive
tags. Formal security analysis shows that the protocol meets the necessary security
requirements of RFID systems. Forward security, which is an open research issue has
been addressed in the proposed protocol. Also, unlike any other protocol, the integrity
of the incoming messages are veriﬁed, hence avoiding generation of invalid proofs. By
taking a holistic approach to grouping proofs, the protocol meets the unique design
requirements that has been identiﬁed thus far by the research community. Simulation
study of the scheme showed the performance of the protocol to be within acceptable
limits making it practical.
Chapter 5
Grouping Proof - Protocol II
In this chapter, a Grouping Proof protocol is proposed that uses probabilistic encryption
based on quadratic residuosity. The signiﬁcance of this protocol is that it provides zero
knowledge to the attackers since it does not transmit the tag secret during the protocol
run. After summarizing the contributions, the workings of the protocol is presented,
followed by the detailed security analysis using the formal analysis models described in
Chapter 3. Then, the work is compared with the contributions made by others in terms
of both security and performance. A simulation study shows the performance of the
proposed protocol in a simulated environment and the simulation results are compared
with other methods. Finally, the chapter is concluded with the recommended parameter
settings for the proposed scheme.
5.1 Introduction
As this chapter is an extension to the previous chapter, please refer to Section 4.1.1
where the design requirements for grouping proof are discussed and Section 4.1.2 where
the application of the protocol is discussed. For a complete understanding on grouping
proofs and the related work in this area, please refer to Chapter 2. Here, one additional
motivation to this work is presented. For more details, please refer to Section 1.6.
5.1.1 Motivation
Transmitting the secret keys during the protocol run using some encryption technique
is a common practice. Hence, there is a heavy reliance on the strength of the encryption
technique for the protocol to be secure. While this may not be an issue with higher-end
tags, it is challenging to achieve the same level of security with low-cost passive tags
where the computational resources are low. Therefore, it is imperative to have methods
that would: i) use less computational resources on the tag; ii) achieve the required
level security without using hash functions or other complex encryption schemes; iii)
and ideally not have to transmit the secret key during the protocol run. The proposed
scheme in the previous chapter achieves the ﬁrst two goals and this scheme achieves all
three goals.
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5.1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as:
• A secure zero knowledge grouping proof protocol that uses probabilistic encryp-
tion based on quadratic residuosity. The protocol provides zero knowledge to the
attackers by not transmitting the tag secret during the protocol run while still
proving the authenticity of the tags involved in the grouping proof. The security
correctness and privacy properties are proved using formal analysis models and
shown to achieve the highest level of security.
• A secure zero knowledge grouping proof protocol that meets the unique design
requirements that has been identiﬁed thus far by the research community. To
my knowledge, none of the existing protocols verify the integrity of the messages,
making them vulnerable to active-attacks or invalid proof generation. Also, the
proposed protocol is resistent to active-attacks; provides forward security solving
the open research issue [105, 123]; and is resilient to m-DoP attacks (where m
represents multiple illegitimate tags) as opposed to 1-DoP [102].
• A secure zero knowledge grouping proof protocol that does not use hash functions
or other complex encryption schemes. Operations of the tags are limited to modulo
(MOD), exclusive-or (XOR) and 128bit PRNG functions. Thus, the proposed
protocol achieves compliance with EPC C1G2 standard and also makes it a viable
option for large-scale implementations on passive tags.
5.2 The Proposed Protocol
In this section, an abstract version of the proposed protocol is presented ﬁrst, followed
by the deﬁnition of the zero knowledge property. A detailed description of the three
phases of the protocol (initialization phase, grouping proof collection phase and proof-
veriﬁcation phase) is then presented. The grouping proof collection phase is broken down
into two parts: 1) collect partial proofs from each tag and 2) compile the whole proof
and send it to the veriﬁer. To enhance readability, clarity and easier understanding,
the ﬁrst part is further broken down into four steps giving a thorough explanation for
each step. Table 5.1 provides a brief description for the notations that are used in the
proposed protocol. The following assumptions are made: a) All entities of the RFID
system have polynomially bounded resources b) The setup phase is carried out in a
secure environment and c) A Trusted Timestamp Server (TTS) is used which is secure.
To understand the probabilistic encryption scheme, refer to Section 3.1.2 and for a
synopsis of the protocol, refer to Section 4.2.1. Let us now look at the initialization
phase of the protocol.
5.2.1 Initialization Phase
Let T(Tid1 , Tid2 , ...Tidm) be the tag-group where m is the number of tags in the group.
Let u be the number of protocol runs pre-authorized for a reader. During the initializa-
tion phase, the veriﬁer pre-computes information for u protocol runs and stores them in
the reader. Initialization is shown below for one tag-group and one run.
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Table 5.1: Notations used in the Protocol
Notation Description
h(.) Represents one-way keyed hash function; used only for pre-computation
purposes
GID,Gid Tag Group ID and pre-computed value of h(GID, hs1)
TID, Tid Unique Tag ID and pre-computed value of h(TID, hs2)
RID,Rid Unique Reader ID and pre-computed value of h(RID, hs3)
hs1 , hs2 , hs3 Unique secrets used in h(.) to compute Gid, Tid, Rid respectively; known
only to the veriﬁer
Gs Shared secret between the tags in a tag group
Ts Secret key unique to each tag in the system. Let Ts be of the form
Ts1 ||Ts2 ||Ts3 ||...Tsk where k represents k-bits in Ts.
Rs Secret key unique to each reader in the system
Gj Represents the j
th tag group; (j = 1, 2...p); p indicates the number of tag
groups that a reader R is authorized to run the grouping proof protocol
for.
rn Represents the protocol run number
Tr, T
′
r Tr is the current secret for the protocol run shared between the veriﬁer
and a tag and changes after each run. T
′
r is the previous value of Tr.
Rr, R
n
r Rr is the current secret for the protocol run shared between the reader
and a tag and changes after each run. Rnr is the next value of Rr.
Vr Pseudo-random number generated by the veriﬁer for each run of the
protocol
Br{1..m} Pseudo-random numbers generated by the reader during a protocol run,
for tags 1..m in a tag group.
T indexr Pseudo-random number generated by a tag during a protocol run, where
index represents the random bit positions x, y, z sent by the veriﬁer to
the tag.
ΔTS Time window before which grouping proof should end
Ektv(CTS) Encrypted current timestamp CTS using secret key ktv shared between
veriﬁer and TTS
TS{1..m} Stores the result of Ektv(CTS) (encrypted current timestamp) for tags
1..m in a tag group
TSf , TSe Future timestamp when the protocol has to run and the end timestamp
that marks the end of the protocol run.
Ekrv(P ) Encrypt proof P using secret key krv shared between veriﬁer and the
reader
T,R, V Indicates tag, reader and veriﬁer respectively
1. Initialize each tag in the tag-group with a pseudo random number Tr as Tr ←
PRNG().
2. Let rn = 1 for the ﬁrst run.
3. Generate future timestamp TSf , when the protocol is to be run.
4. Generate a pseudo random number Vr for the run, as Vr ← PRNG()
5. Compute G1 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr)
6. For each tag j, (where j = 1 to m) in the tag-group
• Select 3 distinct integers x, y, z randomly, s.t (1 ≤ x, y, z ≤ k)
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• Using Tid and Tr of the jth tag:
– Compute Hj = Tid ⊕ PRNG(Tr ⊕ Vr)
– Compute μj = PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tr)⊕ (x||y||z||Vr)
– Update Tr as Tr ← PRNG(Tr) for that tag.
• This ensures that Tid, x, y, z and Vr are stored in the reader in an encrypted
form.
7. Next tag j
8. The veriﬁer repeats the Steps 3 − 7 for u runs, during which time, it increments
rn by 1 for each run. The veriﬁer also ensures that TSf for a given run is greater
that its previous run.
Data storage in each entity is described below:
• The Veriﬁer stores all the information that is generated and computed during the
initialization process, apart from storing the IDs and secrets of all the entities and
the two prime numbers e, f .
• Each tag stores the tuple {Gid, Gs, Tid, Ts, Tr, T ′r, Rid, Rr, B−1r , rn, h, w}. Initially,
Tr = T
′
r and rn = 1 which increments by 1 after each successful run.
• The readers stores {Rid, Rs}, and the tuple {Gid, rn, TSf , G1, H{1..m}, μ{1..m},
Rr{1..m} , R
n
r{1..m}}. A sample access list AL is shown in Table 5.2.
• Note that the reader does not store any sensitive information such as IDs and
secrets. As seen above, G1, H{1..m}, and μ{1..m} are encrypted and without the
knowledge of the IDs/secrets/pseudo random numbers, the reader (or an attacker)
cannot decipher any information. It is important to note that Gid, Tid, and Rid are
already in a pre-computed encrypted form using hs1 , hs2 , hs3 respectively, which
are known only to the veriﬁer. The unencrypted timestamp TSf stored in the
reader acts as a scheduler so the reader can start the protocol run at appropriate
times. It is not transmitted during the protocol run. Hence, all the information
stored in the reader are well protected.
5.2.2 Grouping Proof Collection Phase
Once the setup phase is complete, the connection to the veriﬁer is not needed anymore.
The reader can function independently since it is equipped with all the necessary in-
formation to gather grouping proofs whenever required. This makes the veriﬁer totally
oﬄine. As noted earlier, the collection phase has two parts. The details are presented
below.
PART 1: Here, the reader gathers partial-proof from each tag, for all m tags and is
composed of 4 steps. Steps 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 5.1, and Steps 3 and 4 are
shown in Figure 5.2.
Step 1: The reader starts the protocol run when the timestamp TSf stored in it becomes
true. It computes its challenge, gets the current timestamp from TTS and sends them
along with the pre-computed server challenge, to tag 1. This step is described below.
5.2. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 83
Table 5.2: Sample Access List Stored in a Reader
Gid rn TSfi G1i Hi{1..m} μi{1..m} Rr{1..m} R
n
r{1..m}
Gid1 1 TSf1 G11 H1{1..m} μ1{1..m} Rr1{1..m} R
n
r1{1..m}
Gid1 2 TSf2 G12 H2{1..m} μ2{1..m} Rr2{1..m} R
n
r2{1..m}
Gid1 3 TSf3 G13 H3{1..m} μ3{1..m} Rr3{1..m} R
n
r3{1..m}
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gid1 u TSfu G1u Hu{1..m} μu{1..m} Rru{1..m} R
n
ru{1..m}
Gid2 1 TSf1 G11 H1{1..m} μ1{1..m} Rr1{1..m} R
n
r1{1..m}
Gid2 2 TSf2 G12 H2{1..m} μ2{1..m} Rr2{1..m} R
n
r2{1..m}
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gidp 1 TSf1 G11 H1{1..m} μ1{1..m} Rr1{1..m} R
n
r1{1..m}
Gidp 2 TSf2 G12 H2{1..m} μ2{1..m} Rr2{1..m} R
n
r2{1..m}
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
• The reader generates pseudo-random number Br1 and computes G1 ← G1 ⊕ Br1 ;
H1 ← H1⊕Br1 and μ1 ← μ1⊕Br1 . This is done to introduce additional random-
ness to the pre-computed information.
• It then computes δa = PRNG(Rid ⊕ Rr) ⊕ Br1 , δb = PRNG(Rid ⊕ Rnr ) ⊕ Br1 .
δa, δb serve as blind-factors so Br1 is not sent in the clear.
• The reader requests timestamp TS1 from the TTS. The TTS gets the current
timestamp CTS, encrypts it using the secret key ktv as TS1 = Ektv(CTS). It then
sends TS1 to the reader. As soon as TTS sends the ﬁrst timestamp, it marks the
beginning of the protocol run.
• The reader computes I1 = Rid ⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Br1) which is used by the tag to
authenticate the reader.
• Finally, it sends G1, H1, μ1, I1, δa, δb, TS1 to Tag 1.
Step 2: Tag 1 validates the incoming messages, authenticates the reader, computes its
partial-proof and sends it back to the reader. This step is described below.
• Using stored {Rid, Rr}, tag extracts Br1 from δa as PRNG(Rid ⊕Rr)⊕ δa → Br1
• Then, using Br1 , I1, TS1, the tag veriﬁes if Rid = I1 ⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Br1). If
successful, it authenticates the reader and also conﬁrms the message integrity of
δa, I1, TS1. If the Rid check fails, these tasks are repeated using δb. If either one
results in a successful match for Rid, the protocol proceeds, otherwise it aborts.
• The tag then checks if Br = B−1r . If yes, it does not respond and the protocol
aborts. This is to make sure that an attacker is not replaying the message from
the previous run. This attack cannot be attempted using the messages from the
runs before that, since the Rid is matched only using Rr or R
n
r and everything else
will fail. Messages from a genuine reader will always be fresh since Br is freshly
generated every time. If it is not a replayed message, the tag updates B−1r as
B−1r ← Br.
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Reader Step 1
Br1 ← PRNG()
G1 ← G1 ⊕Br1 ; H1 ← H1 ⊕Br1 ; μ1 ← μ1 ⊕Br1
δa = PRNG(Rid ⊕Rr)⊕Br1 ; δb = PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br1
Get TS1 from TTS
I1 = Rid ⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕Br1)
Send G1, H1, μ1, I1, δa, δb, TS1 to Tag 1
Tag 1 Step 2
Extract: PRNG(Rid ⊕Rr)⊕ δa → Br1
If (Rid = I1 ⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕Br1))
Reader Authenticated;
Message Integrity of δa, I1, TS1 Veriﬁed
Else
Use δb to extract Br1 and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
If Br = B
−1
r then abort; else B
−1
r ← Br
Extract: G1 ⊕Br1 → G1; H1 ⊕Br1 → H1; μ1 ⊕Br1 → μ1
Extract: PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tr)⊕ μ1 → x||y||z||Vr
If (Gid = G1 ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) and
Tid = H1 ⊕ PRNG(Tr ⊕ Vr)) then
Group ID & Tag ID Veriﬁed;
Message Integrity of G1, H1 and μ1 Veriﬁed
Else
Use T
′
r to extract x, y, z, Vr and try again.
If unsuccessful, abort;
S1 = Tsx ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tsy)⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Tsz ⊕ Vr)
J1 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr)⊕Br1
K1 = null
For index in x, y, z
T indexr ← PRNG()
If S1[index] = 0 then
K1 = K1 || (T indexr )2 mod h
else if S1[index] = 1 then
K1 = K1 || w . (T indexr )2 mod h
Endif
Next index
Compute L1 = Rid ⊕ PRNG((J1||K1)⊕Br1 ⊕Rr)
Send J1,K1, L1 to Reader
Figure 5.1: Proposed Zero Knowledge Grouping Proof Protocol - Step 1 & 2
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• The original pre-computed G1, H1, μ1 are then extracted as G1⊕Br1 → G1; H1⊕
Br1 → H1 and μ1 ⊕Br1 → μ1.
• The tag then extracts x||y||z||Vr from μ1 as PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tr) ⊕ μ1 → x||y||z||Vr.
It then veriﬁes if (Gid = G1⊕PRNG(Gs⊕ Vr) and Tid = H1⊕PRNG(Tr ⊕ Vr)).
If the check fails, the tag uses T
′
r and repeats the operation. If either one results
in a Gid, Tid match, it conﬁrms that the messages are for this tag. Otherwise the
protocol aborts.
• Using x, y, z as index, tag selects the subset of the secret Ts as Tsx , Tsy , Tsz . It
then computes S1 = Tsx ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tsy) ⊕PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Tsz ⊕ Vr) and J1 =
Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr)⊕Br1 and initializes K1 = null.
• The tag then generates 3 pseudo-random numbers T indexr where index  {x, y, z}.
Then, if the bit value of S1[index] = 0 the tag computes K1 = K1||(T indexr )2 mod
h. If the bit value of S1[index] = 1 the tag computes K1 = K1|| w . (T indexr )2 mod
h. This computation of random squares or random pseudosquares enables the tag
to prove to the veriﬁer that it has the right secret Ts, without having to reveal it,
thereby providing zero knowledge to the attackers.
• Finally, the tag computes L1 = Rid⊕PRNG((J1||K1)⊕Br1 ⊕Rr) and then sends
J1,K1, L1 to the reader. This is used for verifying message integrity.
Step 3: Here, the reader validates the response from tag 1, computes the reader challenge,
gets the current timestamp from TTS and sends them to tag 2 along with the pre-
computed server challenge and the partial-proof from the ﬁrst tag.
• Using the stored Rid, Rr and the received values J1,K1, L1, the reader veriﬁes if
Rid = L1 ⊕ PRNG((J1||K1) ⊕ Br1 ⊕ Rr). If successful, it authenticates the tag
and also conﬁrms the integrity of the messages J1,K1, L1. Otherwise, the above
step is repeated using Rnr . If either one results in a successful match for Rid, the
protocol proceeds, otherwise it aborts.
• The reader then extracts J1 as J1 ⊕ Br1 → J1. It then updates Rr ← Rnr and
Rnr ← PRNG(Rnr ).
• For the next tag, the reader generates a fresh Br2 and computes J1 ← J1 ⊕ Br2 ;
H2 ← H2 ⊕ Br2 and μ2 ← μ2 ⊕ Br2 ; δa = PRNG(Rid ⊕ Rr) ⊕ Br2 and δb =
PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br2 .
• It then gets the next timestamp TS2 from TTS and computes I2 = Rid⊕PRNG(K1
⊕TS2 ⊕Br2) and sends J1,K1, H2, μ2, I2, δa, δb and TS2 to tag 2.
Step 4: Here, Tag 2 computes its partial-proof using the partial-proof from the tag 1
and sends it back to the reader. As the operations are similar to Tag 1, only the minor
variations are pointed out below.
• The tag authenticates the reader and veriﬁes the integrity of the messages δa,K1, I2,
TS2. It then veriﬁes if the messages are not replayed. If not, it extracts J1, H2, μ2
and veriﬁes Tag ID and Group ID using them. To ensure that the other participant
belongs to the same group as itself, Tag 2 uses the received J1.
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Reader Step 3
If Rid = L1 ⊕ PRNG((J1||K1)⊕Br1 ⊕Rr)
Tag Authenticated;
Message Integrity of J1,K1, L1 Veriﬁed
else
Use Rnr above and try again. If unsuccessful, abort.
Extract J1 as J1 ⊕Br1 → J1
Rr ← Rnr ; Rnr ← PRNG(Rnr );
Br2 ← PRNG()
J1 ← J1 ⊕Br2 ; H2 ← H2 ⊕Br2 ; μ2 ← μ2 ⊕Br2
δa = PRNG(Rid ⊕Rr)⊕Br2 ; δb = PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br2
Get TS2 from TTS
I2 = Rid ⊕ PRNG(K1 ⊕ TS2 ⊕Br2)
Send J1,K1, H2, μ2, I2, δa, δb, TS2 to Tag 2
Tag 2 Step 4
Authenticate Reader & Verify Message Integrity of δa,K1, I2, TS2.
Verify if Br = B
−1
r . If not, extract J1, H2, μ2 and verify Group ID
and Tag ID using them. These steps are similar to Tag 1.
S2 = Tsx ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tsy)⊕ PRNG(K1 ⊕ TS2 ⊕ Tsz ⊕ Vr)
J2 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr)⊕Br2
K2 = null
For index in x, y, z
T indexr ← PRNG()
If S2[index] = 0 then
K2 = K2 || (T indexr )2 mod h
else if S2[index] = 1 then
K2 = K2 || w . (T indexr )2 mod h
Endif
Next index
Compute L2 = Rid ⊕ PRNG((J2||K2)⊕Br2 ⊕Rr)
If Rid matched using δa then Rr ← PRNG(Rr)
If Tid matched using Tr
T
′
r ← Tr; Tr ← PRNG(Tr); rn ++
Send J2,K2, L2 to Reader
Figure 5.2: Proposed Zero Knowledge Grouping Proof Protocol - Step 3 & 4
• It then computes S2 using the partial-proof K1 as in S2 = Tsx⊕PRNG(Tid⊕Tsy)
⊕PRNG(K1 ⊕ TS2 ⊕ Tsz ⊕ Vr). J2,K2, L2 are computed similar to Tag 1. J2
contains the same group information as J1. But this computation is done by each
tag so the next tag that is processed knows that its predecessor belongs to the
same group as itself.
• Tag 2 updates T ′r ← Tr, Tr ← PRNG(Tr) and increments rn by 1. This is done
only if Tid was matched using Tr. If T
′
r was used, this update is not performed. It
also updates Rr as Rr ← PRNG(Rr) if Rid was matched using δa.
• Tag 2 then sends J2,K2, L2 to the reader.
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The same procedure is repeated for all the m tags, with the mth tag taking inputs
J(m−1),K(m−1), Hm, μm, Im, δam , δbm , TSm. After receiving Jm,Km, Lm from the last
tag, the reader gets TS from TTS and computes I, δa , δb . The last message com-
puted/sent/received by the reader is represented with the index , when the reader
processes tag 1 again. The reader sends Jm,Km, H1, μ1, I, δa , δb , TS to the ﬁrst tag.
Tag 1 repeats its operations as in Step 2, computes J,K, L and sends it to the reader.
At this point, it updates Rr, Tr and increments rn by 1. The reader veriﬁes the message
integrity as before and if it is successful, it gets the end timestamp TSe from TTS which
marks the end of the protocol run. This process is depicted in Figure 5.3.
Repeat the process from Tag 3 to Tag m - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
and complete the proof with Tag 1 Tag 3
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
: :
: :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tag 1 (Processed Again) Jm−1,Km−1, Hm, μm, Im, δam , δbm , TSm Tag m
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Repeat Operations as in Step 2 :
: :
: :
If Rid matched using δa then Rr ← PRNG(Rr) If Rid matched using δa then Rr ← PRNG(Rr)
If Tid matched using Tr Jm,Km, H1, μ1, I, δa , δb , TS If Tid matched using Tr
T
′
r ← Tr; Tr ← PRNG(Tr); rn ++ < −−−−−−−−−−−−− T
′
r ← Tr; Tr ← PRNG(Tr); rn ++
Jm,Km, Lm
J,K, L < −−−−−−−
−−−−−− > Authenticate Tag & Verify Message Integrity
Get end timestamp TSe from TTS.
Figure 5.3: Proposed Zero Knowledge Grouping Proof Protocol - From Tag 3 to Tag m
PART 2: The reader compiles all the partial-proofs to form the grouping proof and en-
crypts them as P = {Rid, Gid, rn, (TS1, Br1 ,K1, L1), (TS2, Br2 ,K2, L2), ...(TSm, Brm ,Km,
Lm), (TS, Br ,K, L), TSe}. It is then encrypted as Ekrv(P ) using the secret key krv.
The proof is sent to the veriﬁer either immediately or at a later time with more proofs.
5.2.3 Veriﬁcation Phase
Veriﬁer performs the following with the grouping proof:
• Proof P is decrypted using the shared secret key krv.
• Using Rid, Gid, rn the veriﬁer identiﬁes which reader sent the proof, to which tag
group the proof belongs and which run of the protocol the proof is for. Based on
these, it retrieves the stored information to process the proof.
• The veriﬁer performs the following for the ﬁrst tag:
– TS1 is decrypted using the shared secret key ktv.
– Verify if | TSe− TS1 |< TS . This conﬁrms that the partial-proof collection
process ran within the allowed time-window. Otherwise, the proof is not
accepted.
– The veriﬁer then compute S
′
1 using its own Tid, Tsx , Tsy , Tsz , Vr and received
TS1 as S
′
1 = Tsx ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ Tsy) ⊕PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Tsz ⊕ Vr).
– Using K1, the veriﬁer distinguishes between squares and pseudosquares mod-
ulo h using f, g and decodes the xth, yth, zth bits. If the decoded bits match in
S
′
1, it conﬁrms that the tag has the right secret and that it has participated
in the grouping proof.
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• The veriﬁcation continues in a similar fashion for all the tags, by computing S′2, S
′
3
... S
′
m, S
′
l and matching the decoded bits in K2,K3 ... Km,Kl. The veriﬁer also
checks if the timestamp for the (j + 1)th tag is greater than the timestamp of the
jth tag. Thus, if all messages check out ok and if all timestamps (including the
ﬁnal timestamp) are within the allowed time-window, the grouping proof protocol
run is considered to have completed successfully.
5.2.4 Missing Tags Scenario
If one or more tags leave the tag-group for some reason (e.g., faulty tags, tampered
tags, tags removed for genuine reasons) the protocol gathers proof from the available
tags. As seen in the protocol, the reader waits for the partial-proof from the current
tag which has to be included in the messages sent to the next tag. If the reader does
not receive a response from the currently processed tag within a stipulated time, the
partial-proof received from the previous tag will be sent to the next tag in the queue.
For example, say tag 3 failed to send J3,K3, L3 to the reader. The reader will send
J2,K2, H4, μ4, I4, δa, δb and TS4 to tag 4. Note that the reader uses the partial proof
J2,K2 from tag 2 to send to tag 4. The reader will keep track of the tags that left the
group during a given protocol run and notify the veriﬁer at the end of the protocol run.
The veriﬁer will check if the tags left the group for a valid reason and if not, it takes
the necessary action.
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed. The security correct-
ness of the proposed scheme is proved ﬁrst, followed by the privacy properties of the
scheme.
5.3.1 Security Correctness
The security correctness of the proposed scheme is veriﬁed using GNY Logic [58]. The
following GNY postulates are used in the analysis. T1 which is a Being-told Rule,
P1 and P2 which are Possession Rules, F1 which is a Freshness Rule, I1 which is
an Interpretation Rule and J1 which is the Jurisdiction Rule. For more details on
GNY Logic, please refer to Section 3.2.1. The veriﬁer and TTS are secure and trusted
entities in the protocol and hence it is assumed that they ensure the freshness of the
pseudo-random numbers and the encryptions. The focus here is only for the messages
transmitted by the tags and the reader. The security correctness for one tag/reader
transmission is proven and it applies for all, since they follow a similar message structure.
Protocol messages are shown in Table 5.3, assumptions used in the analysis are shown
in Table 5.4, goals of the analysis are shown in Table 5.5, and the security correctness
is shown in Table 5.6. The proof of goals G1 - G6 and G7 - G10 are shown by the
veriﬁcation steps SC4 and SC8 respectively.
5.3. SECURITY ANALYSIS 89
Table 5.3: GNY Logic - Protocol Messages and parser outputs
Protocol Messages Protocol Parser Output
G1, H1, μ1, I1,
δa, δb, TS1
T  ∗(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), ∗(Tid ⊕
PRNG(Tr ⊕ Vr)⊕Br1), ∗(Tid ⊕ Tr ⊕ (x||y||z||Vr)⊕Br1),
∗(Rid⊕PRNG(TS1⊕Br1)), ∗(PRNG(Rid⊕Rr)⊕Br1),
∗(PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br1), ∗(TS1)
J1,K1, L1 R  ∗(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), ∗((T xr )2 mod h ||
(T yr )2 mod h || (T zr )2 mod h), ∗(Rid⊕PRNG((J1||K1)⊕
Br1 ⊕Rr)) (Note: K1 may include w . (T indexr )2 mod h if
the index xth or yth or zth bit represents 1).
Table 5.4: GNY Logic - Assumptions Used in the Analysis
No. Assumption Notation Assumption Description
A1 V  Vr, Tr V Possesses Vr, Tr
A2 V |≡ #Vr, Tr V believes that Vr, Tr are fresh
A3 T  T indexr T Possesses T indexr
A4 T |≡ #T indexr T believes that T indexr is fresh
A5 T  Tr, T ′r, Rr Ti Possesses Tr, T
′
r, Rr
A6 Ti |≡ #Tr, Rr T believes that Tr, Rr are fresh
A7 V |≡ V Gs←→ G V believes Gs is a suitable secret between it-
self and tags in the tag group G
A8 V |≡ V Ts←→ T V believes Ts is a suitable tag-secret between
itself and tag T
A9 R  Rr, Rnr R Possesses Rr, Rnr
A10 R |≡ #Rr, Rnr R believes that Rr, Rnr are fresh
A11 R  Br1..m R Possesses Br1..m
A12 R |≡ #Br1..m R believes that Br1..m is fresh
A13 V |≡ V hs1 ,hs2 ,hs3←→
GID, TID,RID
V believes hs1 , hs2 , hs3 are suitable secrets be-
tween itself and GID, TID,RID to generate
Gid, Tid, Rid respectively
A14 V |≡ V Rs←→ R V believes Rs is a suitable secret between it-
self and the reader R
5.3.2 Privacy Properties
Here, the privacy properties of the proposed scheme are studied using Avoine’s adver-
sarial model [4] by applying the oracles Query (Q) (πiT , m1, m3), Send (S)(π
j
R, m2),
Execute (E) (πiT , π
j
R), Execute* (E*) (π
i
T , π
j
R) and Reveal (R) (π
i
T ). For more details
about the adversarial model, please refer to Section 3.2.2.
Theorem 1: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is Existential-UNT-QSE.
Proof: Consider that an adversary has access to the Q-oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈
{Query(πiT1 , ∗)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗)}. For any protocol interaction Ii whose
length is ≤ Pchal, based on the output m2{(J1,K1, L1)} of the Q-oracle, K1 is guar-
anteed to be not connected since K1 = (T
index
r )
2 mod h, (or K1 = w · (T indexr )2 mod h)
where T indexr is a freshly generated pseudo-random number and not transmitted. The
probabilistic encryption scheme guarantees that, without the knowledge of e and f
(the factors of h), an adversary cannot solve for T indexr and he also cannot distinguish
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Table 5.5: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Goals
No Goal Notation Goal Description
G1 T |≡ R |∼ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕
Vr)⊕Br1)
T believes R conveyed #(Gid ⊕
PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr)⊕Br1)
G2 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid⊕PRNG(Tr⊕Vr)⊕
Br1)
T believes R conveyed #(Tid ⊕
PRNG(Tr ⊕ Vr)⊕Br1)
G3 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Tr ⊕
(x||y||z||Vr)⊕Br1)
T believes R conveyed #(Tid ⊕ Tr ⊕
(x||y||z||Vr)⊕Br1)
G4 T |≡ R |∼ #(Rid ⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕
Br1))
T believes R conveyed #(Rid ⊕
PRNG(TS1 ⊕Br1))
G5 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(Rid ⊕ Rr) ⊕
Br1)
T believes R conveyed #(PRNG(Rid ⊕
Rr)⊕Br1)
G6 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(Rid ⊕ Rnr ) ⊕
Br1)
T believes R conveyed #(PRNG(Rid ⊕
Rnr )⊕Br1)
G7 T |≡ R |∼ #(TS1) T believes R conveyed #(TS1)
G8 R |≡ T |∼ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕
Vr)⊕Br1)
R believes T conveyed #(Gid ⊕
PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr)⊕Br1)
G9 R |≡ T |∼ #((T xr )2 mod h || (T yr )2
mod h || (T zr )2 mod h)
R believes T conveyed #((T xr )
2 mod h ||
(T yr )2 mod h || (T zr )2 mod h). (Note: K1
may include w . (T indexr )
2 mod h if the
index xth or yth or zth bit represents 1).
G10 R |≡ T |∼ #(Rid ⊕
PRNG((J1||K1)⊕Br1 ⊕Rr))
R believes T conveyed #(Rid ⊕
PRNG((J1||K1)⊕Br1 ⊕Rr))
whether K1 contains random squares or random pseudosquares modulo h. By a simi-
lar argument, J1 is also not connected since J1 = Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1 where
Vr, Br1 are pseudo-random numbers freshly generated during each run, (hidden during
transmission) and also Gs is a shared-secret. The same principle applies to L1 also.
The identiﬁers TID,RID are not sent during the communication. The tag secret Ts
is also not sent during the communication thereby providing zero knowledge to the ad-
versary. Tid and Rid are well enciphered in the messages. Rid cannot be obtained from
δa, δb, I1, L1 without the knowledge of Br1 and Rr, which change during each protocol
run and are hidden during transmission. Similarly, Tid cannot be obtained from H1, μ1
without the knowledge of Tr, Vr, Br1 which change during each protocol run and are
hidden during transmission. Thus, the protocol guarantees tag/reader anonymity and
tag/reader location privacy. In the forward channel, an adversary cannot impersonate
the reader without the knowledge of Rr and Br1 which serve as challenges to the tag to
authenticate the reader. If the veriﬁcation (Rid = I1⊕PRNG(TS1⊕Br1)) is successful,
the tag conﬁrms that the reader is legitimate since only an entity with the knowledge
of Rr and Br1 can compute a valid I1. In a similar fashion, in the backward channel,
the tag challenges the reader by using Rr and Br1 in L1. The reader conﬁrms that the
tag is legitimate since only an entity with the knowledge of Rr and Br1 can compute a
valid L1. Hence, the protocol is resistent to both tag and reader impersonation attacks.
Therefore, with the Q-oracle, the advantage of the adversary is negligible as he does not
learn any useful information. Hence the protocol is Existential-UNT-Q.
Now, consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,
∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m22)} wherem2{(J1,K1, L1)}.
The adversary on sendingm2 as a response to the reader, does not receive anything back
from the reader. Hence the adversary is not presented with any additional advantage.
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Table 5.6: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Proof
No Proof Notation GNY Postulate
SC1 T  (Gid⊕PRNG(Gs⊕Vr)⊕Br1), (Tid⊕PRNG(Tr⊕
Vr) ⊕ Br1), (Tid ⊕ Tr ⊕ (x||y||z||Vr) ⊕ Br1), (Rid ⊕
PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Br1)), (PRNG(Rid ⊕ Rr) ⊕ Br1),
(PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br1), (TS1)
G1, H1, μ1, I1, δa, δb,
TS1, T1
SC2 T  (Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), (Tid ⊕
PRNG(Tr⊕Vr)⊕Br1), (Tid⊕Tr⊕ (x||y||z||Vr)⊕Br1),
(Rid⊕PRNG(TS1⊕Br1)), (PRNG(Rid⊕Rr)⊕Br1),
(PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br1), (TS1)
SC1, P1
SC3 T |≡ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), (Tid ⊕
PRNG(Tr⊕Vr)⊕Br1), (Tid⊕Tr⊕ (x||y||z||Vr)⊕Br1),
(Rid⊕PRNG(TS1⊕Br1)), (PRNG(Rid⊕Rr)⊕Br1),
(PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br1), (TS1)
SC2, F1
SC4 T |≡ R |∼ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), (Tid ⊕
PRNG(Tr⊕Vr)⊕Br1), (Tid⊕Tr⊕ (x||y||z||Vr)⊕Br1),
(Rid⊕PRNG(TS1⊕Br1)), (PRNG(Rid⊕Rr)⊕Br1),
(PRNG(Rid ⊕Rnr )⊕Br1), (TS1)
SC3, A2, I1, P2
SC5 R  (Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), ((T xr )2 mod h ||
(T yr )2 mod h || (T zr )2 mod h), (Rid⊕PRNG((J1||K1)⊕
Br1 ⊕Rr)). (Note: K1 may include w · (T indexr )2 mod
h if the index xth or yth or zth bit represents 1).
J1,K1, L1T1
SC6 R  (Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), ((T xr )2 mod h ||
(T yr )2 mod h || (T zr )2 mod h), (Rid⊕PRNG((J1||K1)⊕
Br1 ⊕Rr))
SC5, P1
SC7 R |≡ #(Gid⊕PRNG(Gs⊕Vr)⊕Br1), ((T xr )2 mod h ||
(T yr )2 mod h || (T zr )2 mod h), (Rid⊕PRNG((J1||K1)⊕
Br1 ⊕Rr))
SC6, F1
SC8 R |≡ T |∼ #(Gid ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) ⊕ Br1), ((T xr )2
mod h || (T yr )2 mod h || (T zr )2 mod h), (Rid ⊕
PRNG((J1||K1)⊕Br1 ⊕Rr))
SC7, A2, I1, P2
Thus the protocol is Existential-UNT-QS. Finally, consider the adversary having access
to QSE-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query( πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R)}
and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R)}. The use of Tr, Rr, Br1 ,
T indexr , Vr which change during each protocol run, hidden during transmission and the
further randomization of the XOR operation guarantees that by messages are unique
each time the protocol is run. Thus, by eavesdropping on multiple instances of the
protocol the adversary is not presented with any advantage over the QS-oracle, thereby
being resistent to replay attacks. Thus the protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE which is
the strongest security requirement when the attacker cannot tamper the tag.
Theorem 2: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Proof: In addition to the QSE-oracles, consider that the adversary also has access
to the R-oracle such that, ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R),
Reveal(πiT1)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R), Reveal(
πiT2)}. By executing the R-oracle, the adversary obtains {Gid, Gs, Tid, Ts, Tr, T
′
r, Rid, Rr,
rn, h, w}. Here, T ′r is updated to the current Tr and Tr is freshly generated using it
current value. Gid, Gs, Tid, Ts remain constant. However, using them and the current
and previous random numbers, if the adversary can link with previous communications
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then the protocol is not Forward-UNT-QSER. These values are used in G1, H1, μ1, I1,
δa, δb, J1 and L1. However, these messages are computed using the freshly generated
pseudo-random numbers Vr, Br1 or T
index
r which are not resident data on the tag. The
freshness guarantees that the messages are unique each time. The further randomization
of the XOR operation and hiding the pseudo random numbers provide additional secu-
rity. Hence an adversary cannot trace the previous communications of the tag using the
current resident data on the tag. Therefore the advantage presented to the adversary
by the R-oracle is negligible and the protocol is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Theorem 3: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is resistant to de-synchronization
attacks.
Proof: An adversary can cause Denial of Service (DoS) attack by de-synchronizing
Rr between the reader and the tags, by blocking certain messages. Consider that the
adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)}
wherem2{(J2,K2, L2)}. The adversary on blockingm2 from reaching the reader, would
cause the tag to update its Rr but the reader would not, causing desynchronization
between them. To overcome this issue, the reader sends δa, δb which contains the current
and next values Rr and R
n
r . When the protocol is run the next time, the tag would ﬁrst
use δa in order to authenticate the reader, which would not result in a match due to
desynchronization. This would prompt the tag to authenticate the reader using δb which
would result in a match and the protocol will proceed without aborting. In the last step,
the tag updates Rr only if the match was made using the current value. If the match
was made using δb, it will not perform this update. Therefore, by blocking m2, the
adversary cannot cause a DoS attack. Finally, if a protocol run were to abort halfway
for any reason, some tags would have updated Rr but not all. The proposed protocol
is resilient to incomplete runs. If the reader had to restart the same run, the tags that
had already updated Rr will not update again because now the ID will be matched
using Rnr . Only the tags that missed the run will perform this update. Same principle
is applied for Tr to prevent de-synchronization between the veriﬁer and the tag. Also,
from Theorem 1, it is seen that the protocol achieves the strongest security requirement
of Existential-UNT-QSE which proves that an attacker cannot successfully complete
a protocol run. Using these principles both DoS and de-synchronization attacks are
completely prevented.
Theorem 4: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is resistant to active-attacks.
Consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,m11),
Send(πiT1 ,m
1
2)}. Assume that the adversary with the ability to modify messages changes
the Q-Oracle m11 to m
′1
1 by introducing some random message denoted by γ, to one or
more of the messages in m11 {G1, H1, μ1, I1, δa, δb, TS1} (e.g., H1 ← H1 ⊕ γ). When
the tag receives m′11 , it will not be able to authenticate the reader when it veriﬁes
if Rid = I1 ⊕ PRNG(TS1 ⊕ Br1). A valid reader ID will not be returned if the at-
tacker were to modify even any one of the messages in {I1, δa, δb, TS1}. Similarly,
a valid Group ID/Tag ID will not be returned if the attacker were to modify any
message in {G1, H1, μ1} when the tag veriﬁes if (Gid = G1 ⊕ PRNG(Gs ⊕ Vr) and
Tid = H1⊕PRNG(Tr⊕Vr)). The protocol will abort in either case. Thus, the integrity
of all the incoming messages are veriﬁed by the tag and an attacker cannot successfully
run the protocol by modifying the messages using the Q-Oracle in the forward chan-
nel. Now, in the backward channel, assume the attacker modiﬁes m12 {J1,K1, L1} to
m′12 . The reader veriﬁes the integrity of the incoming messages using its own reader
ID, Rr and the Br1 that was sent to the tag. If the attacker were to tamper even any
one of the messages in m12, it will not return a valid Rid when the reader veriﬁes if
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Rid = L1 ⊕ PRNG((J1||K1) ⊕ Br1 ⊕ Rr). These checks are performed by each entity
every time a message is received during the entire protocol run. Hence the attacker
cannot successfully run the protocol by modifying the messages in the QS-Oracle. An
adversary with access to QSE-Oracle does not gain anything by repeatedly executing
multiple instances of the protocol by tampering the messages each time. Thus, the
protocol is completely resistent to active-attacks.
5.4 Comparison with Other Protocols
In Table 5.7, the security properties of the various grouping proof protocols that have
been proposed are compared. This is inspired from [123] and includes some additional
ﬁndings. From the table, it is clear that many protocols fail to provide anonymity and
protection from tracking attacks. Both of these properties are very crucial to have a
secure system. Protocols should not send out EPC codes or other sensitive data in
clear. Also, protocols in [13, 77, 135] are vulnerable to impersonation attacks. In the
proposed protocol, a fresh pseudo-random number is generated by the reader for each
tag to prevent tag impersonation attack. Many of the protocols are not resistant to DoP
and illegitimate tag attacks, while some provide only partial resistance. The proposed
protocol is fully resilient to m-DoP attack. Also, as seen, no protocol provides forward
security and resilience to message integrity attack. The latter is because the protocols do
not validate the incoming messages but simply use them to compose the partial proof.
The proposed protocol provides forward security and also veriﬁes the integrity of each
message in each step thus guaranteeing the validity of the proof.
Table 5.8 shows the performance comparison of some of the protocols. From the table,
it is clear that many of the protocols use some type of hash function. The protocols that
use only PRNG and XOR operations are either vulnerable to some attacks (due to the
incorrect usage of the functions) and that they are incomplete in terms of not meeting
the speciﬁc design requirements. The proposed scheme does not require the tags to
implement hash functions. Computation is restricted to XOR, and 128bit PRNG oper-
ations, all of which are within the capabilities of EPC C1G2 tags. Thus, the proposed
scheme provides the required security properties and also meets all the functionality
requirements of grouping proof protocols.
5.5 Performance Study
In order to study the scalability of the proposed scheme, the protocol was implemented
in a simulation environment using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2). The metric of interest
was end-to-end delay which is calculated from the time the ﬁrst message is sent by the
reader to the ﬁrst tag, to when partial proofs for all m tags are gathered. The end-to-
end delay time includes two main parts, the network delay and the processing time in
the reader and the tags. The number of tags in the transaction was varied from 100K
to 1Million. The results of the simulation experiments are presented in Fig. 5.4. Each
data point corresponds to the average of 20 simulation runs.
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The results show that it takes only 4.5 minutes to process up to 100K tags. These results
prove that the proposed scheme is eﬃcient and scalable and does not compromise the
system performance. In Fig. 5.5, the performance of the two proposed schemes and the
Kazhaya protocol proposed by Peris Lopez et al. [123] are compared. The graph shows
that the zero knowledge scheme takes about 4.35 minutes to process 100K tags which is
slightly lower than the PRNG based scheme proposed in the previous chapter. Further,
it is noted that Peris Lopez et al.’s [123] scheme takes about 4.15 minutes to process
100K tags which is lower than the zero knowledge scheme. But, both the proposed
schemes meet all the design requirements of grouping proof and achieve forward secrecy
where as [123] does not. Further, the second scheme provides zero knowledge to the
attackers by not transmitting the tag secret during the protocol run while [123] does
not achieve this.
Table 5.8: Comparison of Performance Properties
Protocol P1 P2 P3
Juels [77] 1 1 6
Saito and Sakurai [135] 1 – 5
Piramuthu [127] 2 1 6
Bolotnyy and Robins [9] 2 5 –
Peris-Lopez et al. [121] 2 – 6
Lin et al. [99] 1 – 4
Burmester et al. [13] 2 1 11
Lo and Yeh (OTSBP) [102] 1 1 2*
Lien et al. [97] 2 1 8
Chien and Liu [25] 5 1 11
Huang and Ku [68] – 3 5
Chien et al. [26] – 3 5
Wu et al. [165] – 12 2*
Peris-Lopez et al. [123] – 9 2*
Ma et al. [105] – 10 2*
Proposed PRNG Scheme – 12** 2
Proposed Zero Knowledge Scheme – 8 2*
P1: Number of Cryptographic Functions on Tag
P2: Number of PRNG Operations Required on Tag
P3: Number of Messages
* Indicates 2/tag and 4 messages for the ﬁrst tag.
** 1 Additional PRNG for the ﬁrst tag.
5.6 Parameter Setting
Typically, low-cost EPC C1G2 passive RFID tags have non-volatile (EEPROM) memory
of 1000bits to 1kb [59]. However, recent RFID application proposals such as plans
by Airbus to track ﬂyable aircraft parts and components, as well as store data, such
as information regarding a part’s initial construction and maintenance demands have
introduced passive RFID tags with higher memory capabilities (4KB to 8KB) [162].
Also, Atmel Corporation has introduced passive RFID tags that can support memory
of between 1KB and 64KB [41].
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Figure 5.4: Simulation Results for the Proposed Grouping Proof Protocol
Figure 5.5: Comparison of Simulation Results
The main requirements of the proposed approach is that the modulus h used to com-
pute the quadratic residues is suﬃciently large to ensure that factorization is infeasible.
Based on the recommendations in [95] it is recommended that h = 1120 − 1464 bits
at minimum. The tag requires storage of {Gid, Gs, Tid, Ts, Tr, T ′r, Rid, Rr, R
′
r, rn, h, w}
and 128bit PRNG. Depending on the tag’s memory capabilities, an appropriate key
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length is chosen to achieve a desired level of security. Let the storage requirement
for each ID be 96bits (e.g., Tid = 96bits), secret be 256 bits (e.g., Ts = 256bits),
h = 1472bits and 128bits for each pseudo-random number. Thus the storage require-
ments are (96+ 256+ 96+ 256+ 128+ 128+ 96+ 128+ 128+ 32+ 1472+ 128+ 128) =
3072/8 = 384bytes. This is not excessive for applications using low cost tags that require
security. Given the length L of 256bits for Ts, the probability of an attacker correctly
guessing Ts is 2
256. Another consideration is the length of the key required to support a
certain number of tags. Ts with L of 256bits, being unique for each tag, the number of
tags that can be supported in the system is limited to 2256. In my opinion, this would
be more than suﬃcient for a majority of applications. This scheme is practical and can
facilitate large scale implementations of the protocol. Finally, it is noted that the use
of the XOR operator raises the expectation that its operands have equal bit lengths in
order to prevent information leakage. As all the parameters are not of equal length, a
simple modiﬁcation to the standard XOR operation is suggested to meet the require-
ments. As an example, in the computation H1 = Tid⊕PRNG(Tr⊕Vr), the operands are
unequal. Here, it is recommended that the largest operand is XOR-ed with a concate-
nation of the XOR of the other operands. In this instance, the implementation would
be H1 = PRNG(Tr ⊕ Vr)⊕ (Tid || Tid || ... Tid).
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, a zero knowledge grouping proof protocol was proposed for EPC C1G2
tags, that uses a probabilistic encryption scheme based on quadratic residuosity. Oper-
ations of the tag are limited to MOD, XOR and 128bit PRNG functions. The protocol
does not use hash functions which makes it viable for large scale implementations using
low-cost passive tags. Formal security analysis shows that the protocol meets the neces-
sary security requirements. Forward security, which is an open research issue has been
addressed in the proposed protocol. Also, unlike any other protocol, the integrity of the
incoming messages are veriﬁed by each entity before using them, hence avoiding gener-
ation of invalid proofs. By taking a holistic approach to grouping proofs, the protocol
meets the unique design requirements that has been identiﬁed thus far by the research
community. Above all, the protocol does not transmit the tag secret during the protocol
run and hence does not provide any knowledge to the attackers. Simulation study of the
scheme showed the performance of the protocol to be within acceptable limits making
it practical.
Chapter 6
Ownership Transfer -
Multi-Owner/Multi-Tag
In this chapter, an Ownership Transfer protocol for a multi-owner/multi-tag environ-
ment is proposed, based on simple XOR and 128bit PRNG operations. The motivation
for the work is ﬁrst described, followed by a summary of the contributions. The work-
ings of the protocol is described at length followed by the detailed security analysis
using the formal analysis models described in chapter 3. The work is then compared
with the contributions made by others in terms of meeting security and performance. A
simulation study is then presented that shows the performance of the proposed protocol
in a simulated environment. Finally, the chapter is concluded with the recommended
parameter settings for the proposed scheme.
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 introduced the ownership transfer concept and presented an extensive cov-
erage of the existing work in this area. Here, after a quick recap of the deﬁnition, the
motivation behind this work is summarized. For a complete understanding on ownership
transfer and the related work in this area, please refer to Chapter 2.
Ownership transfer requires that control (i.e., communication capabilities) of a tag is
transferred from the current owner(s) to the new owner(s). Ownership transfer can be
classiﬁed into three major types: a) transferring a single tag from the current owner to
a new owner; b) transferring multiple tags from the current owner to a new owner; and
c) transferring multiple tags from a group of current owners to a group of new owners.
The proposed scheme addresses the third category. The uniqueness to the proposed
protocol comes from the fact that it provides individual owner privacy.
6.1.1 Design Requirements
Individual Owner Privacy: Typical ownership transfers involve transferring one tag at
a time but there can be cases where there are multiple tags that belong to one object
(A car for example, can have tags for engine, tyres, doors, music system etc.) and all
of which have to be transferred together to the new owner. There are also situations
where the ownership of tags has to be shared among diﬀerent owners. Shared ownership
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does not necessarily mean zero or shared privacy with the other owners. Any owner
while sharing ownership with others should still be able to maintain privacy - meaning
his communications/operations with the tags should not be known to (or accessible by)
others in the group. To my knowledge, the current multi-owner multi-tag protocols have
not been designed to ﬁt the privacy-among-owners model. This is an important privacy
feature required for a multi-owner/multi-tag environment and the proposed protocol
aims to ﬁll this gap.
Figure 6.1: Ownership Transfer for Multi-Tag Multi-Owner Environment
6.1.2 Protocol Application
The proposed protocol has a wide range of applications such as:
• In hospitals, where multiple vendors provide multiple surgical kits to the hospital.
• In houses, where the multiple items in a smart-fridge are used by multiple residents
of the house.
• In car sales/rental, where multiple tags in a car are owned/used by multiple owners
of a car.
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6.1.3 Motivation
As detailed in Section 2.2.2 many of the current approaches to ownership transfer in a
multi-tag multi-owner environment: a) do not meet the security requirements of RFID;
b) are vulnerable to certain known attacks in RFID; c) are not viable for large scale
implementations; d) are not compliant with EPC C1G2 standards due to the use of hash
functions or other complex encryption schemes and e) they do not provide individual
owner privacy. The proposed protocol aims to address these important gaps in ownership
transfer. Only a summary of the motivation is presented here. For more details, please
refer to Section 1.6.
6.1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• A secure multi-owner, multi-tag ownership transfer protocol that is ultra lightweight
in terms of the use of simple XOR and 128bit PRNG operations and also meets
the necessary security requirements.
• A secure multi-owner, multi-tag ownership transfer protocol designed to achieve
privacy-among-owners.
• A secure multi-owner, multi-tag ownership transfer protocol that does not use
hash functions or other complex encryption schemes making it a viable option for
large-scale implementations on low-cost passive tags which are highly constrained
in computational resources thereby achieves compliance with EPC C1G2 standard.
6.2 The Proposed Protocol
The proposed protocol is designed to achieve privacy-among-owners by generating a new
secret for each new owner. The protocol uses simple XOR and 128bit PRNG operations
which are easily implemented on low-cost RFID tags and also meets the necessary secu-
rity requirements. As the protocol does not use expensive hash functions or any complex
encryption schemes it is compliant with EPC C1G2 standard making it a viable option
for large-scale implementations on low-cost passive tags. The protocol provides addi-
tional protection by hiding the pseudo-random number during all transmissions using a
blind-factor. This ensures that an adversary will not be able to decipher anything even
if the messages are captured during transmission by eavesdropping.
6.2.1 Protocol Synopsis
A typical ownership transfer functionality design for a multi-owner multi-tag environ-
ment is shown in Figure 6.1. The protocol begins when the current owner group sends
an OT message to the TTP . In Step 2, the TTP generates a new secret for each new
owner in that group and sends it to them along with the tags’ data encrypted using
secret/pseudo-random numbers. The new owners authenticate the messages, verify if
the messages are intended for them and decrypt the received tag data including the new
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Table 6.1: Notations used in the Protocol
Notation Description
TID, Tid Unique Tag Identiﬁcation Number and pre-computed value of
h(TID, Ts)
OID,Oid Owner ID and pre-computed value of h(OID,Os)
Ts Unique secret key for each tag used to compute Tid, known only
to the TTP
Os Secret key used to compute Oid, known only to the TTP
OTs, OT
′
s Current and previous shared secret between each owner and the
Tags in a Tag-Group
Ns New secret generated by TTP for each new owner
SOs, SO
′
s Current and previous shared secret between the TTP and Owners
in a Owner-Group
STs, ST
′
s Current and previous shared secret between the TTP and the Tags
in a Tag-Group
SOsn New shared secret between TTP and Owners in a Owner-Group
STsn New shared secret between TTP and Tags in a Tag-Group
S1r, S2r Pseudo-Random numbers generated by the TTP
O1r, T1r Pseudo-Random numbers generated by the new owners & Tags in
a Tag-Group respectively
RNDt, RNDo Blind-factors sent by Tags in Tag-Group and new owners to the
TTP respectively, to hide the pseudo-random numbers
ACKt, ACKo Acknowledgements sent by Tags in Tag-Group and new owners to
the TTP respectively
Oi, Tj i
th Owner and jth Tag
secret. Each new owner sends an acknowledgment to the TTP . Step 3 is where the
TTP veriﬁes the received acknowledgments from all the new owners and then sends the
new secret to all the tags in the tag group. The tags authenticate the messages, verify
if the messages are intended for them and decrypt the received owner IDs and their
respective new secret. Each tag then sends an acknowledgment to the TTP . In Step 4,
after verifying the tags’ acknowledgments, the TTP sends a ﬁnal conﬁrmation message
to the previous owners. As a last step in the process, the new owners run the ownership
test protocol to make sure they can access the tags.
The proposed protocol depicts the scenario where all tags in the tag group are transferred
to the new owners. But it can be easily adapted to handle scenarios like: i) Where only
some tags in a tag group are transferred to a group of new owners. For example, tags
are installed in several automobile components like the tyres, stereo system etc. A set of
owners of a car, can sell just one of these components of the car but not the whole car, to
another set of owners. This scenario can be handled by having the current owners send
the tag IDs that are being transferred when they send the OT request in Step 1. The
TTP can then run the ownership transfer process only for those tags. ii) Where tags
move in and out of a tag group. For example, a worn-out tyre can be replaced with a
new tyre. This wouldn’t be classiﬁed as ownership transfer scenario. But to handle this
situation, the current owners have to work with the TTP to have the worn out tyre’s
tag ID removed from the system and add the new tyre’s tag ID added to the system.
The proposed Ownership Transfer protocol has two phases - the Initialization Phase
which is assumed to occur in a secure environment and the Ownership Transfer phase.
These two phases are described below.
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6.2.2 Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase all the tags and owners are setup with their IDs, shared/private
secrets. The TTP computes Tid = h(TID, Ts) and the result is stored in the tags.
Similarly TTP computes Oid = h(OID,Os) and the result is stored in the owners. The
TTP shares a secret STs with the group of tags which the current and new owners
do not know. Similarly, the TTP shares a unique secret SOs with current and new
owner groups that are not known to the other party. Each owner stores the tuple
{OID,Oid, SOs, SO′s, Tid1..j , OTs}; each tag stores the tuple {TID, Tid, STs, ST
′
s} once
and {Oid, OTs, OT ′s} for each owner that has access to the tag. Table 6.1 gives a brief
description for the notations that are used in the proposed protocol and the ownership
transfer protocol is shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
6.2.3 Secure Ownership Transfer Scheme
The protocol begins when the TTP receives the OT request from the current owner.
The Ownership Transfer phase has 2 steps. First step is between the TTP and the new
owners and the second step is between the TTP and all the Tags in the Tag-Group.
Step 1: TTP → New Owners→ TTP . Here, the new owners are given the Tag IDs and
each owner’s respective new secret to the tags in the group.
Step 1A: TTP performs the following:
• TTP generates a pseudo-random number S2r and a new secret SOsn that is shared
between the TTP and the owners. Then, for each new owner i:
– TTP generates a new secret Nsi which the owner shares with all the tags in
the tag-group. It then computes M1i = Oidi ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r), M2i =
S2r ⊕ PRNG(Oidi ⊕ SOs), M3i = Nsi ⊕ PRNG(Oidi ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r), M0i =
SOsn⊕PRNG(M1i⊕Oidi⊕SOs). M1i is used inM0i to keep all the PRNG
operations unique for each message.
– Then, for each Tag j in the Tag-Group, TTP computes M4j = Tidj ⊕
PRNG(Nsi ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r) and M cj = PRNG(M0i ⊕ SOs) ⊕ PRNG(M3i ⊕
SOs)⊕ PRNG(M4j ⊕ S2r).
– TTP sends M0i,M1i,M2i,M3i,M4(1..j) and M
c
(1..j) to each new owner i.
• TTP repeats the process for the next owner.
Step 1B: Each new owner i performs the following:
• Using the stored Oid, SOs each owner extracts S2r as: M2i⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs)→
S2r and veriﬁes if Oid =M1i ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r).
• If the check fails, the owner uses the previous secret SO′s in the above step. If
either one of the secrets result in a match, then the TTP is authenticated and
the owner knows that the message is for itself. This validation ensures that M1i
and M2i are not tampered by an adversary during transmission. Otherwise, the
protocol aborts. For the reminder of the operations either SOs or SO
′
s will be
used based on which one returned a successful match.
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• Then, using the stored SOs, extracted S2r and received values, for all j, the
owners verify if PRNG(M0i⊕SOs)⊕PRNG(M3i⊕SOs)⊕PRNG(M4j⊕S2r) =
M cj . This validation ensures that M0i,M3i and M4(1..j) are not tampered by an
adversary during transmission. Tidj is extracted as M4j ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕ SOs ⊕
S2r)→ Tidj . If the check fails for any j, the protocol aborts.
• The owner extracts SOsn as M0i ⊕ PRNG(M1i ⊕ Oid ⊕ SOs) → SOsn ; and the
new secret for the tags Nsi as M3i ⊕ PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r)→ Nsi . Then, the
owner inserts the Tag IDs Tid(1..j) that it is authorized to access and its own secret
as OTs = Nsi .
• Once that is accomplished, the owner generates pseudo-random number O1r, com-
putes RNDo = O1r ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs and ACKo = Oid ⊕OTs ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r).
The owner then sends RNDo, ACKo to the TTP .
• Finally, if Oid was matched using SOs then the owner updates the shared secret
as SO
′
s ← SOs and SOs ← SOsn .
Step 1C: For each new owner’s reply, TTP performs the following: Using the stored
Oidi and SOs, the TTP extracts O1r as RNDo ⊕ Oidi ⊕ SOs → O1r. It then veriﬁes
if Oidi ⊕ Nsi = ACKo ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕ O1r). If it is successful, the new owner is
authenticated and it also conﬁrms that the new secret has been successfully updated
for that new owner. If the TTP does not receive acknowledgements from all the new
owners within a stipulated time, it will restart the process from Step 1A. Otherwise, it
updates the shared secret SOs as SOs ← SOsn and commences Step 2.
Trusted Third Party (TTP) New Owners
Step 1A Step 1B
Generate S2r M2i ⊕ PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs)→ S2r
Generate TTP To Owner-Group New Secret SOsn if Oid =M1i ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r)
For each New Owner i TTP Authenticated; & Message is for this Owner;
Generate Owner To Tag-Group New Secret Nsi else
M1i = Oidi ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r) Use SO
′
s in the above steps and try again;
M2i = S2r ⊕ PRNG(Oidi ⊕ SOs) If Unsuccessful, abort;
M3i = Nsi ⊕ PRNG(Oidi ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r)
M0i = SOsn ⊕ PRNG(M1i ⊕Oidi ⊕ SOs) For all j:
If PRNG(M0i ⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M3i ⊕ SOs) ⊕
For each Tag j in Tag-Group: PRNG(M4j ⊕ S2r) =M cj then
M4j = Tidj ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r) M4j ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r)→ Tidj
M cj = PRNG(M0i ⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M3i ⊕ SOs)⊕ else abort;
PRNG(M4j ⊕ S2r)
Next Tag M0i ⊕ PRNG(M1i ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs)→ SOsn
M3i ⊕ PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r)→ Nsi
M0i,M1i,M2i,M3i,M4(1..j), M
c
(1..j) Insert Tid(1..j) and OTs = Nsi
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− >
Next Owner Generate O1r
RNDo = O1r ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs
Step 1C ACKo = Oid ⊕OTs ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r)
For each New Owner’s Reply
RNDo ⊕Oidi ⊕ SOs → O1r RNDo, ACKo
If Oidi ⊕Nsi = ACKo ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r) < −−−−−
New Owner Authenticated
New Owner has New Secret Nsi If Oid matched using SOs
SO
′
s ← SOs
If All ACK NOT Received Goto Step 1A SOs ← SOsn
else SOs ← SOsn ; Goto Step 2A
Figure 6.2: Proposed Multi Owner/Tag Ownership Transfer Protocol - Step 1
Step 2: TTP → Tag-Group → TTP . Here, the TTP sends the new owner IDs and
their respective new secret, to the tags in the tag-group.
Step 2A: The TTP performs the following:
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Trusted Third Party (TTP) Each Tag in Tag-Group
Step 2A Step 2B
Generate S1r M8j ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs)→ S1r
Generate TTP To Tag-Group New Secret STsn
For each New Owner i If Tid =M7j ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r)
M5i = Nsi ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r) TTP Authenticated; & Message is for this Tag;
M6i = Oidi ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r) else
M ci = PRNG(M5i ⊕ S1r ⊕ STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6i ⊕ STs) Use ST
′
s in the above steps and try again;
Next Owner If Unsuccessful, abort;
For each Tag j in Tag-Group M9j ⊕ PRNG(M7j ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs)→ STsn
M7j = Tidj ⊕ PRNG(Tidj ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r) For all i
M8j = S1r ⊕ PRNG(Tidj ⊕ STs) If PRNG(M5i ⊕ S1r ⊕ STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6i ⊕ STs) =M ci
M9j = STsn ⊕ PRNG(M7j ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs) M5i ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r)→ Nsi
M6i ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r)→ Oidi
M5(1..i),M6(1..i),M7j ,M8j ,M9j , M
c
(1..i) else abort;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− >
Next Tag Remove Previous Owners’ IDs & Secrets from Tag
Insert Oid(1..i) , OTs = Ns(1..i) , OT
′
s = Ns(1..i)
Step 2C Generate T1r
For each Tag’s Reply: RNDt = T1r ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs
RNDt ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs → T1r ACKt = Tid ⊕ (Oid||OTs)(1..i) ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r)
if Tidj⊕ (Oid||Ns)(1..i) = ACKt ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r)
Tag Authenticated RNDt, ACKt
New Owners & Secrets Successfully Inserted < −−−−−
If All ACK NOT Received then If Tid matched using STs
Goto Step 2A ST
′
s ← STs
else STs ← STsn STs ← STsn
Figure 6.3: Proposed Multi Owner/Tag Ownership Transfer Protocol - Step 2
• TTP generates a pseudo-random number S1r and a new secret STsn which the
TTP shares with all the tags in the tag-group. Then for each new owner i:
• TTP computes M5i = Nsi ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r), M6i = Oidi ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕
STs ⊕ S1r) and M ci = PRNG(M5i ⊕ S1r ⊕ STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6i ⊕ STs).
• Then for each Tag j in the Tag-Group, it computes M7j = Tidj ⊕ PRNG(Tidj ⊕
STs ⊕ S1r), M8j = S1r ⊕ PRNG(Tidj ⊕ STs) and M9j = STsn ⊕ PRNG(M7j ⊕
Tidj ⊕STs). M7j is used in M9j to keep all the PRNG operations unique for each
message.
• TTP then sends M5(1..i),M6(1..i),M7j ,M8j ,M9j and M c(1..i) to the Tag-Group
Step 2B: Each Tag in the Tag-Group performs the following:
• Using stored Tid, STs tag extracts S1r as M8j ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs) → S1r and
veriﬁes if Tid =M7j ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r).
• If the check fails, the tag uses the previous secret ST ′s in the above step. If either
one of the secrets result in a match, then the TTP is authenticated and the tag
knows that the message is for itself. This validation ensures that M7j and M8j
are not tampered by an adversary during transmission. Otherwise, the protocol
aborts. For the reminder of the operations either STs or ST
′
s will be used based
on which one returned a successful match.
• The tag then extracts STsn asM9j⊕PRNG(M7j⊕Tid⊕STs)→ STsn . Then, for
all i, using the stored STs, extracted S1r and receivedM5i,M6i, the tag veriﬁes if
PRNG(M5i⊕S1r ⊕STsn)⊕PRNG(M6i⊕STs) =M ci . This validation ensures
that M5i,M6i and M9j are not tampered by an adversary during transmission.
The tag then extracts the new owner IDs and their respective secrets as M5i ⊕
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PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r) → Nsi and M6i ⊕ PRNG(Nsi ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r) → Oidi . If the
check fails for any i, the protocol aborts.
• It then removes all the previous owner IDs that are stored and inserts the new
owners Oid(1..i) and sets the current and previous shared secrets as OTs = Ns(1..i) ,
OT
′
s = Ns(1..i) . One row for each owner i is inserted in the form {Oidi , OTsi , OT
′
si}.
• Once that is accomplished, the tag generates a fresh pseudo-random number T1r
and computes RNDt = T1r ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs and ACKt = Tid⊕ (Oid1 ||OTs1) ⊕
(Oid2 ||OTs2) ⊕...⊕ (Oidi ||OTsi) ⊕PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r). For ease of representation,
this computation is shown in the Figure 6.3 as ACKt = Tid ⊕ (Oid||OTs)(1..i) ⊕
PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r). The tag then sends RNDt, ACKt to the TTP
• Finally, if the Tid was matched using STs then the tag updates the shared secret
as ST
′
s ← STs and STs ← STsn .
Step 2C: For each Tag’s reply, the TTP performs the following: It extracts T1r using
stored Tid, STs as RNDt⊕Tid⊕STs → T1r and veriﬁes if Tidj⊕ (Oid1 ||Ns1)⊕(Oid2 ||Ns2)
⊕... ⊕ (Oidi ||Nsi) = ACKt ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r). If it is successful, the tag is authen-
ticated and it also conﬁrms that the new owners and their respective secrets have been
successfully inserted in that tag. For ease of representation, this computation is shown
in the Figure 6.3 as if Tidj⊕ (Oid||Ns)(1..i) = ACKt ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r). If the TTP
does not receive acknowledgements from all the tags in the Tag-Group within a stipu-
lated time, it will restart the process from Step 2A. Otherwise, it updates the shared
secret STs as STs ← STsn . As the last step in the process, the TTP sends a Owner-
ship Transfer Conﬁrmation message to the current owner and completes the Ownership
Transfer process.
6.2.4 Ownership Test Protocol
Once Ownership Transfer is complete it is important that the new owners can verify
ownership over the tags that they believe is in their possession. For this purpose, a
Ownership Test Protocol is proposed, that serves to check if the new owners have own-
ership over the tags. It is assumed that this can be carried out in a virtual environment
without any adversarial interference [156]. Because of this secure channel assumption,
messages are not encrypted. For environments where this secure channel cannot be
assumed, a mutual authentication protocol like [38] can be used to test ownership.
For each new owner i and for each Tag j in Tag-Group, the protocol sends Oidi , Tidj
to the Tag-Group. Each tag in the Tag-Group checks if Tid = Tidj and if so, computes
Mtst = Oidi ⊕ OTs ⊕ Tid using OTs for that Oidi . Mtst is sent back to the owner. For
each Tag Reply received, and for each tag in the Tag-Group, each new owner checks if
Oidi ⊕ OTsi = Mtst ⊕ Tidj . If yes, the tag ownership is conﬁrmed and the for-loop is
exited at this point to reduce processing time. If all tags are not identiﬁed by all owners
within a stipulated time, the ownership test protocol is restarted.
6.3 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed. The security cor-
rectness of the proposed scheme is proved ﬁrst, followed by the privacy properties
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of the scheme. In the analysis, messages M0...M9 are referred without their sub-
script/superscript i/j for clarity reasons but it does not change the meaning or the
construction of the messages.
6.3.1 Security Correctness
The security correctness of the proposed scheme is veriﬁed using GNY Logic [58]. The
following GNY postulates are used in the analysis. T1 which is a Being-told Rule, P1
and P2 which are Possession Rules, F1 which is a Freshness Rule, I1 which is an Inter-
pretation Rule and J1 which is the Jurisdiction Rule. For more details on GNY Logic,
please refer to Section 3.2.1. Protocol messages are shown in Table 6.2, assumptions
used in the analysis are shown in Table 6.3, goals of the analysis are shown in Table
6.4, and the security correctness is shown in Table 6.5. The proof of goals G1 - G6 are
shown by the veriﬁcation step V4 (which is derived using V1, V2, V3); proof of goals
G7, G8 are shown by the veriﬁcation step V8 (which is derived using V5, V6, V7); proof
of goals G9 - G14 are shown by the veriﬁcation step V12 (which is derived using V9,
V10, V11) and proof of goals G15, G16 are shown by the veriﬁcation step V16 (which
is derived using V13, V14, V15).
Table 6.2: GNY Logic - Protocol Messages and parser outputs
Messages Protocol Parser Output
M0,M1,M2,M3,
M4,M c
Oi ∗(SOsn⊕PRNG(M1⊕Oid⊕SOs)), ∗(Oid⊕PRNG(SOs⊕
S2r)), ∗(S2r⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs)), ∗(Ns⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs⊕
S2r)), ∗(Tid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕SOs⊕S2r)), ∗(PRNG(M0⊕SOs)⊕
PRNG(M3⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M4⊕ S2r))
RNDo, ACKo TTP ∗(O1r ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs), ∗(SOs ⊕ PRNG(Oid ⊕O1r))
M5,M6,M7,
M8,M9,M c
T ∗(Ns⊕PRNG(STs⊕S1r)), ∗(Oid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕STs⊕S1r)),
∗(Tid⊕PRNG(Tid⊕STs⊕S1r)), ∗(S1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕STs)),
∗(STsn ⊕ PRNG(M7 ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs)), ∗(PRNG(M5 ⊕ S1r ⊕
STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
RNDt, ACKt TTP ∗(T1r⊕Tid⊕STs), ∗(Tid⊕(Oid||OTs)(1..i)⊕PRNG(STs⊕
T1r))
6.3.2 Privacy Properties
Here, the privacy properties of the proposed scheme are studied using Avoine’s adversar-
ial model [4] by applying the oracles Query (Q) (πiT ,m1,m3), Send (S)(π
j
R,m2), Execute
(E) (πiT , π
j
R), Execute* (E*) (π
i
T , π
j
R) and Reveal (R) (π
i
T ). For more details about the
adversarial model, please refer to Section 3.2.2. Note: The analysis is restricted to the
communication between the TTP and the tags. But the same principles can be applied
for the messages exchanged between the TTP and the new owners to prove all of the
security and privacy properties mentioned in Section 1.3.3. This is due to the fact that
the message construction/computation follow the same structure/principles and the ﬂow
of messages between the entities are also the same.
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Table 6.3: GNY Logic - Assumptions Used in the Analysis
No. Assumption Notation Assumption Description
A1 TTP  S1r, S2r TTP Possesses S1r, S2r
A2 TTP |≡ #(S1r, S2r) TTP believes that S1r, S2r are fresh
A3 TTP |≡ TTP STs←→ T TTP believes STs is a suitable secret between
itself and T
A4 T |≡ T STs←→ TTP T believes STs is a suitable secret between
itself and TTP
A5 TTP |≡ TTP SOs←→ O TTP believes SOs is a suitable secret be-
tween itself and O
A6 O |≡ O SOs←→ TTP O believes SOs is a suitable secret between
itself and TTP
A7 TTP |≡ O Ns←→ T TTP believes Ns is a suitable secret between
O and T
A8 T |≡ T Ns←→ O T believes Ns is a suitable secret between it-
self and O
A9 O |≡ O Ns←→ T O believes Ns is a suitable secret between it-
self and T
A10 T  T1r T Possesses T1r
A11 T |≡ #T1r T believes that T1r is fresh
A12 O  O1r O Possesses O1r
A13 O |≡ #O1r O believes that O1r is fresh
Theorem 1: The proposed ownership transfer protocol P is Existential-UNT-QSE.
Proof: Consider that an adversary has access to the Q-oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈
{Query(πiT1 , ∗)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗)}. For any protocol interaction Ii whose
length is ≤ Pchal, based on the output m2{(RNDt, ACKt)} of the Q-oracle, ACKt is
guaranteed to be not connected since ACKt = Tid⊕ (Oid1 ||OTs1) ⊕ (Oid2 ||OTs2) ⊕ ...
⊕(Oidi ||OTsi) ⊕PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r), where T1r is a freshly generated pseudo-random
number; STs is a shared-secret; STs, T1r change during each run and the XOR opera-
tion between them is further randomized using the 128bit PRNG function. Also, OTs
changes during each protocol run andOid remains constant only if the protocol were to be
run for the same owners due to an incomplete run, otherwise it also changes during each
run. By a similar argument, RNDt is also independent since RNDt = T1r ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs
where T1r is a freshly generated pseudo-random number hidden during transmission
and also STs is updated during each run of the protocol. As seen, TID is not sent dur-
ing the communication. Tid is well enciphered in RNDt, ACKt and cannot be obtained
without the knowledge of STs and T1r thus providing tag anonymity and tag location
privacy. In the forward channel, an adversary cannot impersonate the TTP by guessing
m1{(M5..M9)} without the knowledge of STs and S1r which serve as challenges to the
tag so it can authenticate the TTP. Similarly, in the backward channel, the tag challenges
the TTP using STs and T1r without which an adversary cannot impersonate the tag.
Hence, the protocol is resistent to both tag and server impersonation attacks. Therefore,
with the Q-oracle, the advantage of the adversary is negligible as the adversary does not
learn any useful information. Hence the protocol is Existential-UNT-Q.
Now, consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,
∗), Send(πiT1 , m12)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m22)} where m2{(RNDt,
ACKt)}. The adversary on sending m2 as a response to the TTP, does not receive any-
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Table 6.4: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Goals
No Goal Notation Goal Description
G1 O |≡ TTP |∼ #(SOsn ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕Oid ⊕ SOs))
O believes TTP conveyed #(SOsn ⊕
PRNG(M1⊕Oid ⊕ SOs))
G2 O |≡ TTP |∼ #(Oid ⊕
PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r))
O believes TTP conveyed #(Oid ⊕
PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r))
G3 O |≡ TTP |∼ #(S2r ⊕
PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs))
O believes TTP conveyed #(S2r ⊕
PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs))
G4 O |≡ TTP |∼ #(Ns⊕PRNG(Oid⊕
SOs ⊕ S2r))
O believes TTP conveyed #(Ns ⊕
PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r))
G5 O |≡ TTP |∼ #(Tid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕
SOs ⊕ S2r))
O believes TTP conveyed #(Tid ⊕
PRNG(Ns ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r))
G6 O |≡ TTP |∼ #(PRNG(M0 ⊕
SOs) ⊕ PRNG(M3 ⊕ SOs) ⊕
PRNG(M4⊕ S2r))
O believes TTP conveyed
#(PRNG(M0 ⊕ SOs) ⊕ PRNG(M3 ⊕
SOs)⊕ PRNG(M4⊕ S2r))
G7 TTP |≡ O |∼ #(O1r ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs) TTP believes O conveyed #(O1r ⊕Oid ⊕
SOs)
G8 TTP |≡ O |∼ #(Oid ⊕ OTs ⊕
PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r))
TTP believes O conveyed #(Oid ⊕OTs ⊕
PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r))
G9 T |≡ TTP |∼ #(Ns⊕PRNG(STs⊕
S1r))
T believes TTP conveyed #(Ns ⊕
PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r))
G10 T |≡ TTP |∼ #(Oid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕
STs ⊕ S1r))
T believes TTP conveyed #(Oid ⊕
PRNG(Ns ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r))
G11 T |≡ TTP |∼ #(Tid⊕PRNG(Tid⊕
STs ⊕ S1r))
T believes TTP conveyed #(Tid ⊕
PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r))
G12 T |≡ TTP |∼ #(S1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕
STs))
T believes TTP conveyed #(S1r ⊕
PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs))
G13 T |≡ TTP |∼ #(STsn ⊕
PRNG(M7⊕ Tid ⊕ STs))
T believes TTP conveyed #(STsn ⊕
PRNG(M7⊕ Tid ⊕ STs))
G14 T |≡ TTP |∼ #(PRNG(M5 ⊕
S1r ⊕ STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
T believes TTP conveyed
#(PRNG(M5 ⊕ S1r ⊕ STsn) ⊕
PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
G15 TTP |≡ T |∼ #(T1r ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs) TTP believes T conveyed #(T1r ⊕ Tid ⊕
STs)
G16 TTP |≡ T |∼ #(Tid ⊕
(Oid||OTs)(1..i)⊕PRNG(STs⊕T1r))
TTP believes T conveyed #(Tid ⊕
(Oid||OTs)(1..i) ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r))
thing back from the TTP. Hence the adversary is not presented with any additional ad-
vantage. Thus the protocol is Existential-UNT-QS. Finally, consider the adversary hav-
ing access to QSE-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query( πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 ,
πjR)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R)}. The freshness in
T1r, STs and OTs and the further randomization of the XOR operation between Tid and
T1r guarantees that the messages are unique each time the protocol is run. Thus, by
eavesdropping on multiple instances of the protocol the adversary is not presented with
any advantage over the QSE-oracle, thereby being resistent to replay attacks. Thus the
protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE which is the strongest security requirement when the
attacker cannot tamper with the tag.
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Table 6.5: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Proof
No Proof Notation Postulate
V 1 O (SOsn ⊕ PRNG(M1⊕Oid ⊕ SOs)), (Oid ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕
S2r)), (S2r ⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs)), (Ns⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs⊕
S2r)), (Tid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕SOs⊕S2r)), (PRNG(M0⊕SOs)⊕
PRNG(M3⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M4⊕ S2r))
M0,M1,M2,
M3,M4,M c,
/ ∗ T1 ∗ /
V 2 O  (SOsn ⊕PRNG(M1⊕Oid⊕SOs)), (Oid⊕PRNG(SOs⊕
S2r)), (S2r ⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs)), (Ns⊕PRNG(Oid⊕SOs⊕
S2r)), (Tid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕SOs⊕S2r)), (PRNG(M0⊕SOs)⊕
PRNG(M3⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M4⊕ S2r))
V 1, P1
V 3 O |≡ #(SOsn ⊕ PRNG(M1 ⊕ Oid ⊕ SOs)), #(Oid ⊕
PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r)), #(S2r ⊕ PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs)), #(Ns ⊕
PRNG(Oid⊕SOs⊕S2r)), #(Tid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕SOs⊕S2r)),
#(PRNG(M0⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M3⊕ SOs)⊕ PRNG(M4⊕
S2r))
V 2, F1
V 4 O |≡ TTP |∼ (SOsn ⊕ PRNG(M1 ⊕ Oid ⊕ SOs)), (Oid ⊕
PRNG(SOs ⊕ S2r)), (S2r ⊕ PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs)), (Ns ⊕
PRNG(Oid ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r)), (Tid ⊕ PRNG(Ns ⊕ SOs ⊕ S2r)),
(PRNG(M0⊕SOs)⊕PRNG(M3⊕SOs)⊕PRNG(M4⊕S2r))
V 3, A2, A5, A7, I1,
P2
V 5 TTP (O1r ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs), (Oid ⊕OTs ⊕ PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r)) RNDo, ACKo,
/ ∗ T1 ∗ /
V 6 TTP  (O1r ⊕Oid ⊕ SOs), (Oid ⊕OTs ⊕PRNG(SOs ⊕O1r)) V 5, P1
V 7 TTP |≡ (O1r⊕Oid⊕SOs), (Oid⊕OTs⊕PRNG(SOs⊕O1r)) V 6, F1
V 8 TTP |≡ T |∼ (O1r ⊕Oid⊕ SOs), (Oid⊕OTs⊕PRNG(SOs⊕
O1r))
V 7, A6, A13,
I1, J1, P2
V 9 T (Ns⊕PRNG(STs⊕S1r)), (Oid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕STs⊕S1r)),
(Tid ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r)), (S1r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs)),
(STsn⊕PRNG(M7⊕Tid⊕STs)), (PRNG(M5⊕S1r⊕STsn)⊕
PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
M5,M6,M7,
M8,M9,M c,
/ ∗ T1 ∗ /
V 10 T  (Ns⊕PRNG(STs⊕S1r)), (Oid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕STs⊕S1r)),
(Tid ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs ⊕ S1r)), (S1r ⊕ PRNG(Tid ⊕ STs)),
(STsn⊕PRNG(M7⊕Tid⊕STs)), (PRNG(M5⊕S1r⊕STsn)⊕
PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
V 9, P1
V 11 T |≡ #(Ns⊕PRNG(STs⊕S1r)), #(Oid⊕PRNG(Ns⊕STs⊕
S1r)), #(Tid⊕PRNG(Tid⊕STs⊕S1r)), #(S1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕
STs)), #(STsn ⊕ PRNG(M7 ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs)), #(PRNG(M5 ⊕
S1r ⊕ STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
V 10, F1
V 12 T |≡ TTP |∼ (Ns ⊕ PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r)), (Oid ⊕ PRNG(Ns ⊕
STs⊕S1r)), (Tid⊕PRNG(Tid⊕STs⊕S1r)), (S1r⊕PRNG(Tid⊕
STs)), (STsn⊕PRNG(M7⊕Tid⊕STs)), (PRNG(M5⊕S1r⊕
STsn)⊕ PRNG(M6⊕ STs))
V 11, A1, A3, I1,
J1, P2
V 13 TTP (T1r⊕Tid⊕STs), (Tid⊕ (Oid||OTs)(1..i)⊕PRNG(STs⊕
T1r))
RNDt, ACKt,
/ ∗ T1 ∗ /
V 14 TTP  (T1r⊕Tid⊕STs), (Tid⊕(Oid||OTs)(1..i)⊕PRNG(STs⊕
T1r))
V 13, P1
V 15 TTP |≡ (T1r⊕Tid⊕STs), (Tid⊕(Oid||OTs)(1..i)⊕PRNG(STs⊕
T1r))
V 14, F1
V 16 TTP |≡ Tj |∼ (T1r ⊕ Tid ⊕ STs), (Tid ⊕ (Oid||OTs)(1..i) ⊕
PRNG(STs ⊕ T1r))
V 15, A4, A11, I1,
J1, P2
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Theorem 2: The proposed ownership transfer protocol P is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Proof: In addition to the QSE-oracles, consider that the adversary also has access
to the R-oracle such that, ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R),
Reveal(πiT1)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R), Reveal(
πiT2)}. By executing the R-oracle on a tag, the adversary obtains {TID, Tid, STs, ST
′
s}
and {Oid, OTs, OT ′s} for all the owners. TID is not used in the protocol run, the se-
crets STs and ST
′
s are updated during each protocol run. Also, Oid, OTs and OT
′
s
which are the new owner IDs/secrets also change every time the protocol is run. How-
ever, Tid remains constant. Hence by using Tid, if the adversary can link with previ-
ous communications then the protocol is not Forward-UNT-QSER. This value is used in
M4,M7,M8,M9, RNDt and ACKt. However, these messages are computed using the
freshly generated pseudo-random numbers S2r, S1r and T1r which are hidden during
the transmission and are not resident data on the tags. The freshness guarantees that
the messages are unique each time and the further randomization of the XOR operation
provides additional security. Also, all the pseudo-random numbers are hidden using a
blind factor during transmission and only the entity with the right secret information
can extract them. Hence an adversary cannot trace the previous communications of the
tag using the current resident data on the tag. Therefore the advantage presented to
the adversary by the R-oracle is negligible and the protocol is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Theorem 3: The proposed ownership transfer protocol P is forward-untraceable.
Proof: One of the key requirements of an ownership transfer protocol is that the new
secret shared between the new owners and the tags should not be revealed to the pre-
vious owners or any other third parties. Also, the current secret shared between the
current owners and the tags should not be revealed to the new owners or any other par-
ties, thus ensuring privacy for both the parties. Consider the adversary having access
to QSE-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R)}
and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R)}. The adversary on cap-
turing m11 {M5,M6,M7,M8,M9,Mc} via eavesdropping attack cannot get the new
secret Ns which is enciphered in M5 and used in the PRNG operation of M6. Both
M5,M6 use the secret STs which is not known to both the owners and the pseudo-
random number S1r is hidden during the transmission. Hence without the knowledge
of STs and S1r the current owner or an adversary cannot decipher the new secrets.
By a similar argument, the current owner or an adversary cannot get Ns from ACKt
because of the unknowns STs and T1r. Also, Ns cannot be obtained from M3,M4
because of the unknowns SOs and S2r. Thus, the current owner cannot communicate
with the tag post-ownership guaranteeing privacy for the new owners. As seen in Step
2B, once the tag authenticates the TTP and all the new owners and their respective
new secrets are successfully extracted, the tag removes all the previous owners’ IDs and
their respective secrets. This is accomplished before the new owner can take ownership
of the tags. Therefore, the new owners cannot trace the past communications of the tag
thereby guaranteeing privacy for the previous owners. Thus the protocol achieves the
forward-untraceability property.
Theorem 4: The proposed ownership transfer protocol P is resistant to desynchroniza-
tion attacks.
Proof: An adversary can cause Denial of Service (DoS) attack by de-synchronizing the
keys between the TTP and the tags. Consider that the adversary has access to QS-
Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)} where m2{(RNDt, ACKt)}.
The adversary on blocking m2 from reaching the TTP, would cause the tag to update
its secret STs but the TTP would not, causing desynchronization of keys. In order to
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overcome this, the tag stores the secret from the current session STs and also the secret
used in the previous round ST
′
s . As seen in the protocol, messages are computed using
either the current or the previous secret secrets during the veriﬁcation step. If either
one of the values match the protocol run will complete successfully thus preventing
DoS/Desynchronization attacks. More importantly, the tag updates its secret STs only
if the match was based on the current secret and the TTP updates its secret only after
receiving acknowledgments from all the tags in the Tag-Group. Therefore, by blocking
m2, the adversary cannot cause a DoS attack. Finally, if a protocol run were to abort
halfway for any reason, some tags would have updated STs but not all. The proposed
protocol is resilient to incomplete runs. If the TTP had to restart the same run, the tags
that had already updated STs will not update again because now the ID will be matched
using ST
′
s. Only the tags that missed the run will perform this update. Same principle
is applied for the secret V Ts to prevent desynchronization between the server and the
tag. Also, from Theorem 1, it is seen that the protocol achieves the strongest security
requirement of Existential-UNT-QSE which proves that an attacker cannot successfully
complete a protocol run. Using these principles both DoS and desynchronization attacks
are completely prevented.
Theorem 5: The proposed grouping proof protocol P is resistant to active-attacks.
Consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,m11),
Send(πiT1 ,m
1
2)}. Assume that the adversary with the ability to modify messages changes
the Q-Oracle m11 to m
′1
1 by introducing some random message denoted by γ, to one or
more of the messages in m11 {M5,M6,M7,M8, M9,Mc} (e.g., M5←M5⊕ γ). When
the tag receives m′11 , it will not be able to authenticate the TTP when it veriﬁes if
Tid =M7⊕PRNG(Tid⊕STs⊕S1r). A valid tag ID will not be returned if the attacker
were to modify even any one of the messages in {M7,M8}. In a similar fashion, if the
attacker were to modify even any one of the messages in {M5,M6,M9} the veriﬁcation
if PRNG(M5i ⊕ S1r ⊕ STsn) ⊕ PRNG(M6i ⊕ STs) = M ci will fail and the protocol
will abort. Thus, the integrity of all the incoming messages are veriﬁed by the tag and
an attacker cannot successfully run the protocol by modifying the messages in the Q-
Oracle in the forward channel. In the backward channel, assume the attacker modiﬁes
m12 {RNDt, ACKt} to m′12 . The TTP will not be able to authenticate the tag when it
veriﬁes if Tidj⊕ (Oid1 ||Ns1)⊕(Oid2 ||Ns2) ⊕...⊕(Oidi ||Nsi) = ACKt⊕PRNG(STs⊕T1r).
These checks are performed by each entity every time a message is received during the
entire protocol run. Hence the attacker cannot successfully run the protocol by modify-
ing the messages in the QS-Oracle. An adversary with access to QSE-Oracle does not
gain anything by repeatedly executing multiple instances of the protocol by tampering
the messages each time. Thus, the protocol is completely resistent to active-attacks.
6.4 Comparison with Other Protocols
In Table 6.6, the security properties of the various ownership transfer protocols that
have been proposed are compared. For this purpose, the informal properties listed in
Section 1.3.3 are used, for ease of comparison with most other schemes that do not
specify security properties formally.
It is observed that the schemes proposed by Osaka et al. and Dimitriou fail to meet
the security property of tag location privacy while Kapoor and Piramuthu’s scheme only
satisﬁes this property under the assumption that a third party cannot eavesdrop over the
wireless channel. Forward secrecy is also not satisﬁed by both Osaka et al. and Kapoor
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and Piramuthu’s schemes. The property of forward untraceability is not satisﬁed by
a majority of the current schemes. The schemes proposed by Kulseng et al. (without
a TTP), Dimitriou, Song and Mitchell and Kapoor and Pirmuthu all fail to guarantee
this property. All schemes are protected against replay attacks using similar methods
such as nonce values and updated secrets to ensure that an attacker cannot replay mes-
sages from previous protocol sequences. Protection against desynchronization through
DoS is only achieved by two of the current schemes - Kulseng et al. (without a TTP)
and Kapoor and Piramuthu (with TTP). Further, Dimitriou’s scheme is vulnerable to
server impersonation attacks while Song and Mitchell’s scheme is only partially secure.
As noted in the security analysis Section 6.3, the proposed scheme satisﬁes all of the
required security properties.
Table 6.6: Comparison of Security and Privacy Properties
Scheme P1 P2 P3 P4 A1 A2 A3 A4
Osaka et al. [117]  No No   No  No
Fouladgar and Aﬁﬁ [51]      No  No
Kulseng et al. (with TTP). [88]      No  No
Kulseng et al. (without TTP). [88]    No    No
Dimitriou [36]  No  No  No No No
Song and Mitchell [142]    No  No § No
Kapoor and Piramuthu (with TTP). [80]  § § No    No
Kapoor and Piramuthu (without TTP). [80]  § § No  No  No
Proposed Scheme        
P1: Tag/Reader Anonymity A1: Replay Attacks
P2: Tag/Reader Location Privacy A2: Denial-of-Service Attacks
P3: Forward Secrecy A3: Tag/Reader/Server Impersonation Attacks
P4: Forward Untraceability A4: Active Attacks
: Fully Satisﬁed §: Partially satisﬁed under certain assumptions.
Table 6.7: Comparison of Performance Properties
Scheme C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
Osaka et al. [117] I 1Hash – 3 No
Fouldagar and Aﬁﬁ [51] k1, k2 5Hash or
5Encryption(keyed)
3 5 No
Kulseng et al. (with TTP). [88] In, I, s, c 2PUF
1LFSR
4 2 §
Kulseng et al. (without TTP). [88] In, I, s1, s2 4PUF 6 8 §
Dimitriou [36] I 4Hash 1 3 No
Song and Mitchell [142] I, k, c 4Hash
2Encryption(keyed)
– 4 No
Kapoor and Piramuthu (w/TTP). [80] s, k1, k2 2Hash(keyed) 2 4 No
Kapoor and Piramuthu (w/o TTP). [80] k1, k2 2Hash(keyed)
1Encryption
(keyed)
2 4 No
Proposed Scheme I, s, r, n – 5 2* 
C1: Type of secrets stored on tag C2: Type/No. of Crypto. Function on tag
C3: No. of PRNG required on tag C4: No. of messages exchanged by the tag
C5: EPC Class-1 Gen-2 Compliance * - Includes Mutual Authentication
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In Table 6.7, the performance properties of the various protocols are compared. It is
observed that most existing schemes except the scheme by Kulseng et al. employ the
use of cryptographic hash function and/or encryption functions. Firstly, implementing
hash functions on passive RFID tags is an open research problem and secondly, such
assumptions are not in conformance to EPC standards [45]. The use of PUF proposed
by Kulseng et al. [88] will require additional circuitry to be introduced into the RFID
tag and hence the cost of low cost passive tags will be increased.
The proposed scheme does not require the tags to implement hash functions. Further,
the tag computation is restricted to bit-wise operations (XOR) and 128bit PRNG gen-
eration, all of which are within the capabilities of EPC Class-1 Gen2 tags. Thus, the
proposed scheme provides the required security properties while at the same time con-
forming to EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standards. In terms of the number of messages, in the
proposed scheme, there is a total of only 2 message exchanges that the tag is involved
in (including the mutual authentication). In comparison to some other schemes this is
much lower. The storage requirements is comparable across most of the schemes.
6.5 Performance Study
In order to study the scalability of the proposed scheme, the protocol was implemented
in a simulation environment using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2). The metric of interest
was end-to-end delay which is calculated from the time the ﬁrst message is sent by the
TTP to all the tags in the group, to when all the tags’ acknowledgments are veriﬁed by
the TTP and the ownership is updated for all the owners. The end-to-end delay time
includes two main parts, the network delay and the processing time in the TTP including
the database search, the tags and the owners. The number of tags in the transaction was
varied from 100K to 1Million. The results of the simulation experiments are presented
in Fig. 6.4. Each data point corresponds to the average of 20 simulation runs. It is
observed from the results that it takes only 3.6 minutes to process up to 100K tags.
These results prove that the proposed scheme is eﬃcient and scalable, and achieves the
required security properties without compromising system performance. In Fig. 6.5, the
performance of the proposed scheme is compared with the protocol proposed by Wang
et al. [159] and Doss et al. [40]. It is noted that Wang’s hash based scheme takes about
4.4 minutes to process 100K tags and Doss’s quadratic residues scheme takes about 4
minutes to process 100K tags. It is apparent that the proposed scheme out performs
both Wang’s and Doss’s schemes. Further, the scheme handles multiple owners and also
provides individual-owner-privacy for all the owners, whereas both Wang’s and Doss’s
schemes do not provide these important features of ownership transfer.
6.6 Parameter Setting
Typically, low-cost EPC Class-1 Gen 2 passive RFID tags have non-volatile (EEPROM)
memory of 1000bits to 1kilobyte (KB) [59]. However, recent RFID application proposals
such as plans by Airbus to track ﬂyable aircraft parts and components, as well as store
data, such as information regarding a part’s initial construction and maintenance de-
mands have introduced passive RFID tags with even higher memory capabilities( 4KB
to 8KB) [162]. Also, Atmel Corporation has introduced passive RFID tags that can
support memory of between 1KB and 64KB [41].
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Figure 6.4: Simulation Results for the Proposed Ownership Transfer Protocol
Figure 6.5: Comparison of Simulation Results
The main requirements of the proposed approach is the storage of< TID, Tid, STs, ST
′
s >
once per tag and < Oid, OTs, OT
′
s > for each owner. In the proposed approach de-
pending on the memory capabilities of the tag an appropriate key length is chosen to
achieve a desired level of security. Let STs = 256bits, ST
′
s = 256bits, TID = 96bits,
Tid = 96bits and 128bit PRNG totalling to 832bits (104bytes). This is not exces-
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sive for applications using low cost tags that require security. Given Oid = 128bits,
OTs = 256bits, OT
′
s = 256bits, the storage requirements on the tag for each owner
would be 128 + 256 + 256 = 640bits which is 80bytes. Hence, a 8KB tag would be able
to store a maximum of 101 owners (8192− 104)/80 = 101).
Given the length L of 256bits for the key STs the probability of an attacker correctly
guessing STs is 2
256. This applies to guessing Ns also. Another consideration is the
length of the key required to support a certain number of tags. The design of the
scheme requires that Ts is unique for each tag in the system. This means that with
a key length of L = 256bits, the number of tags that can be supported in the system
is limited to 2256. Finally, it is noted that the use of the XOR operator raises the
expectation that its operands have equal bit lengths in order to prevent information
leakage. As all the parameters are not of equal length, a simple modiﬁcation to the
standardXOR operation is suggested to meet the requirements. As an example consider,
M5 = Nsi⊕PRNG(STs⊕S1r) where the operands are unequal. Here, it is recommended
that the largest operand is XORed with a concatenation of the XOR of the other
operands. In this instance, the implementation would beM5 = Nsi⊕PRNG(STs⊕S1r)
||PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r) ... || PRNG(STs ⊕ S1r).
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, a Secure Ownership Transfer protocol was proposed for multi-tag multi-
owner RFID systems with individual owner privacy. The protocol is ultra-lightweight
as only simple XOR and 128bit PRNG functions are employed and can be implemented
in low-cost passive RFID tags which are highly resource constrained. Importantly, the
protocol does not use hash functions thereby meeting the EPC C1G2 standard and hence
the scheme is practical. Security analysis shows that the protocol achieves the required
properties of tag anonymity, tag location privacy, forward secrecy, forward untraceability
while being resistant to replay, desynchronization and server impersonation attacks.
Simulation study of the scheme showed the performance of the protocol to be within
acceptable limits making it practical.
Chapter 7
RFID Enabled Currency
In this chapter, two ownership transfer protocols for RFID Enabled Currency are pro-
posed. The motivation for the work is presented ﬁrst, followed by a summary of the
contributions. The existing work in this area is then analyzed in detail and the strengths
and weaknesses of these protocols are highlighted. The workings of the proposed pro-
tocols are then described at length followed by the detailed security analysis using the
formal analysis models described in chapter 3. The work is then compared with the
contributions made by others in terms of meeting security and performance. A sim-
ulation study is then presented that shows the performance of the proposed protocol
in a simulated environment, followed by the recommended parameter settings for the
proposed schemes. Finally, the chapter is concluded with a detailed analysis of the pros
and cons of the proposed schemes.
7.1 Introduction
One of the major crimes the world faces today is the counterfeit currency and it is
becoming increasingly unsafe to use cash. Currencies of economically well developed
countries such as the US, UK and Australia are highly attractive for counterfeiting to
conduct black-market and underworld businesses. To date, there is no fool-proof way to
ﬁght this crime. Many of the existing methods that help detect counterfeit currency take
a certain level of expertise and a trained eye in addition to the automated tools. Thus,
most of the counterfeits go undetected by common users. This work aims to eradicate
one of the biggest crimes in the world by proposing two robust protocols for RFID
Enabled Currency. Application of RFID is extended to conducting cash transactions,
which is one of the most widely carried out everyday acts throughout the globe.
7.1.1 Protocol Application
The proposed protocols have the following two major applications:
• To handle everyday cash transactions between banks and individuals; between
banks and businesses and between businesses and individuals.
• To handle bulk cash transactions between the Central Bank and the retail banks.
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7.1.2 Motivation
The US Federal Reserve estimates counterfeits in circulation to be at a minimum of
US$40 − 50million and as high as US$108 million [76]. Havocscope [62] notes the fol-
lowing: As per the US Secret Service, Peru produces the most counterfeit US dollars in
the world; as per the European Central Bank, most of the euro counterfeits are made
in Italy and it removes 0.5− 0.8million fake notes each year; Bank of England removed
719, 000 counterfeits in 2012; 317, 000 counterfeit euro banknotes were seized in the Eu-
ropean Union, in ﬁrst half of 2013; the Reserve Bank of India estimated a circulation
of 69.38 billion counterfeits during 2011 − 2012; and a 2013 estimate states that up
to 120, 000billion Indian Rupees (US$2.2 Trillion) of currency could be counterfeits. A
2011 statistics [131] states that, US has a part-per-million (PPM) of 6.5PPM, meaning
6.5 counterfeit notes passed as real currency out of 1 million banknotes; Australia has a
rate of 6.8PPM, and Mexico has a rate of 83PPM. A sting operation conducted by the
FBI and Secret Service Agents in the Newark Port found a container with counterfeit
bills valued over US$300, 000 hidden under false-bottomed compartments [109]. Analy-
sis revealed that the counterfeits were nearly ﬂawless and only by applying sophisticated
forensic analysis the agents conﬁrmed them to be counterfeits. US FBI report says that
in 2009 alone more than US$45 million was stolen and over 140 people injured in 6000
robberies of ﬁnancial institutions [155]. In 2011, the number of robberies were over 5000
resulting in 13 deaths, 88 injuries, 30 hostages and US$38 million was stolen [154]. 2.5%
of robberies committed in the US are gas station robberies [52] often resulting in death,
injury and stolen property including cash. These statistics form the major motivation
for this work.
Also, the existing approaches to RFID Currency do not meet the security requirements
and are not EPC Class-1 Gen-2 (C1G2) compliant because they use complex encryption
schemes. Further, they focus on enabling the Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) to be able
to track the banknotes with or without the knowledge of the consumer. In my opinion,
this is a major violation of consumer privacy. It is appropriate to track banknotes/check
for counterfeits, only when supported by proper documentation that would give the LEA
the authority to do so and only on suspected individuals. Otherwise, a corrupt agent
could misuse the system with personal/civil/criminal motives thereby compromising the
privacy, security and safety of the consumers. The proposed protocols eliminate the need
for such tracking on every individual and they are based on two principles :
1. Currency changes ownership constantly from the time it is printed and distributed
by the Central Bank to the outside world.
2. There is one and only one owner for any given banknote at any given point of
time.
These two principles form the backbone of the proposed schemes and to the
best of my knowledge, they are the ﬁrst of their kind. The current approaches
to RFID-enabled banknotes are from entirely diﬀerent perspectives. It is important to
note that, though the proposed protocols use the quadratic residues property (described
in Section 3.1.2), keeping the above-said principles as the base, similar levels of security
and performance can be achieved by designing the protocols using various other methods
as in [39, 144, 145] or other light-weight cryptography methods discussed in [57].
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7.1.3 Contributions
• A secure RFID Currency ownership transfer protocol to handle our everyday cash
transactions.
• A secure RFID Currency ownership transfer protocol to handle bulk cash transac-
tions, speciﬁcally designed to handle transactions involving millions of banknotes.
• The protocols take a revolutionary approach to transform paper currency based
on the above-said principles. A full-scale implementation of the protocols could
possibly lead to a world free from counterfeit currency, pick-pocketing and retail-
store/bank robberies (which often end in fatal shootings, thereby saving precious
human lives) and also possibly curtail money-laundering to a considerable extent.
• The protocols are based on quadratic residues and operations of the tags are
limited to modulo (MOD), exclusive-or (XOR) and 128bit PRNG functions. The
protocols do not use hash functions or other complex encryption schemes and
hence achieves compliance with EPC C1G2 standard. This also makes it a viable
option for large-scale implementations on passive tags.
7.2 Related Work
The news article [178] about Euro banknotes to embed RFID tags, prompted researchers
to propose protocols for RFID Currency. Angell and Kietzmann [2] discuss the following
advantages and disadvantages of such a system. The advantages being dramatic decrease
in fraud, ability to verify a banknote’s authenticity. The disadvantages include the
government’s ability to track the banknotes, decreased anonymity, replacing a banknote
when a tag is destroyed and screening by thieves to ﬁnd out if someone is worth robbing.
It is argued that the acceptance of RFID Currency should be based on its ability to
overcome privacy objection. Booker and Bontis [11] present the societal, technical and
governmental issues and potential beneﬁts for r-money (RFID Currency). Martinez et
al. [107] discuss a Medium Access Control (MAC) method to prevent counting attacks
in RFID-enabled banknotes. Privacy is ensured by using noise tags to mask the number
of responses, because of which an attacker cannot tell if a response is real or if it is a
collision between valid tags. The downside to the protocol as discussed by the authors
is, if an attacker controls additional noise tags, it will lead to DoS attack.
Juels and Pappu [78] proposed a scheme for RFID Currency (r-money) based on the
idea of re-encryption to cause ciphertexts to change in appearance. The scheme assumes
that re-encryption could be performed by shops, banks and even by individuals. The
basis of the design are the use of digital signature to provide forgery resistance and
alteration of tag-data made possible only after making optical contact to provide privilege
separation (preventing unauthorized alterations). Banknotes have two data sources -
optical (human/machine readable) and electronic (RFID tag). The optical data contains
serial number S and a digital signature Σ = Sig(SKB, [S||den]). The tag contains
two memory cells viz., γ cell which is universally readable and keyed-writable using
D = h(Σ). The γ cell contains C = Enc(PKL, [Σ||S], r) where PKL is the public key; δ
cell contains the encryption factor r and is both keyed readable/writable using D. For
re-encryption purposes, a merchant can get S,Σ and compute D. This gives access to
the δ cell and hence by using the current encryption factor r, he can validate C. If it is
successful, a new encryption factor r′ is selected to compute a new C which is written
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to the γ cell and r′ is written to the δ cell. The LEA, in order to trace a banknote,
obtains C from the γ cell, computes plaintext Σ||S = Dec(SKL, C) where SKL is their
private key, and then checks if Σ is a valid signature. If so, the LEA obtains the serial
number S. The major drawbacks of the protocol are: it empowers the LEA to be able
to trace all banknotes which is a violation of consumer privacy; it permits a widespread
alteration of the tag information which is a highly risky proposition; it empowers third
parties (e.g., merchants) who are no more than consumers themselves to alter the data;
and it relies on them to detect invalid ciphertexts and report to the LEA.
Avoine [3] discusses several attacks on Juels and Pappu’s [78] protocol. 1) An attacker
can conduct pick-pocketing attack by simply scanning a passer-by and determine how
many banknotes he is carrying, though he cannot obtain the serial number or the de-
nomination of the banknotes. 2) Data recovery attack allows an attacker to obtain
the serial number of a banknote without optical access but by simply eavesdropping
the communications. 3) Ciphertext tracking attack is accomplished when a merchant
re-encrypts C with a ﬁxed r0, discloses r0 to another merchant thereby enabling suc-
cessful tracking of the customer. 4) Access-key tracking attack allows the attacker to
track banknotes by using the static access key D, once he captures D via eavesdropping
attack. 5) Cookies threat is due to the ability to modify the values in γ, δ cells using
D which can be used to hide additional information in those cells. 6) Denial-of-Service
Attack can be accomplished by anyone who can get D by eavesdropping and by putting
invalid data into γ, δ cells because of the ability to change those cells. DoS can also be
accomplished by killing the tags as the kill-key is only 8 or 24bits which is vulnerable
to brute-force attacks. 7) Counterfeiting banknotes is easily accomplished by putting
Σ and S obtained from clean money into the fake banknotes which will easily check
out. 8) In sleeping/dead banknotes attack, fake banknotes can be put to sleep mode
when passing through customs and woken up later. Also, clean notes (used for money
laundering) can be abused in a similar fashion.
Zhang and King [181] point out another vulnerability in [78]. Once a banknote is opti-
cally contacted the ﬁrst time and S,D are recorded, the re-encryption can be performed
at a later time with just RF contact alone. It is also noted that the LEA will not be
able to detect if two banknotes have swapped their ciphertexts to avoid lawful tracing.
This also compromises the integrity of tag information. Further, the authors point out
that there is a lack of deﬁnitive link between the real banknote and its optical text to its
ciphertext. As a ﬁx, the authors have proposed a protocol that creates a cryptographic
binding between the RF signal and the serial number which is optical. Yang et al. [169]
suggest improvements to [78] but their assumptions are not be realistic. For example,
a dishonest merchant and the ability of an attacker to eavesdrop the backward channel
(tag to reader) are considered out of scope for the system. Choi et al. [29] suggest an
improvement to [78] for protecting the location privacy of a banknote holder but the
above-mentioned issues remain unresolved.
To summarize, the current approaches to RFID currency heavily relies on the Law
Enforcement Agency and even the individual consumers to detect counterfeits. Even
then, it is shown to be ineﬀective and are vulnerable to attacks. The proposed protocol
takes an entirely fresh perspective on RFID enabled currency that it eﬀectively protects
from the above discussed attacks or invalidates the attack altogether because of the
underlying principles. We now describe the proposed protocol starting with the system
architecture design.
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7.3 The Proposed Protocol
Here, the system architecture is described ﬁrst followed by the diﬀerent phases involved
in the scheme and ﬁnally the two currency ownership transfer schemes are presented.
7.3.1 System Architecture
The key elements of the system are the RFID-enabled banknotes, RFID reader (or mobile
phones with RFID capability), wired/wireless communication systems, internet infras-
tructure and the distributed Central Bank Servers. In this work, the scope is limited to
the three components viz., RFID-enabled banknotes, RFID readers and the back-end
server. In order to ensure 24/7 availability of the system, a decentralized architecture
should be deployed using critical components such as data replication, backup/failover
processing, Storage Area Network (SAN), load balancing and ﬁltering traﬃc using ﬁre-
wall. The replicated servers should be geographically distributed across various parts
of a country. This would ensure 24/7 system availability (or signiﬁcantly reduce the
impact), in case of natural/man-made disasters or other attacks on the infrastructure.
Business Continuity Management (BCM), Incident Management (IM) and Disaster Re-
covery (DR) plans are mandatory for the system. The recovery objectives should aim
for zero-data-loss and recovery to the point of failure. Figure 7.1 shows the proposed
system architecture for RFID Enabled Currency.
7.3.2 Protocol Synopsis
Here, a general description of the steps involved in the ownership transfer phase of the
protocol is given for better understanding.
STEP 1: The following events take place in Step 1 of the protocol.
• The current owner launches the currency ownership transfer application using his
RFID-Reader-Enabled iPhone/iPad (or any RFID reader that is setup to handle
this application). He then logs-in using his user ID and password and chooses
Initiate Funds Transfer Option. He then optically scans the new owner ID to
whom the banknotes are to be transferred to. A government issued card (like an
ATM card) with a barcode of the owner ID can be used for this purpose or the
card can be RFID tag enabled.
• The current owner then takes the RFID-enabled banknotes and scans them. The
banknotes respond back with encrypted messages that only the Central Bank
Server (CBS) can decipher. After the current owner receives all the banknote
responses, he sends them as a group along with his authentication information
and new owner ID to the CBS in an encrypted fashion. This channel can be
wired or wireless. For instance, a customer going to a retail shop would typically
have only his RFID-Reader-Enabled iPhone/iPad and his wallet and would rely
on wireless communication. The reverse scenario (i.e., the retail shop giving back
cash) would typically be wired.
• The CBS then performs the following: a) veriﬁes the authenticity of the current
owner; b) veriﬁes if the new owner is a valid registered user with the system; c)
processes each banknote response to verify the serial number and its corresponding
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denomination; and d) checks if the current owner owns the banknotes as claimed.
If any of these checks fail, the CBS aborts the transaction and takes necessary
action based on the reason for failure. For example, if a serial number could
not be validated, potentially it could be a counterfeit; if denomination did not
match, potentially someone could have physically tampered the tag; if the current
owner did not own a banknote, potentially it could be a lost/stolen banknote. If
these veriﬁcations are successful, the CBS counts the number banknotes, the total
amount involved in the transaction and generates a new transaction number. It
then encrypts these messages and sends them to the current owner.
• The current owner decrypts the messages, veriﬁes if the number of banknotes
scanned and the total amount match with the banknotes on hand. If not, using
the messages received, he can ﬁnd out which banknote/s did not get scanned.
This step helps to identify the banknotes with faulty tags. It also helps to ensure
that the system has correctly obtained the amount involved in the transaction.
Otherwise, for example, let us say the current owner scanned 5 banknotes worth
$100 and the system only validated 4 banknotes worth $50. Without this check,
the current owner would have given the 5 banknotes to the new owner who would
not have actually obtained ownership of all the 5 banknotes even though he may
physically possess them, thereby resulting in an incorrect transaction. Therefore,
this step gives an opportunity for the current owner to abort the transaction at
this point so he could troubleshoot the issue. Otherwise, the current owner sends
an acknowledgment to the CBS.
• The CBS veriﬁes the acknowledgment and if successful, it sends the transaction
number that it generated, to the new owner.
STEP 2: The following events take place in Step 2 of the protocol.
• The new owner logs-in to the application using his ID and password. He then
sends his authentication information along with the transaction number that he
received to the CBS.
• The CBS veriﬁes if the new owner ID and the transaction number match. If
the veriﬁcation fails, the transaction is aborted. Otherwise, the CBS generates a
new secret key for each banknote involved in the transaction, ﬂags the banknotes
for ownership transfer and sends the banknote details such as the serial number,
denomination and the new secret key to the new owner. One encrypted message
is sent for all the banknotes involved in the transaction.
• The new owner decrypts the messages, veriﬁes the authenticity of the received
information and if successful, it extracts the details of the banknotes and generates
an acknowledgement. After taking physical control of the banknotes from the
current owner, he sends the new secret keys to the banknotes.
• Each banknote veriﬁes the received messages and if successful, it updates the
secret and sends back an acknowledgment to the new owner. After receiving
all acknowledgments, the new owner validates them and if successful, he sends
the acknowledgments that he generated to the CBS. The CBS veriﬁes if all
acknowledgments have been received, validates them and if successful, it updates
the ownership of the banknotes to the new owner, unﬂags the banknotes and sends
a transaction complete message to both owners.
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• This completes the Ownership Transfer phase. The new owner ﬁnally runs the
Ownership Test Protocol to conﬁrm his ownership of the banknotes. It is important
to note that most of these operations occur behind the scenes. From the end-users’
perspective, it only takes a couple of scans/clicks to conduct the ownership transfer.
7.3.3 The Three Phases
The scheme has 3 phases: the banknotes/users creation phase, the initialization phase
and the ownership transfer phase.
Banknotes/Users Creation Phase: Banknotes are created by the Central Bank
(CB) using RFID low-cost passive tags in uniﬁcation with the standard procedure.
When a banknote is ﬁrst printed, it is owned by the CB. Every banknote user is
required to register with the CBS to have a unique user ID Uid and a strong password
Upwd. It is recommended that the users keep their password safe and secure, change
it frequently, do not store it anywhere in the reader that is used for conducting cash
transactions and do not cache it in the application. This would be exactly like treating
an online banking password and has the same level of risks when revealed. The users
are prevented from creating multiple IDs by validating them against one or more of the
following: Social Security Number, Driver’s License, Passport Number and Voter ID.
Initialization Phase is assumed to occur in a secure environment. Each tag (ban-
knote) is initialized with {TID, Tid, Ts, Tk, den, n}. Except for Tk, all other ﬁelds are
keyed-writable and only the CB has the authority to modify them if necessary. The
CBS computes TTID = Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den and T ′TID = Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ T
′
k ⊕ den and
it stores the tuple {TID, Tid, Ts, Tk, T ′k, TTID, T
′
TID, den, Po, Co, p, q} for each banknote.
For each owner, the CBS computes UUID = h(Uid) ⊕ Upwd and it stores the tuple
{Uid, h(Uid), Upwd, UUID, g, h}. Each owner is initialized with {Uid, h(Uid),m}.
Ownership Transfer Phase has three steps. The ﬁrst step is between the banknotes
(tags), the current owner, and the CBS; the second step is between the new owner, the
CBS and the banknotes; and the third step is the ownership test protocol where the
new owner veriﬁes the ownership of the banknotes. Table 7.1 provides a brief description
for the notations that are used in the proposed protocol.
7.3.4 Secure Ownership Transfer Scheme for Banknotes
Here, the messages exchanged between the diﬀerent entities during the ownership trans-
fer are described. Step 1 of the protocol is between the CBS,Co, and the banknotes.
1.1 Co logs-in to the Currency Ownership Transfer application by entering his creden-
tials Uid and Upwd. Co then optically scans the new-owner-id Nid to whom the
banknotes have to be transferred to. He then sends an Ownership Transfer (OT )
request to the banknotes involved in the transaction.
1.2 Each banknote receiving the OT request computes x = Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den ⊕ t
where t is a freshly generated random number. It then computes x′ = x2 mod n,
x′′ = (x2)2 mod n and similarly t′, t′′. The banknote then sends back {x′′, t′′} to
Co. The CBS would use these messages to authenticate the banknote.
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Table 7.1: Notations used in the Protocol
Notation Description
CB,CBS,CBU Central Bank, Central Bank Server & Central Bank User.
TID Unique Serial Number for each banknote which is the Tag ID itself.
Ts Unique secret key for each banknote (tag).
Tid Ciphertext of TID computed as h(TID, Sk), where h(·) is a hash
function and Sk is the secret key known only to the CBS. The
hash function h(·) is used only by the CBS and not by the tags.
Tk, T
′
k Tk is the secret key for the owner and changes during every trans-
fer. T
′
k is the previous value of Tk.
den Denomination of a banknote.
Po, Co, No Previous, current and new owners respectively.
Uid, Upwd Represents the owner ID and password registered with the system,
used to connect to the CBS.
Nid New owner ID to whom the cash is transferred to.
Tnk New secret key for each banknote (tag), for new owner, generated
during ownership transfer.
Trn# Transaction Number generated by CBS of the form {Uid −Nid −
current timestamp}.
δt Time limit before CBS should receive the ownership request from
the new owner No.
Tc Transaction Complete message sent by CBS to Co and No.
(X,x′); (Y, y′);
(Z, z′); (J, j′)
X,x′ pair represents the Quadratic Residues for the banknote; the
next two pairs for the Co and the last pair for the No.
p, q; g, h; e, f ; Six large prime numbers generated by the CBS.
n,m, l n = p · q; m = g · h and l = e · f
Gid, Gs ID and secret for the group tag on a currency bundle.
TSpt, TSi Encrypted timestamp sent to the pallet tag (PT ) and encrypted
timestamp sent to the group-tags.
TS Time window set by the CBS.
TSk Secret key used to decrypt the timestamp.
P Proof generated by the CBU .
1.3 Co computes y = h(Uid)⊕Upwd⊕u and z = Nid⊕u where u is a freshly generated
random number. It then computes u′′ = (u2)2 mod m, y′′ = (y2)2 mod m and
z′′ = (z2)2 mod m. He then forwards g{x′′, t′′}, u′′, y′′, z′′ to CBS where g{x′′, t′′}
represents all the banknote responses as one group. The CBS would use y′′ to
authenticate Co and z
′′ to authenticate No.
1.4 On receiving g{x′′, t′′}, u′′, y′′, z′′ from Co the CBS performs the following:
1.4.1 num tags and tot amt are initialized to 0 and Srl# is initialized to null.
1.4.2 CBS solves for the least positive residue U of u2 modulo m, Y of y2 modulo
m and Z of z2 modulo m using Chinese Reminder Theorem [132]. CBS is
capable of doing this due to its knowledge of the factors of m which are g
and h. Using g and h, it computes the four square roots of u4 mod m and
identiﬁes the quadratic residue of u2 mod m and the value of u2 using the
Legendre symbols of these square roots modulo g and h. Note that without
the knowledge of g and h it is infeasible to calculate the value of U [132].
Similarly, CBS determines the values of Y, Z using g, h.
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1.4.3 If y⊕ u returns a valid UUID, then the owner is authenticated; otherwise the
protocol aborts.
1.4.4 If z ⊕ u returns a valid Nid, it represents a valid registered owner; otherwise
the protocol aborts.
1.4.5 For each banknote response in g{x′′, t′′}, CBS solves for X,T using p, q (sim-
ilar to Step 1.4.2). If x ⊕ t does not return a valid TTID or T ′TID or if the
Co does not own the banknote, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the banknote
is authenticated and the ownership is veriﬁed in which case, Tid is concate-
nated to Srl#; num tags is incremented by 1 and tot amt is calculated as
tot amt+ den.
1.4.6 CBS then computes S# = Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ) and Msg = (num tags||
tot amt)⊕PRNG(y⊕Y ⊕u). After generating Trn#, CBS computes T# =
Trn#⊕PRNG(y⊕Y ⊕Z) and V = PRNG(S#⊕Msg⊕T#⊕Y ). The serial
numbers, total amount and the transaction number are well enciphered here
and an attacker cannot solve them without the knowledge of the factors of
m due to the quadratic residue property. CBS then encrypts the messages
for additional protection as EUidpwd(S#,Msg, T#, V ) and sends it to Co.
1.5 Co decrypts the received message and veriﬁes the integrity of the messages by
checking if PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ y′) = V . If yes, the protocol aborts. Oth-
erwise, Srl# is extracted as S# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ y′)→ Srl# and num tags, tot amt
are extracted as Msg ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ y′ ⊕ u) → (num tags||tot amt). Co then
checks if the number of banknotes scanned and the total amount match. If not,
he knows that one or more of the banknotes did not get scanned which he trou-
bleshoots using Srl# which contains the Tid of all banknotes that were successfully
scanned. The protocol aborts at this point. Otherwise, the Trn# is extracted as
T#⊕PRNG(y⊕y′⊕ z′)→ Trn#. It is then encrypted using his ID and password
and sent back to the CBS as an acknowledgment.
1.6 CBS decrypts the acknowledgement and veriﬁes it. If successful, the Trn# is
encrypted using the new owner’s ID and password and sent to the new owner.
Step 2 of the currency ownership transfer is between the CBS, new owner No and the
banknotes.
2.1 No logs-in to the application using his credentials Uid and Upwd to decrypt the
Trn#. He then computes j = h(Uid) ⊕ Trn# ⊕ r where r is a freshly generated
random number. No then computes j
′′ = (j2)2 mod m and r′′ = (r2)2 mod m and
sends {r′′, j′′} to CBS. The CBS would use these messages to authenticate No.
2.2 If the CBS does not receive the request from No, within the time limit δt, it aborts
the protocol. Otherwise, on receiving {r′′, j′′}, it performs the following:
2.2.1 CBS initializes Srnd to null and solves for R, J using g, h (similar to Step
1.4.2). If j ⊕ r = h(Nid) ⊕ Trn#, CBS aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the
new owner is authenticated and the Trn# conﬁrms that it is a legitimate
ownership transfer request.
2.2.2 For each banknote associated with the Trn#, the CBS performs the follow-
ing: A new owner key Tnk is generated and it computes K = Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x ⊕X) and C = PRNG(K ⊕X), where X is quadratic residue for
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Central Bank Server (CBS) Current Owner (Co) Banknotes (Tags)
Step 1.1
Login using Uid and Upwd Step 1.2
Step 1.4 Get New Owner ID Nid t← PRNG()
num tags = 0; tot amt = 0; Srl# = ’ ’ OT x = Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den⊕ t
Solve u, y, z using CRT with g, h −− > x′ = x2 mod n
If y ⊕ u = UUID Owner Authenticated; else Abort; x′′ = (x2)2 mod n
If z ⊕ u = Nid Valid New Owner; else Abort; t′ = t2 mod n
Step 1.3 t′′ = (t2)2 mod n
For each Banknote-Response in g{x′′, t′′}: u← PRNG()
Solve x, t using CRT with p, q y = h(Uid)⊕ Upwd ⊕ u x′′, t′′
If x⊕ t = TTID or T ′TID then Abort; z = Nid ⊕ u < −−−−
If Co does not own the banknote then Abort; u
′′ = (u2)2 mod m
y′′ = (y2)2 mod m
Banknote Identiﬁed and Owner Veriﬁed; z′′ = (z2)2 mod m
Srl# = Srl# ‖ Tid;
num tags++; g{x′′, t′′}, u′′, y′′, z′′
tot amt = tot amt+ den; < −−−−−−−−
Next Banknote-Response
Step 1.5
S# = Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ) Decrypt DUidpwd(S#,Msg, T#, V )
Msg = (num tags||tot amt)⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ u) If PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ y′) = V
Generate Trn# then Send Error; Abort;
T# = Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ Z)
V = PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y ) S# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ y′)→ Srl#
Msg ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ y′ ⊕ u)→
EUidpwd(S#,Msg, T#, V ) (num tags||tot amt)
−−−−−−−−− >
If num tags & tot amt Not OK:
Find unidentiﬁed banknote/s
using Srl#; Send Error; Abort;
T# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ y′ ⊕ z′)→ Trn#
Encrypt Trn# using Uid & Upwd
Step 1.6 to send as Acknowledgment
Decrypt & Verify Acknowledgment
If Not OK Send Error; Abort; EUidpwd(Trn#)
Encrypt Trn# using New Owner’s ID & Password < −−−−−
Send ENidpwd(Trn#) To New Owner
Figure 7.2: RFID Enabled Banknote - Ownership Transfer Protocol - Step 1
that banknote, solved in Step 1.4.5. CBS then updates the previous key T
′
k as
T
′
k ← Tk and T
′
TID ← TTID only if Tid was matched using the current key Tk
in Step 1.4.5. This prevents desynchronization attack. The current key is then
updated as Tk ← Tnk and TTID is recomputed as TTID ← Tid⊕Ts⊕Tnk⊕den.
2.2.3 The CBS then generates a random number s and concatenates this to Srnd.
The banknotes are ﬂagged for ownership transfer at this point. CBS then
computes bnid = Tid⊕PRNG(j⊕J ⊕ s); bnd = den⊕PRNG(j⊕J ⊕ r⊕ s);
bnk = Tnk ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ r′ ⊕ s) and D = PRNG(bnid ⊕ bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J).
These contain the ownership information such as the Tid, den and the new
owner key Tnk. These messages are well enciphered and an attacker cannot
solve them without the knowledge of the factors of m due to the quadratic
residue property and the freshly generated random number s.
2.2.4 It then computes Crnd = Srnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J) and sends an encrypted
message ENidpwd( g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D}, Crnd, g{K,C}) to No.
2.3 No decrypts the received message and extracts Srnd as Crnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′) →
Srnd. Then, for each banknote in g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D}, No performs the following:
s is extracted from Srnd for this banknote. Then, it veriﬁes the integrity of the
messages by checking if PRNG(bnid ⊕ bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ j′) = D. If successful, the
banknote details are extracted as bnid⊕PRNG(j⊕j′⊕s)→ Tid; bnd⊕PRNG(j⊕
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Banknotes (Tags) New Owner (No) Central Bank Server (CBS)
Step 2.1 Step 2.2
Login using Uid and Upwd If No does not respond within the time limit δt,
Decrypt Trn# as D
Nid
pwd(Trn#) the protocol aborts.
r ← PRNG() Srnd = ’ ’
j = h(Uid)⊕ Trn# ⊕ r Solve r, j using CRT with g, h
j′′ = (j2)2 mod m r′′, j′′ If j ⊕ r = h(Nid)⊕ Trn#: Send Error; Abort;
r′′ = (r2)2 mod m −−−−− >
For Each Banknote (Tid) Associated With Trn#:
Generate New Owner Key Tnk
K = Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X)
C = PRNG(K ⊕X)
If Tid identiﬁed using TTID then
T
′
k ← Tk; T
′
TID ← TTID
Step 2.3 Endif
DNidpwd(g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D}, Crnd, g{K,C}) Tk ← Tnk; TTID ← Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den
Crnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′)→ Srnd
s← PRNG(); Srnd = Srnd ‖ s;
For Each Banknote in g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D} : Flag Tid for Ownership Transfer
Extract s from Srnd for this banknote bnid = Tid ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ s)
If PRNG(bnid ⊕ bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ j′) = D then bnd = den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ r ⊕ s)
bnid ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ s)→ Tid bnk = Tnk ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ r′ ⊕ s)
bnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ r ⊕ s)→ den D = PRNG(bnid ⊕ bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)
bnk ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ r′ ⊕ s)→ Tnk Next Banknote (Tid)
Crnd = Srnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J)
Insert Banknote Details (Tid, den, Tnk)
ACKr = Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den⊕ ENidpwd(g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D}, Crnd, g{K,C})
Step 2.4 PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid) < −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If PRNG(K ⊕ x′) = C then Else
Send Error; Abort; Rollback; Send Error; Abort;
else Next Banknote
K ⊕ Tid ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′)→ Tnk
Tk ← Tnk g{K,C}
ACKt = Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′) < −−−− Step 2.6
Endif If All ACKr Not found in g{ACKr} then
Step 2.5 Send Error; Abort;
ACKt If All ACKt Not Received then
−−− > Rollback; Send Error; Abort; For Each ACKr in g{ACKr}
If Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den = ACKr ⊕
For Each ACKt Received PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ Tid) then
If Tid ⊕ Tnk = K ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X) Send Error; Abort;
then Rollback; Send Error; Abort;
For Each Banknote Associated With Trn#
g{ACKr} Po ← Co; Co ← Nid; Un-ﬂag Tid;
−−−− >
Send Tc w/Details to Co and No
Figure 7.3: RFID Enabled Banknote - Ownership Transfer Protocol - Step 2
j′ ⊕ r ⊕ s) → den and bnk ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ r′ ⊕ s) → Tnk. No then inserts
one record for each banknote. An acknowledgement is generated as ACKr =
Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid). If there are any errors even for one
banknote, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, No sends g{K,C} to the banknotes.
2.4 Each banknote that received the new key, veriﬁes if PRNG(K ⊕ x′) = C. If yes,
the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the banknote extracts the new key as K ⊕ Tid ⊕
PRNG(x⊕ x′)→ Tnk and updates Tk ← Tnk. It then computes an acknowledge-
ment ACKt = Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′) and sends it to No.
2.5 If acknowledgements are not received from all banknotes, No aborts the protocol.
Otherwise, for each ACKt received, No veriﬁes if Tid⊕Tnk = K⊕PRNG(x⊕X).
If yes, the protocol aborts. Otherwise, the acknowledgments g{ACKr} generated
in Step 2.3 are sent to the CBS.
2.6 If all acknowledgements are not found in g{ACKr}, CBS sends an error to both
owners and aborts the protocol. Otherwise, for each acknowledgement, it veriﬁes
if Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den = ACKr ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ Tid). If the acknowledgment is not
validated, CBS sends an error to both owners and the protocol aborts. Otherwise,
it updates the ownership information as Po ← Co; Co ← Nid for all the banknotes
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involved in the transaction and un-ﬂags them. Finally, CBS sends a Transac-
tion Complete Message (Tc) with details to both the owners. This completes the
ownership transfer protocol.
7.3.5 Ownership Test Protocol
Once the ownership transfer is complete, No runs the ownership test protocol. In addi-
tion to verifying ownership, this protocol is also useful post-ownership test. For instance,
anyone who randomly takes a bunch of banknotes from his wallet wanting to know the
number of banknotes and the total amount, can simply run this protocol to accomplish
this. The steps are very close to the Step 1 of the ownership transfer protocol and hence
only diﬀerences are pointed out. Recall that once the ownership transfer is complete,
the new owner No becomes the current owner Co of the banknotes. Hence the notation
Co is used below, so it can be easily related with Step 1.
3.1 Co sends a hello message to the banknotes, each banknote responds with x
′′, t′′
and Co sends g{x′′, t′′}, u′′, y′′ to the CBS.
3.2 This step is almost the same as Step 1.4 in the ownership transfer protocol. The
diﬀerence is that the CBS has to authenticate only the Co and it does not use
Trn#, T#. The CBS sends E
Uid
pwd(S#,Msg, V ) to Co.
3.3 As in Step 1.5 in the ownership transfer protocol, if Co can successfully verify the
number of banknotes scanned and the total amount, it also conﬁrms that he has
ownership of the banknotes. This completes the test protocol and Co does not
send anything back to the CBS.
7.3.6 Bulk Transactions
Cash transactions between the Central Bank and Retail Banks can be in several millions
on any given day. To address this need, a protocol speciﬁc to only these two entities is
proposed. A signiﬁcant performance gain can be seen by adopting this bulk-ownership
transfer method. Say for example, a million banknotes are to be transferred to a retail
bank. Instead of processing one million banknotes (tags) one at a time, by grouping
them as bundles of 100, only 10, 000 tags are scanned and processed. The protocol
has two steps. In Step 1, grouping proof is collected to ensure that all the group tags
involved in the transaction are scanned simultaneously. The bulk ownership transfer
occurs in Step 2. Only the diﬀerences that are speciﬁc to this scenario are explained
in detail and only a simpliﬁed version of grouping proof protocol is given to explain the
concept. For a detailed grouping proof design requirements, refer to [145, 149]. The
assumptions made are: A currency bundle contains 100 banknotes and each bundle has
a Group Tag with a Group Code Gid and Group Secret Gs. The tags in the individual
banknotes are in sleep mode. The channels between CBS,CBU and the Retail Bank
are secure and the channel between the Group Tags (Banknote Bundles) and the CBU
is assumed to be insecure. A pallet-tag PT acts as the starting point for the grouping
proof. CBS maintains the list of group-tags that are associated with the pallet.
Step 1: Grouping Proof Collection Phase
• CBU optically scans the retail bank’s ID Nid.
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Pallet Tag Current Owner Group Tag 1
(PT) (Central Bank User) (Banknote Bundle 1)
Get New Owner Id Nid
Get TSpt from CBS
Generate PTr
PT = PTid ⊕ PTk ⊕ PTr TSpt
PM = PRNG(PTid ⊕ PTk)⊕ PRNG(TSpt ⊕ PTr) < −−
PT ′′ = (PT 2)2 mod l; PT ′′r = (PT 2r )2 mod l
PM ′′ = (PM2)2 mod l Generate G1r
X1 = Gid ⊕Gs ⊕G1r
PT ′′, PT ′′r , PM ′′ M1 = PRNG(Gid ⊕Gs ⊕G1r)⊕ PRNG(PM ′′ ⊕ TS1⊕G1r)
−−−−−−−− > Get TS1 from CBS X1′′ = (X12)2 mod l; G1′′r = (G12r)2 mod l
M1′′ = (M12)2 mod l
TS1, PM ′′
−−−−− >
X1′′, G1′′r ,M1′′
< −−−−−−−
: :
: :
: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
: Group Tag n
: (Banknote Bundle n)
: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Get TSn from CBS
TSn,M
′′
(n−1)
−−−−−− >
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - :
Pallet Tag :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Xn′′, Gn′′r ,M
′′
n
Get TS from CBS < −−−−−−
: TS,M
′′
n
: < −−−−
:
PT
′′
 , PT
′′
r
, PM
′′

−−−−−−−− >
Figure 7.4: RFID Enabled Banknote - Bulk Ownership Transfer Protocol - Step 1
• CBU now executes the grouping proof protocol to ensure that all the group tags
involved in the transaction are scanned simultaneously. CBU requests a times-
tamp from the CBS to begin the transaction with the pallet tag PT . CBS sends
TSpt in an encrypted form to the CBU . This is forwarded to the PT which does
the following:
– PT generates random number PTr.
– It computes PT = PTid ⊕ PTk ⊕ PTr and PM = PRNG(PTid ⊕ PTk)
⊕PRNG(TSpt ⊕ PTr).
– It then computes PT ′′ = (PT 2)2 mod l, PT ′′r = (PT 2r )2 mod l and PM ′′ =
(PM2)2 mod l.
– PT then sends {PT ′′, PT ′′r , PM ′′} to the CBU .
• CBU gets the encrypted TS1 from CBS and sends TS1, PM ′′ to the ﬁrst group
tag which does the following:
– Tag generates random number G1r and computes X1 = Gid ⊕Gs ⊕G1r and
M1 = PRNG(Gid ⊕Gs ⊕G1r)⊕ PRNG(PM ′′ ⊕ TS1⊕G1r).
– X1′′, G1′′r ,M1′′ are computed and sent to the CBU .
• CBU now gets the next encrypted timestamp TS2 from CBS and sends TS2,M1′′
to the next group tag. The process repeats for all the group tags. When the
message from the last group tag is received it is forwarded to the PT again which
performs similar operations.
• CBU now gathers the proof P as P = {PT ′′, PT ′′r , PM ′′, TSpt}, {(X1′′, G1
′′
r ,M1
′′,
TS1)}, {(X2′′, G2′′r ,M2′′, TS2)}, ... {(Xn′′, Gn
′′
r ,M
′′
n , TSn)}, {(PT
′′
 , PT
′′
r
, PM
′′
 ,
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TS)} }, where  represents the last message. The proof P is sent along with Nid
to the CBS.
Central Bank Server (CBS) New Owner (Retail Bank)
Receive Proof P , Nid from Current Owner
If Nid exists, then Valid New Owner; else Send Error Abort;
Decrypt TSpt, TS; If | TS − TSpt | Not ≤ TS then Send Error; Abort;
Solve PT, PTr using e, f ; Compute PMs
If PMs = PM then Pallet Tag Validated; else Send Error; Abort;
Retrieve all Gid associated with PT ;
For each Message-Group {Xi′′, Gi′′r ,M
′′
i , TSi} in P
Solve Xi,Gir using CRT with e, f .
If Xi⊕Gir = Gid ⊕Gs then Valid Group Tag; else Send Error; Abort;
Verify if CBS owns the identiﬁed Group Tag; else Send Error; Abort;
Compute Mis; If Mis =Mi Grouping Proof Failed; Send Error; Abort;
Next Message-Group ACK = ’ ’
For each Currency-Bundle-Details in Gdetid
If all Gid associated with PT exist in P then Extract each Banknote Details from bn
i
det1
..bnidet100
Grouping Proof received for all Gid associated with PT
else Send Error; Abort; bnidetx → Tidx , denx, Tkx (x = 1..100)
Insert All 100 Banknote Details
For each Group-id Giid
For j = 1 To 100 TIDs in each Giid If all Inserts are Successful then:
bnidetj = (Tid)
i
j ||denij ||(Tk)ij ACK = ACK||Gokid
Next j Gdetid Else:
Gdetid = bn
i
det1
||bnidet2 ...||bnidet100 −−−−− > Rollback Entire Transaction
Next Group-id Giid Return Unsuccessful Inserts as:
Gdetid ||Tidx ||Tid(x+y) ||...
Send Error; Abort;
If Gokid Not Found in ACK for any Gid then Next G
det
id
Rollback ALL;
Verify which Gokid Not Received; Send Error; Abort; ACK
else < −−
Update Po ← Co; Co ← Nid for all individual banknotes involved
in the transaction. Send Tc to Co and No.
Figure 7.5: RFID Enabled Banknote - Bulk Ownership Transfer Protocol - Step 2
Step 2: Bulk Currency Ownership Transfer Phase
• CBS validates the retail bank ID, decrypts the timestamps TSpt, TS using TSk
and veriﬁes if the diﬀerence is within the time window i.e., | TS − TSpt |< TS .
Otherwise the protocol aborts.
• It then solves for PT, PTr using e, f ; computes PMs and veriﬁes if it matches with
the received PM . If so, the pallet tag is veriﬁed and it retrieves all the group tags
associated with the PT . Otherwise the protocol aborts. The group tags are then
veriﬁed in a similar fashion. CBS then veriﬁes if it owns the group tag and also
veriﬁes if each Mis matches with the received Mi. Then, CBS checks to see if all
the Gid associated with the PT exist in the proof P and if so, it conﬁrms that the
grouping proof was received for all the group tags.
• CBS now processes one bundle (group tag) Giid at a time. It retrieves the in-
formation {Tid, den, Tk} for all the associated banknotes (j = 1 to 100) for that
group tag. It then concatenates the three pieces of information as one string
bnidetj = (Tid)
i
j ||denij ||(Tk)ij . Finally, it concatenates the data for all 100 banknotes
into a single string Gdetid = bn
i
det1
||bnidet2 ...||bnidet100 . CBS now sends Gdetid to the
retail bank and repeats the same process for the next group tag in the transaction.
• Using Gdetid , the retail bank extracts each banknote’s information from bnidetx (for
x = 1..100) and inserts into its database. If all inserts are successful, an acknowl-
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edgement Gokid is generated for that group tag. Otherwise, the entire transaction
is rolled back. This process is repeated for all the group-tags and all acknowledg-
ments are concatenated as one string as ACK and sent to the CBS.
• The CBS rollsback the entire transaction even if one acknowledgment is missing
for any group-tag. Otherwise, ownership information for each banknote in each
bundle is changed to Nid and a transaction complete message is sent to the CBU
and the retail bank.
7.4 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed. First, the protocol is
shown to be resilient to the attacks discussed by Avoine [3]. The security correctness
of the proposed approach is shown using GNY Logic [58]. The security and privacy
properties are then proved using Avoine’s adversarial model [4].
7.4.1 Attacks Discussed by Avoine [3]
In the proposed scheme, all banknotes are registered with the CBS and an owner is
associated with each banknote. This makes counterfeiting, pick-pocketing and counting
attacks pointless. Data recovery attacks and ciphertext tracking attacks are eliminated
due to the unknown secrets/random numbers and the strength of the quadratic residues
property. Cloned banknotes produced by an attacker using the data recovered from
a physical attack on the banknotes, will not be authenticated by the CBS. This is
because the ownership information for the banknotes is stored only in the CBS and not
on the banknotes. There is no static access-key in the proposed scheme and hence the
access-key tracking attack does not apply here. Also, the cookies threat is not applicable
to the proposed scheme as no sensitive part of the tag such as {TID, Tid, den} are
writable by anyone except by CB. The sleeping and dead banknotes is not an issue
in the proposed scheme because of two factors: 1) all serial numbers are registered
with the CBS and have owners associated with them which makes it irrelevant whether
the legitimate banknote is in sleep mode or if it is awake and 2) counterfeit banknotes
produced using fake serial numbers cannot be used in the proposed scheme since the
CBS will detect them during authentication as they are not registered with the CBS
and have no associated owners either.
7.4.2 Security Correctness
The security correctness of the proposed scheme is veriﬁed using GNY Logic [58]. The
following GNY postulates are used in the analysis. T1 which is a Being-told Rule,
P1 and P2 which are Possession Rules, F1 which is a Freshness Rule, I1 which is an
Interpretation Rule and J1 which is the Jurisdiction Rule. For more details on GNY
Logic, please refer to Section 3.2.1. In the analysis, S represents CBS, R represents the
owner and T represents the tag (banknote). Protocol messages are shown in Table 7.2,
assumptions used in the analysis are shown in Table 7.3, goals of the analysis are shown
in Table 7.4, and the security correctness is shown in Table 7.5 and 7.6.
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Table 7.2: GNY Logic - Protocol Messages and parser outputs
Protocol Messages Protocol Parser Output
x′′, t′′ R  ∗(((Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den ⊕ t)2)2 mod n), ∗(((t)2)2
mod n)
g{x′′, t′′}, u′′, y′′, z′′ S ∗(x′′), ∗(t′′), ∗((u2)2 mod m), ∗(((h(Uid)⊕Upwd⊕u)2)2
mod m), ∗(((Nid ⊕ u)2)2 mod m)
S#,Msg, T#, V R  ∗(Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y )), ∗((num tags||tot amt) ⊕
PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ u)), ∗(Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕
Z)), ∗(PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y ))
r′′, j′′ S  ∗((r2)2 mod m), ∗(((h(Uid)⊕ Trn#⊕ r)2)2 mod m)
g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D},
Crnd, g{K,C}
R  ∗(Tid ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ s)), ∗(den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕
r⊕ s)), ∗(Tnk ⊕PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ r′⊕ s)), ∗(PRNG(bnid⊕
bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)), ∗(Srnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J)), ∗(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕X)), ∗(PRNG(K ⊕X))
g{K,C} T  ∗(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X)), ∗(PRNG(K ⊕X))
ACKt R  ∗(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′))
g{ACKr} S  ∗(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid))
Table 7.3: GNY Logic - Assumptions Used in the Analysis
No. Assumption Description
A1 T  t T Possesses t
A2 T |≡ #t T believes that t is fresh
A3 R  u R Possesses u
A4 R |≡ #u R believes that u is fresh
A5 S |≡ S Upwd←→ R S believes Upwd is a suitable secret between itself and R
A6 R  r R Possesses r
A7 R |≡ #r R believes that r is fresh
A8 S  Tk, S  T ′k Server (S) Possesses Tk and T
′
k
A9 S |≡ #Tk Server (S) believes that Tk is fresh
A10 R  Tk, Tnk R Possesses Tk, Tnk
A11 R |≡ #Tk,#Tnk R believes that Tk, Tnk are fresh
A12 R |≡ R Tk,Tnk←→ T R believes Tk, Tnk are suitable secrets between itself and T
A13 T  Tk, Tnk T Possesses Tk, Tnk
A14 T |≡ #Tk,#Tnk T believes that Tk, Tnk are fresh
A15 T |≡ T Tk,Tnk←→ R T believes Tk, Tnk are suitable secrets between itself and R
A16 S |≡ S Ts←→ T S believes Ts is a suitable secret between itself and T
A17 S  Ts and T  Ts S Possesses Ts and T Possesses Ts
A18 S  s and S |≡ #s S Possesses s and S believes s is fresh
7.4.3 Privacy Properties
Here, the privacy properties of the proposed scheme are studied using Avoine’s adver-
sarial model [4] by applying the oracles Query (Q) (πiT , m1, m3), Send (S)(π
j
R, m2),
Execute (E) (πiT , π
j
R), Execute* (E*) (π
i
T , π
j
R) and Reveal (R) (π
i
T ). For more details
about the adversarial model, please refer to Section 3.2.2.
Theorem 1: The proposed protocol P is Existential-UNT-QSE.
Proof: Consider that an adversary has access to the Q-oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈
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Table 7.4: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Goals
No. Goal Notation Goal Description
G1 R |≡ T |∼ #(((Tid⊕Ts⊕Tk⊕den⊕
t)2)2 mod n)
R believes T conveyed #(((Tid⊕Ts⊕Tk⊕
den⊕ t)2)2 mod n)
G2 R |≡ T |∼ #(((t)2)2 mod n) R believes T conveyed #(((t)2)2 mod n)
G3 S |≡ R |∼ #(((Tid⊕Ts⊕Tk⊕den⊕
t)2)2 mod n)
S believes R conveyed #(((Tid⊕Ts⊕Tk⊕
den⊕ t)2)2 mod n)
G4 S |≡ R |∼ #(((t)2)2 mod n) S believes R conveyed #(((t)2)2 mod n)
G5 S |≡ R |∼ #((u2)2 mod m) S believes R conveyed #((u2)2 mod m)
G6 S |≡ R |∼ #(((h(Uid)⊕Upwd⊕u)2)2
mod m)
S believes R conveyed #(((h(Uid)⊕Upwd⊕
u)2)2 mod m)
G7 S |≡ R |∼ #(((Nid⊕u)2)2 mod m) S believes R conveyed #(((Nid ⊕ u)2)2
mod m)
G8 R |≡ S |∼ #(Srl#⊕PRNG(y⊕Y )) R believes S conveyed #(Srl# ⊕
PRNG(y ⊕ Y ))
G9 R |≡ S |∼
#((num tags||tot amt) ⊕
PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ u))
R believes S conveyed
#((num tags||tot amt)⊕PRNG(y⊕Y ⊕
u))
G10 R |≡ S |∼ #(Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕
Y ⊕ Z))
R believes S conveyed #(Trn# ⊕
PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ Z))
G11 R |≡ S |∼ #(PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕
T# ⊕ Y ))
R believes S conveyed #(PRNG(S# ⊕
Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y ))
G12 S |≡ R |∼ #((r2)2 mod m) S believes R conveyed #((r2)2 mod m)
G13 S |≡ R |∼ #(((h(Uid)⊕Trn#⊕r)2)2
mod m)
S believes R conveyed #(((h(Uid) ⊕
Trn# ⊕ r)2)2 mod m)
G14 R |≡ S |∼ #(Tid⊕PRNG(j⊕J⊕s)) R believes S conveyed #(Tid⊕PRNG(j⊕
J ⊕ s))
G15 R |≡ S |∼ #(den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕
r ⊕ s))
R believes S conveyed #(den⊕PRNG(j⊕
J ⊕ r ⊕ s))
G16 R |≡ S |∼ #(Tnk ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕
r′ ⊕ s))
R believes S conveyed #(Tnk⊕PRNG(j⊕
J ⊕ r′ ⊕ s))
G17 R |≡ S |∼ #((PRNG(bnid ⊕ bnd ⊕
bnk ⊕ J)))
R believes S conveyed #((PRNG(bnid ⊕
bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)))
G18 R |≡ S |∼ #(Srnd⊕PRNG(j ⊕ J)) R believes S conveyed #(Srnd ⊕
PRNG(j ⊕ J))
G19 R |≡ S |∼ #(Tid⊕Tnk⊕PRNG(x⊕
X))
R believes S conveyed #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕X))
G20 R |≡ S |∼ #(PRNG(K ⊕X)) R believes S conveyed #(PRNG(K⊕X))
G21 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid⊕Tnk⊕PRNG(x⊕
X)
T believes R conveyed #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕X))
G22 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(K ⊕X)) T believes R conveyed #(PRNG(K⊕X))
G23 R |≡ T |∼ #(Tid⊕Tnk⊕PRNG(x⊕
x′))
R believes T conveyed #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕ x′))
G24 S |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den ⊕
PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid))
S believes R conveyed #(Tid⊕Tnk⊕den⊕
PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid))
{Query(πiT1 , ∗)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗)}. For any protocol interaction Ii whose
length is ≤ Pchal, based on the output m2 {(x′′ , t′′), (ACKt)} of the Q-oracle, x′′ is
guaranteed to be not connected since x = Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den ⊕ t where t is a freshly
generated random number, Ts, Tk are shared secrets and Tk changes after each run. The
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Table 7.5: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Proof
No Proof Notation GNY Postulates
V 1 R  (((Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den ⊕ t)2)2 mod n), (((t)2)2
mod n)
x′′, t′′, T1
V 2 R  (((Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den ⊕ t)2)2 mod n), (((t)2)2
mod n)
V 1, P1
V 3 R |≡ #(((Tid⊕ Ts⊕ Tk ⊕ den⊕ t)2)2 mod n), (((t)2)2
mod n)
V 2, F1
V 4 R |≡ T |∼ #(((Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ den⊕ t)2)2 mod n) A2, A15, A16, V 3, I1, P2
V 5 R |≡ T |∼ #(((t)2)2 mod n) A2, V 3, I1, P2
V 6 S  (x′′), (t′′), ((u2)2 mod m), (((h(Uid)⊕Upwd⊕u)2)2
mod m), (((Nid ⊕ u)2)2 mod m)
x′′, t′′, u′′, y′′, z′′, T1
V 7 S  (x′′), (t′′), ((u2)2 mod m), (((h(Uid)⊕Upwd⊕u)2)2
mod m), (((Nid ⊕ u)2)2 mod m)
V 6, P1
V 8 S |≡ #(x′′), (t′′), ((u2)2 mod m), (((h(Uid) ⊕ Upwd ⊕
u)2)2 mod m), (((Nid ⊕ u)2)2 mod m)
V 7, F1
V 9 S |≡ R |∼ #(x′′) A2, A15, A16, V 8, I1, P2
V 10 S |≡ R |∼ #(t′′) A2, V 8, I1, P2
V 11 S |≡ R |∼ #((u2)2 mod m) A4, V 8, I1, P2
V 12 S |≡ R |∼ #(((h(Uid)⊕ Upwd ⊕ u)2)2 mod m) A4, A5, V 8, I1, P2
V 13 S |≡ R |∼ #(((Nid ⊕ u)2)2 mod m) A4, V 8, I1, P2
V 14 R  (Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y )), ((num tags||tot amt) ⊕
PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ u)), (Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕
Z)), (PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y ))
S#,Msg, T#, V, T1
V 15 R  (Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y )), ((num tags||tot amt)⊕
PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ u)), (Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕
Z)), (PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y ))
V 14, P1
V 16 R |≡ #(Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕
Y )), ((num tags||tot amt) ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕
u)), (Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ Z)), (PRNG(S# ⊕
Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y ))
V 15, F1
V 17 R |≡ S |∼ #(Srl# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y )) V 16, I1, P2
V 18 R |≡ S |∼ #((num tags||tot amt)⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕
u))
V 16, I1, P2
V 19 R |≡ S |∼ #(Trn# ⊕ PRNG(y ⊕ Y ⊕ Z)) V 16, I1, P2
V 20 R |≡ S |∼ #(PRNG(S# ⊕Msg ⊕ T# ⊕ Y )) V 16, I1, P2
V 21 S  ((r2)2 mod m), (((h(Uid)⊕Trn#⊕r)2)2 mod m) r′′, j′′, T1
V 22 S  ((r2)2 mod m), (((h(Uid)⊕Trn#⊕r)2)2 mod m) V 21, P1
V 23 S |≡ #((r2)2 mod m), (((h(Uid) ⊕ Trn# ⊕ r)2)2
mod m)
V 22, F1
V 24 S |≡ R |∼ #((r2)2 mod m) A7, V 23, I1, P2
quadratic residues property guarantees that x
′′
cannot be solved without the knowledge
of p and q. By a similar argument, t
′′
is also not connected since t is a freshly generated
random number. ACKt is calculated using Tid, Tnk, x, x
′. While Tid remains constant
between interactions, Tnk changes during each run and x, x
′ cannot be computed with-
out the knowledge of p, q. TID is not sent during the communication and Tid is well
enciphered in the messages and it cannot be obtained from x′′, ACKt without the knowl-
edge of Ts, Tk, Tnk, t, p, q. Thus, the protocol guarantees tag anonymity and tag location
privacy. The tag challenges the server by using Ts, Tk and t in x
′′. By solving x′′ using
7.4. SECURITY ANALYSIS 135
Table 7.6: GNY Logic - Security Correctness Proof (Continued...)
No Proof Notation GNY Postulate
V 25 S |≡ R |∼ #(((h(Uid)⊕ Trn# ⊕ r)2)2 mod m) A7, V 23, I1, P2
V 26 R  (Tid ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ s)), (den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕
r⊕ s)), (Tnk⊕PRNG(j⊕J ⊕ r′⊕ s)), (PRNG(bnid⊕
bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)), (Srnd ⊕PRNG(j ⊕ J)), (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕X)), (PRNG(K ⊕X))
g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D},
Crnd, g{K,C}, T1
V 27 R  (Tid⊕PRNG(j⊕ J ⊕ s)), (den⊕PRNG(j⊕ J ⊕
r⊕ s)), (Tnk⊕PRNG(j⊕J ⊕ r′⊕ s)), (PRNG(bnid⊕
bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)), (Srnd ⊕PRNG(j ⊕ J)), (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕X)), (PRNG(K ⊕X))
V 26, P1
V 28 R |≡ #(Tid⊕PRNG(j⊕J⊕s)), (den⊕PRNG(j⊕J⊕
r⊕ s)), (Tnk⊕PRNG(j⊕J ⊕ r′⊕ s)), (PRNG(bnid⊕
bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)), (Srnd ⊕PRNG(j ⊕ J)), (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕
PRNG(x⊕X)), (PRNG(K ⊕X))
V 27, F1
V 29 R |≡ S |∼ #(Tid ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ s)) A18, V 28, I1, P2
V 30 R |≡ S |∼ #(den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ r ⊕ s)) A7, A18, V 28, I1, P2
V 31 R |≡ S |∼ #(Tnk ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J ⊕ r′ ⊕ s)) A7, A18, V 28, I1, P2
V 32 R |≡ S |∼ #(PRNG(bnid ⊕ bnd ⊕ bnk ⊕ J)) A15, V 28, I1, P2
V 33 R |≡ S |∼ #(Srnd ⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ J)) A18, V 28, I1, P2
V 34 R |≡ S |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X)) A15, V 28, I1, P2
V 35 R |≡ S |∼ #(PRNG(K ⊕X)) A15, V 28, I1, P2
V 36 T  (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X)), (PRNG(K ⊕X)) g{K,C}, T1
V 37 T  (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X)), (PRNG(K ⊕X)) V 35, P1
V 38 T |≡ #(Tid⊕Tnk⊕PRNG(x⊕X)), (PRNG(K⊕X)) V 36, F1
V 39 T |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕X)) A15, V 37, I1, P2
V 40 T |≡ R |∼ #(PRNG(K ⊕X)) A15, V 37, I1, P2
V 41 R  (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′)) ACKt, T1
V 42 R  (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′)) V 40, P1
V 43 R |≡ #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′)) V 41, F1
V 44 R |≡ T |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ PRNG(x⊕ x′)) A12, V 42, I1, P2
V 45 S  (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid)) g{ACKr}, T1
V 46 S  (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid)) V 44, P1
V 47 S |≡ (Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid)) V 45, F1
V 48 S |≡ R |∼ #(Tid ⊕ Tnk ⊕ den⊕ PRNG(j ⊕ j′ ⊕ Tid)) A12, V 46, I1, P2
p, q the server authenticates the tag. An attacker cannot successfully compute a valid
x′′ without knowing these challenges an hence, the protocol is resistent to tag imperson-
ation attacks. Therefore, with the Q-oracle, the advantage of the adversary is negligible
as he does not learn any useful information. Hence the protocol is Existential-UNT-Q.
Now, consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 ,
∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m22)} where m2 {(x
′′
, t
′′
),
(ACKt)}. The adversary on sending m2 as a response to the reader, receives m3
{K,C}. K contains the new key Tnk but it is protected with x and X. C is used
only for veriﬁcation purposes. Both K,C are based on the values x,X which cannot be
solved without the knowledge of p, q. Hence the adversary is not presented with any ad-
ditional advantage. Thus the protocol is Existential-UNT-QS. Finally, consider the ad-
versary having access to QSE-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2),
Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R)}. The
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use of freshly generated random number t, the unknown secrets Ts, Tk and the computa-
tional infeasibility property provided by quadratic residue, guarantee that the messages
are unique each time and by eavesdropping on multiple instances of the protocol the
adversary is not presented with any additional advantage. Thus, the protocol is resistent
to replay attacks.
The security of the messages exchanged between the server and the current/new owners
can be proved in a similar fashion. Consider the adversary having access to QSE-Oracle
such that ωi(O1) ∈ {Query(πiO1 , ∗), Send(πiO1 ,m2), Execute(πiO1 , π
j
R)} and ωi(O2) ∈
{Query(πiO2 , ∗), Send(πiO2 ,m2), Execute(πiO2 , π
j
R)}. Here, wherem1 {(g{x′′, t′′}, u′′, y′′,
z′′), (r′′, j′′)}; m2 {(S#,Msg, T#, V ), (g{bnid, bnd, bnk, D}, Crnd, g{K,C})} and m3 
{g{ACKr}}. The use of freshly generated random numbers u, r, s, the shared secret
Upwd and the computational infeasibility property provided by quadratic residue due to
the unknown factors g, h, e, f guarantee that the adversary does not learn any useful
information from these messages. Applying the same principles as above, the protocol
satisﬁes reader anonymity, reader location privacy and reader/server impersonation at-
tacks. Therefore the protocol is Existential-UNT-QSE which is the strongest security
requirement when the attacker cannot tamper the tag.
Theorem 2: The proposed protocol P is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Proof: In addition to the QSE-oracles, consider that the adversary also has access
to the R-oracle such that, ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R),
Reveal(πiT1)} and ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R), Reveal(
πiT2)}. By executing the R-oracle, the adversary obtains {TID, Tid, Ts, Tk, den, n}. Tk
is updated during each protocol run but TID, Tid, Ts, den, n remain constant. By us-
ing them, if the adversary can link with previous communications then the protocol
is not Forward-UNT-QSER. TID is not transmitted during the protocol run and n is
already public but is large enough to be computationally infeasible to determine its
factors p, q. Tid, Ts, den can be obtained from S#, g{K,C}, g{bnid, bnden}, ACKr in
the forward channel and x′′, ACKt in the backward channel. S# is protected by Y ;
g{K,C}, ACKt, x′′ are protected by X and g{bnid, bnden}, ACKr are protected by J .
It is infeasible for the adversary to solve X,Y, J without their respective factors due to
the quadratic residue property. Moreover, these messages are computed using freshly
generated random numbers r, t, u, s which are not resident data on the tag and the fresh-
ness guarantees that the messages are unique each time. Hence, an adversary cannot
trace the previous communications of the tag using the current resident data on the tag.
Therefore the advantage presented to the adversary by the R-oracle is negligible and
the protocol is Forward-UNT-QSER.
Theorem 3: The proposed protocol P is forward-untraceable.
Proof: One of the key requirements of an ownership protocol is that the new se-
cret shared between the new owner and the tags should not be revealed to the old
owner or any other third parties. Also, the current secret shared between the cur-
rent owner and the tags should not be revealed to the new owner or anyone else,
thus ensuring privacy for both the parties. Consider the adversary having access to
QSE-Oracle such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m2), Execute(πiT1 , π
j
R)} and
ωi(T2) ∈ {Query(πiT2 , ∗), Send(πiT2 ,m2), Execute(πiT2 , π
j
R)}. An adversary (or the new
owner) on capturing m2 {x′′, t′′} via eavesdropping attack cannot get the current
owner’s secret Tk from x
′′ without the knowledge of the tag secret Ts and the random
number t which is protected in t′′. Also, the quadratic residue property guarantees that
x′′, t′′ cannot be solved without the knowledge of the factors p, q. Therefore, the new
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owner cannot trace the past communications of the tag thereby guaranteeing privacy
for the old owner. By a similar argument, the current owner or an adversary cannot get
Tnk from g{K,C}, bnk, ACKr, ACKt which cannot be solved without the knowledge of
the factors p, q or g, h (due to the quadratic residue property) and the random numbers
r, t which are well protected in r′′, t′′. Thus, the current owner cannot communicate
with the tag post-ownership transfer, guaranteeing privacy for the new owner. Thus the
protocol achieves the forward-untraceability property.
Theorem 4: The proposed protocol P is resistant to de-synchronization attacks.
Proof: An adversary can cause Denial of Service (DoS) attack by de-synchronizing the
key between the CBS and the tag. Consider that the adversary has access to QS-Oracle
such that ωi(T1) ∈ {Query(πiT1 , ∗), Send(πiT1 ,m12)} where m2{g{K,C}}. If an attacker
blocks the messagem2 which contains the new key from reaching the tag, it will result in
desynchronization of the key between the CBS and the tag. To prevent this, the CBS
stores both the current and previous keys Tk and T
′
k. The tags are authenticated using
either TTID or T
′
TID and CBS updates the previous key T
′
k only if the match is made
using the current key Tk. Similarly, if the acknowledgement g{ACKr} is blocked from
reaching CBS, it will not update the ownership information. The previous and current
owners {Po, Co} are stored only in the CBS and hence desynchronization cannot be
caused by blocking this message. CBS updates them in the last step of the protocol,
only if all the acknowledgments in g{ACKr} were veriﬁed successfully. Co can ensure
his ownership of the banknotes since CBS can authenticate them by using T
′
k and the
ownership which is still Co. Further, Theorem 1 shows that the protocol achieves the
strongest security requirement of Existential-UNT-QSE which proves that an attacker
cannot successfully complete a protocol run. Thus the protocol protects from DoS attack
and is desynchronization resistant.
7.5 Comparison with Other Protocols
In Table 7.7 the security properties of the various protocols are compared and also have
included some additional properties. Avoine’s [3] analysis of [78] shows that the latter
does not protect from counting attack, tracking attack and DoS attack. By getting
D = h(Σ) through eavesdropping attack, it is noted that the protocol does not protect
from tag anonymity, tag location privacy and counterfeiting which are very vital to the
system. The protocol provides forward secrecy but forward untraceability is not achieved
as an attacker is able to track the tag at any time once the access key D is available to
him. Choi et al.’s [29] scheme protects from tracing attack through the use of counters,
tag anonymity through encryption but counterfeiting is achieved only partially. Yang
et al.’s [169] scheme oﬀers protection from tracing attack due to the use of random
nonce. As mentioned in Section 7.2, the protocol has some impractical assumptions
leading to compromising tag anonymity, location privacy, forward untraceability and
cause DoS attacks. Zhang et al.’s [181] protocol is an improved version of [78] and oﬀers
protection from tracking and information leakage but still empowers the LEA to track
banknotes. The proposed scheme satisﬁes all of the required security properties and
in addition gives total protection from counterfeiting, cloning and theft protection. In
terms of performance, Juels and Pappu’s [78] scheme and its improved versions use PKI
architecture but the tag isn’t burdened with any of the encryptions. This applies to
Zhang et al.’s [181] scheme also where as Choi et al.’s [29] scheme requires the tag to
perform hash computation and is out of compliance. The proposed protocol is compliant
with EPC C1G2 standard since it uses only XOR, MOD and PRNG operations. Also,
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the ownership transfer principle in the proposed protocol makes it totally unique from
all the other protocols.
Table 7.7: Comparison of Security and Privacy Properties
Scheme P1 P2 P3 P4 A1 A2 A3 C1 C2 T1 E
Juels et al. [78] No No  No  No NA No No No 
Yang et al. [169] No No  No  No NA No No No 
Choi et al. [29]      No NA § No No No
Zhang et al. [181]    No   NA No No No 
Proposed Scheme           
P1: Tag/Rdr. Anonymity A1: Replay Attack C2:Cloning Attack
P2: Tag/Rdr. Location Privacy A2: DoS Attack T1:Theft Protection
P3: Forward Secrecy A3: Impersonation Attack E: EPC Compliance
P4: Forward Untraceability C1:Counterfeit Attack NA: Not Applicable
: Fully Satisﬁed §: Partially Satisﬁed
7.6 Performance Study
In order to study the scalability of the scheme, the protocol was implemented in a
simulation environment using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2). The metric of interest was
end-to-end delay which is calculated from the time the ﬁrst message is sent by current
owner to the banknotes involved in the transaction (Step 1.1), to when all the tags’
acknowledgments are veriﬁed by the CBS and the ownership is updated for the ban-
knotes (Step 2.6). The end-to-end delay time includes two main parts, the network delay
and the processing time in the reader, banknotes and the CBS including the database
search. The number of banknotes in the transaction was varied from 1 to 10, 000 and the
number of readers was set at 2 (current and new owner). The results of the simulation
experiments are presented in Fig. 7.6. Each data point corresponds to the average of
20 simulation runs. As seen from the results, it takes less than 6 seconds to transfer
up to 100 banknotes and less than 50 seconds to transfer up to 1000 banknotes. These
results show that the proposed scheme achieves an acceptable system performance and
would be suitable for handling our day-to-day cash transactions which involve a few
dozen banknotes at the most.
7.7 Parameter Setting
Typically, low-cost EPC C1G2 passive RFID tags have non-volatile (EEPROM) mem-
ory of 1000bits to 1kb [59]. However, recent RFID application proposals such as plans
by Airbus to track ﬂyable aircraft parts and components, as well as store information re-
garding a part’s initial construction and maintenance demands have introduced passive
RFID tags with higher memory capabilities (4KB to 8KB) [162]. Also, Atmel Corpora-
tion has introduced passive RFID tags that can support memory of between 1KB and
64KB [41].
The main requirements of the proposed approach is that the modulus n used to com-
pute the quadratic residues is suﬃciently large to ensure that factorization is infeasible.
Based on the recommendations in [95] it is suggested that n = 1120 − 1464bits at
minimum. Only one large prime number pair {p, q} is shown in the protocol for all
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Figure 7.6: Simulation Results for the RFID Currency Ownership Transfer Protocol
banknotes (tags). The server can generate as many unique pairs as possible, so n will
be considerably diﬀerent in the banknotes. CBS can store {TID, p, q, n, index} and
encrypted index can be stored in the tag. The tag can send the encrypted index during
the communication, and CBS can decrypt it to ﬁnd out which p, q pair to use to solve
the quadratic residues. This technique can be applied to the owners as well. Depending
on the memory capabilities of the tag an appropriate key length can be chosen to achieve
a desired level of security. Given TID of 512bits, Tid of 512bits, Ts of 512bits, Tk of
256bits, den of 32bits, n = 1472bits and a 128bit PRNG, the storage requirements on
the tag would be 512 + 512 + 512 + 256 + 32 + 1472 + 128 = 3424bits ≈ 428bytes. As
mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the protocol can be implemented in less than 2k gates and
is practical. Given the key length L of 512bits for Ts, the probability of an attacker
correctly guessing Ts is 2
512. Also, the design of the proposed scheme requires that the
values of TID, Ts are unique to each tag in the system. This means that with a length of
512bits the number of tags that can supported is limited to 2512. But the length can be
altered if required since the protocol uses less than 0.5Kbytes for the storage. Finally, as
the parameters used in the XOR operations are not of equal length, to prevent leakage
of information, a simple modiﬁcation to the XOR operation is suggested. As an example
consider, x = Tid ⊕ Ts ⊕ Tk ⊕ t where the operands are of unequal length. Here, it is
recommended that the largest operand is XORed with a concatenation of the XOR of
the other operands. In this case, it will be x = Tid⊕Ts⊕ (Tk ‖ Tk) ⊕(t ‖ t ‖ t ‖ t) which
makes all the operands 512bits.
7.8 Pros And Cons Of The System
In this section, the scheme is ﬁrst analyzed in terms of ﬁghting and preventing currency
related crimes. Consumer privacy is then discussed followed by a note on handling
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emergency situations. The technological needs is then analyzed followed by a discussion
on the beneﬁts/security provided by the banknote as a physical component of the system
and ﬁnally a brief note on how to meet the needs of the poor and needy is presented.
7.8.1 Fighting & Preventing Currency Related Crimes
The proposed system can eﬀectively ﬁght and prevent currency related crimes using
the following 7 key aspects of the system: 1) the two key principles that form the
backbone of this system viz., banknotes change ownership constantly and that there is
only one owner for any given banknote at any given time; 2) all serial numbers of the
banknotes are registered with the CBS; 3) the CBS assigns an owner for every registered
banknote; 4) it requires that the current owner, the new owner, the banknotes and the
CBS work with one another to successfully transfer the ownership; 5) the ownership
of the banknote can never be transferred without going through the protocol (except
in government approved emergency situations); 6) the CBS veriﬁes the authenticity of
both the owners and the ownership of the banknotes involved the transaction and 7)
the strength of the quadratic residues property. As mentioned in Section 7.1.2, keeping
the above-said aspects as the base, similar levels of security and performance can be
achieved by designing the protocols using various other methods as in [39, 144, 145]
or other light-weight cryptography methods discussed in [57]. Let us now see how a
full scale implementation of the protocols driven by these facets can ﬁght and prevent
currency related crimes.
Counterfeiting banknotes becomes pointless because of two reasons. The ﬁrst reason is
that, all banknotes are registered with the CBS and each registered banknote has one
owner associated with it. If an adversary were to clone banknotes that do not belong
to him, they cannot be used because the CBS will detect based on the mismatched
ownership. If the adversary were to clone his own banknotes and use that in a trans-
action, it will be successful but it will automatically invalidate the original banknotes.
He will never be able to use the original banknotes in a transaction ever again since
the ownership of those serial numbers would have already been transferred to someone
else. The second reason being, new counterfeit banknotes produced using fake serial
numbers cannot be brought into circulation because the CBS will detect them based
on the lack of registration and/or ownership. Thus, despite the massive eﬀorts taken to
create counterfeit banknotes, the attacker stands to gain nothing.
Pick-pocketing becomes pointless because the stolen banknotes would already be reg-
istered with the CBS under the actual owner. If anyone else attempts to use those
banknotes, the CBS will detect it based on the mismatched ownership. This princi-
ple can also be applied for lost banknotes. If a reader is lost/stolen, the owner of the
banknotes is still protected. The reader that is setup to handle the currency transfer
application stores {Tid, Tk, den} for the banknotes owned by the consumer. But, without
the main credentials {Uid, Upwd} of the owner, transactions with the CBS cannot be
initiated. Even if ID and password were cached in the reader, without the banknotes,
the attacker cannot successfully transfer the banknotes to himself since the protocol
requires the banknotes to initiate the transfer.
Retail-store/bank robberies often result in fatal shootings and by implementing this
system, these crimes also become pointless, thereby saving precious human lives. When
there is no way to use the stolen banknotes due to the ownership principle, there would
be no reason to commit these crimes anymore. To simply put it, if a banknote is
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possessed by anyone other than the actual owner, it would be nothing more than a piece
of paper. The system would be that robust.
Yet another biggest advantage of the proposed system is that, the ﬂow of currency in
and out of the country could be kept on a very tight leash. As the consumers (including
foreign nationals) have to go through the system to transfer cash, one could not possibly
even dream about smuggling banknotes in to or out of the country (counterfeits or
otherwise). Terrorist organizations heavily rely on such money laundering activities
for their illegal undertakings and the proposed protocols could possibly root out such
activities or curtail them to a great extent. Also, corruption within the country (bribing
for example, by people in power or by businesses/individuals) could also be brought
under control. By implementing the proposed system, the governments around the
world could be saving trillions of dollars, the money spent on ﬁghting/solving currency
related crimes and hence improve the world economy. Thus, the proposed system can
eﬀectively ﬁght and prevent currency related crimes.
7.8.2 Protecting Consumer Privacy
The proposed system does not compromise consumer privacy any more than the sys-
tems that people are already accustomed to. Some examples are: several individuals
(strangers) in all types of ﬁnancial institutions handle our investments/savings and they
know our income and their sources; individuals in the credit card companies have ac-
cess to information about our day-to-day purchases; security cameras in shopping and
business centers, bus stops, railway stations and airports enable strangers to watch our
every movement; public transportation system with automated travel cards, enables
individuals to look at our daily travel information; and last but not least, the mobile
phones and other GPS enabled devices enable pinpointing the location of an individual
with such precision. We have come to accept these advancements in the modern world
for reasons of safety, security and convenience.
Similarly, the CBS would store information about all banknotes, their owners and their
transactions. The servers that maintain such classiﬁed ﬁnancial data should be treated
as highly conﬁdential and highly secured. Activities on such servers should be extremely
restricted and logged. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) legislation was enacted in 2002
as a result of the high-proﬁle Enron and WorldCom ﬁnancial scandals, to protect the
shareholders and the general public from fraudulent practices [137]. It introduced major
changes to the regulation of ﬁnancial practice and corporate governance. Speciﬁcally,
Sections 802(a), 802(a)(1), 802(a)(2) state how electronic data (including ﬁnancial data),
must be accessed, stored and retained by corporations [137]. The CBS, the distributed
servers and all the other critical components of the proposed system should be subject
to SOX compliance and required to go through SOX audits. Six Sigma projects greatly
assist to achieve SOX compliance [163]. Also, tracing the banknotes should not be
allowed without court authorization. Strict policies and procedures should be in place
to enable tracing and all activities should be logged.
People visiting a foreign country should be able to access the currency by registering
themselves with the system using their passport. The consulates can add this to their
visa processing procedures. People ﬁling for visas already give out a wealth of their
personal information to the host country including but not limited to data about their
ﬁnancial/ﬁxed assets, bank statements, health records, employment history, paystubs
and other family details. They have nothing more to lose by going through this system.
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7.8.3 Handling Emergency Situations
The proposed system relies on the internet and computer systems infrastructure and
wired/wireless communications. The following back-up plans are suggested to handle
emergency situations such as infrastructure failure, black-outs and natural/man-made
disasters. A) Contingency currency marked as “Emergency Cash” can be used without
having to go through this system, but only when the government declares an emergency,
only in the area where it is declared and only for the announced period of time. This will
ensure that people are able to go about with their lives without interruptions (in this
respect) while containment/recovery eﬀorts are underway. B) When the users register
with the system ﬁrst, the government can issue a card (similar to an ATM card), with
their user ID, photo and other required details, printed on the card. A contingency
manual system in place would allow the RFID Currency to be used without having
to go through the system, using this card as ID proof. Consumers would ﬁll out a
simple form with both from and to user IDs and the serial numbers of the banknotes
involved in the transaction. Both parties would date and sign the form and keep a
copy as a receipt. When things return to normal, consumers would have to report
their manual transactions (both receipts and payments) to the bank. Even though the
banknotes would change hands multiple times, it would still create a chain. By entering
these transactions into the system, the link can be recreated. But this process is prone
to errors. Lost/unreported receipts could break the link, but the amount in question
would deﬁnitely not be in millions as in the case of counterfeits that happen everyday
and it has to be an acceptable loss under such circumstances. The safety and security
provided by the system in our everyday lives, deﬁnitely outweighs this minor drawback.
7.8.4 How Technology Aids the Proposed System
The proposed system architecture is based on existing, stable and well-established tech-
nologies such as the internet, networking using wired/wirless communication systems
and the IT infrastructure in general. The communication between the CBS and the
consumer can be established using wired or wireless systems and the protocol design
requires the consumers to possess an RFID reader either as a separate device or as
part of their mobile phones. RFID reader enabled mobile phones are already a reality
[30, 72, 158, 180], though it is not widespread at this time. Considering the possible sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁts of the system mentioned in Section 7.8.1, the government can push the
mobile phone industry to make the RFID reader capability a standard feature. In places
where technologies like 3G and 4G mobile phones and WiFi are fairly new, the system
can still be fully functional using wired connections and traditional RFID readers. The
proposed system is futuristic in nature but deﬁnitely realistic and it will go through an
evolutionary process before the beneﬁts can be fully reaped. By the time it takes strong
roots, further technological advancements would facilitate a smooth transition to the
new system. During this transition period, the new system can run in parallel with the
current method, just as it goes with any newly developed system.
Let us now take brief look at the read and response rate between the tags and the
reader. The performance benchmarks by Ramakrishnan and Deavours [128] show that
in a strong-in-ﬁeld region, the tag response rate is nearly 100% and number of tags read
per second could be as high as 65. One experiment was based on a population of 140
Class-1 tags and the time to read was set to 300 seconds. The total tags read rate in
population which is deﬁned as the number of times any tag in the population was read
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divided by the time, was shown to 45.6 with a standard deviation of 0.99, indicating the
read rates to be robust. Donno et al. [37] have shown the tag response rate to be between
0.85ms (millisecond) to 3.45ms. Currie et al.’s [34] experimental results on EPC C1G2
tags show a read rate of 150 tags/second and notes that the maximum read rate is 450
tags/second on such tags. It is to be noted that this would be more than suﬃcient to
this application. From an end user’s perspective, it takes only a couple of scans between
two parties to safely transfer cash to each other. Though it slightly increases the time
taken when compared to the manual system, with a stable architecture in place, it would
be nothing more than conducting a credit card transaction. Also, the idea of not getting
robbed or shot-at (for this reason), deﬁnitely outweighs this minor drawback.
7.8.5 Additional Beneﬁts & Security Provided by the Banknotes
The banknotes play a vital role in the scheme from the ease of system design and
security/privacy perspectives. Assume that a current owner sends a request to the CBS
to transfer X amount without using the banknotes. Without knowing which banknotes
to transfer, the CBS has to determine the denomination on its own to transfer to the
new owner. If that’s done, it has to notify the current owner of the serial numbers that
were transferred to the new owner. If the current owner does not physically possess
those particular banknotes at that time (we don’t carry all the banknotes with us all
the time), then it invalidates the transaction. Even if he did possess all the banknotes,
he has to manually go through them to match the serial numbers sent by the CBS. This
manual process is prone to error and complicates the transaction. Having the current
owner scan the banknotes to initiate the ownership transfer puts him in control of the
transaction. Minus the banknote, the system would resemble a credit card/debit card
transaction. Unless the governments around the world eliminate banknotes altogether
and go eCurrency completely, this physical component (banknotes) is very vital to the
system. Also, if the protocol does not involve the banknotes, someone could simply
tamper the ownership information at the system level (or use a lost/stolen reader) to
gain ownership to the banknotes. Since the protocol requires that the banknotes send a
challenge to the CBS to initiate the transfer, these attacks are prevented. Finally, every
time a banknote is transferred to a new owner, the key Tk in the banknote changes,
thereby providing privacy for both the current and the previous owners. Thus, the
physical component (banknotes) provides additional security and privacy.
7.8.6 Meeting the Needs of the Poor and Needy
In an ideal world, there would be no one seeking alms. But the reality is that, no
matter how rich a country may be, one can still ﬁnd people seeking alms and it is
reasonable to assume that this might be more prominent in economically poor countries.
Unfortunately, these people are not part of the system - they may have no IDs, no
Social Security Number, no bank accounts and mainly, no income. Obviously, every
banknote printed based on this scheme, will have one and only one owner, the owner
being registered with the system, a system that identiﬁes the individual in the society.
This eliminates the possibility of giving alms to those seeking, whose survival relies on
this for the most part. Innovative methods such as food-stamps and gift-vouchers can
be used as alternatives, methods that would not discriminate these individuals. Also,
donation boxes placed in shops, airports, temples and churches, to collect money to give
to the poor and needy, can be automated to conduct the ownership transfer.
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7.9 Summary
In this chapter, two RFID Enabled Currency ownership transfer schemes were pre-
sented, one to handle our every day cash transactions and the other to handle bulk
cash transactions. The protocols enable large scale implementation using low-cost pas-
sive tags, as the operations of the tags are limited to MOD, XOR and 128bit PRNG
functions. The protocols do not use hash functions and hence are compliant with EPC
C1G2 standard. Security analysis shows that the protocol meets the security require-
ments of RFID systems. The revolutionary approach gives an entirely new dimension
to how paper currency could be looked at in the future and the beneﬁts of the proposed
protocol deﬁnitely outweigh some minor drawbacks. Taking this ﬁrst step today could
set the world in the path to making a dream-come-true: a world free from counterfeit
currency, pick-pocketing, retail-store/bank robberies (which often end in fatal shootings,
thereby saving precious human lives) and also possibly curtail money-laundering to a
considerable extent. In future, I plan on building a working model of the proposed
system.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The main objective of this work was to develop security protocols forGrouping Proof and
Ownership Transfer functionalities in a Multi-Tag Passive RFID Environment. Chapter
1 presented a brief history of RFID, introduced the key elements of RFID, justiﬁed the
need for security in RFID, analyzed the existing security issues, described the possible
attacks on RFID systems, summarized the required security properties for RIFD sys-
tems, deﬁned the scope of the research, presented the motivation to conduct the research
and ﬁnally listed the research questions that are answered in this research. Chapter 2
provided an elaborate survey of existing work in the areas of grouping proof and own-
ership transfer. Systematic study of the existing literature was carried out to identify
the open research issues and areas that required improvement. Chapter 3 discussed the
methods used to develop the protocols and presented the formal analysis models used
to conduct privacy and security analysis. As a result of the study, three generic secu-
rity protocols (two in grouping proof and one in ownership transfer) were proposed in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Finally, in Chapter 7, two ownership transfer protocols
speciﬁc to RFID-enabled currency were proposed. Based on these, a summary of the
key accomplishments of this work is presented below.
• All the proposed schemes are ultra-lightweight in terms of the use of simple XOR,
128bit PRNG and MOD functions. These operations are easily implementable in
passive tags which are highly constrained in computational resources and hence
are viable options for large-scale implementations.
• The protocols do not use complex cryptographic schemes or expensive hash func-
tions on the tags, making them compliant with EPC C1G2 standard. All complex
operations (including the solving of Quadratic Residues using the Chinese Re-
minder Theorem) are limited to the server/reader which have the computational
power to carry out these functions. In the protocols that use just PRNG and XOR,
a blind factor is used to hide the generated pseudo random numbers during all
transmissions. So, even if an attacker captures the messages using eavesdropping
attacks, he cannot decipher anything from the messages without the knowledge of
the pseudo random numbers which cannot be obtained without the knowledge of
the secret/s.
• The security and privacy properties of the proposed schemes are formally shown
using industry accepted threat/security models such as the Avoine’s adversarial
model [4] and GNY Logic [58].
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• Accomplishments speciﬁc to the proposed grouping proof protocols are as follows:
– The protocols meet all the unique design requirements of grouping proof such
as proving simultaneity, creating dependence between tags, detecting illegit-
imate tags, preventing race conditions, eliminating unwanted tag processing,
preventing denial-of-proof attacks and completing the protocol within a pre-
deﬁned time window. Existing work in this area only partially addresses these
design requirements.
– The protocols provide forward security, which is an open research issue as
stated in [105] and [123].
– The protocols are resistent to Denial-of-Proof attacks from multiple illegiti-
mate tags as opposed to 1 illegitimate attack in [102] and many of the other
protocols do not even address this requirement.
– The protocols verify the integrity of the messages received, thus making them
resilient to active-attacks and invalid proof generation. To my knowledge, the
existing schemes do not perform this integrity check and hence are vulnerable
to these attacks.
– In addition to the above, the second grouping proof protocol provides zero
knowledge to the attackers by not transmitting the tag secret during the
protocol run while still proving the authenticity of the entities involved in
the grouping proof.
– This makes the proposed grouping proof protocols complete both in terms of
meeting the security/privacy and design requirements.
• The proposed multi-owner multi-tag ownership transfer protocol presents a sce-
nario where a group of tags is shared with a group of owners. The uniqueness to
the protocol comes from the fact that it provides privacy-among-owners, though
the ownership is shared with others. This is an important privacy requirement in
a shared environment and the existing schemes do not ﬁt this privacy model.
• A summary of the eﬀects that the RFID Currency Ownership Transfer Protocols
could possibly have is given below.
– The two key principles discussed in Section 7.1.2 form the backbone of the
schemes and they give an entirely new dimension to how paper currency could
be looked at in the future.
– A full scale implementation of the proposed protocols has a strong potential
to defeat the purpose of producing counterfeit currency or in other words
eradicate counterfeit currency altogether.
– The proposed protocols have a strong potential to eradicate pick-pocketing
and retail-store/bank robberies (which often end in fatal shootings,
thereby saving precious human lives) and may prevent other banknote
related frauds. Every individual could possibly conduct cash transactions
safely without worrying about counterfeit banknotes or getting robbed or
getting shot at (for this reason).
– Money laundering being one of the major crimes, can be substantially
reduced if not eliminated.
– The above beneﬁts could potentially reduce the crime rate around the world,
which in turn would enable the governments to save trillions of dollars that
are spent on ﬁghting these crimes.
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Based on the above, the following closing statements are presented. The primary goal
of the research was to develop Security Protocols for EPC Class-1 Gen-2 Multi-Tag
RFID Systems, limiting the functionality to grouping proof and ownership transfer. The
proposed schemes addressed the unique design and security challenges in their respective
areas. Lightweight operations such as the PRNG, XOR and MOD were used on the
tag side and the protocols did not rely on hash functions or other complex encryption
schemes. Hence, the protocols achieve compliance with EPC C1G2 standard and enable
large-scale implementations using passive tags. The proposed schemes have been shown
to meet the necessary security requirements of RFID systems through industry accepted
formal analysis models. Finally, the simulation results showed that the proposed schemes
are practical and scalable. A methodical approach was taken to achieve these goals
and the set mission was successfully accomplished in a timely fashion. Hope these
contributions add value to the existing work and take the industry one step closer to
providing secure and private RFID systems.
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